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This thesis looks at the economics of mass media from a variety of perspec-
tives. The main aim is to analyse the key factors that influence media reporting
behaviour, and in turn the impact of reportage on individual decision-making
processes.
The first chapter provides a brief summary of the contextual background of
this thesis, by presenting the main points tackled in the subsequent chapters as
well as a concise overview of the main contributions across various fields of study.
The second chapter explores the relationship between advertisers and the
media using a simple model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation
in a duopolistic setting. In this framework, when a news story is published
one firm will benefit in terms of higher consumer demand and profits, while the
other will suffer. Firms can influence the media’s decision to publish the news
story or withhold it via advertising expenditure. The main result shows that in
equilibrium when news signals conform to people’s prior beliefs, extreme or strong
stories will be withheld from publication by the media. This is because strong
stories will result in a drastic decline in profits for one firm, thus providing it with
an incentive to switch over and change its production process to mimic the other
(beneficiary) firm, thereby eliminating vertical product differentiation. Therefore,
the beneficiary firm would have an incentive to ensure that the news story is
withheld to prevent this increase in competition and the subsequent erosion of
its profit margins. The results provide an alternative rationale to explain recent
evidence on under-reporting by the U.S. media in relation to various issues like
climate change and the nutritional content of food.
The third chapter looks at the responsiveness of individual private behaviour
to media coverage of a particular news story. Survey data on charitable gift-giving
in the U.S. are used in order to analyse the impact of newspaper coverage of the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami on both the likelihood and magnitude of monetary
disbursements towards the relief effort. The identification strategy employed in
this paper exploits differences in county-level growth rates of violent crime in order
to account for the variation in newspaper coverage of the tsunami, thus circum-
venting potential endogeneity problems. The results show that media coverage
only had a modest effect on people’s decision to donate or not, but conversely
had a significant and non-trivial impact on the amount of money donated. Fur-
thermore, this impact was larger for young adults within the 25-34 age bracket
and individuals who had undertaken some form of voluntary work in the previous
year. These results hold even after the implementation of various robustness tests,
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and serve to highlight the growing influence of the media on people’s behaviour.
The final chapter analyses the impact of media reports on electoral outcomes,
and in particular the extent to which soft or sensationalist news reportage influ-
ences voting. Survey data on individual voting behaviour during the 2000 U.S.
Presidential election is used, together with a novel dataset on the amount of
coverage afforded to the Monica Lewinsky scandal over the period January 17,
1998 to August 31, 2000. We first show that Lewinsky coverage was not driven
by the newspapers’ political bias, but rather by other factors including tabloid
journalism. This independence enables us to focus solely on the impact of me-
dia reports on voting, in contrast to the rest of the literature which deals with
the electoral influence of politically-biased media outlets. We then look at how
newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky scandal influenced voting patterns in the
2000 U.S. Presidential election. To account for potential endogeneity issues we
use county-level variation in the number of deaths caused by extreme weather
events as an instrument for Lewinsky articles. We find that media coverage of
the scandal had a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood
of voting for George W. Bush, and conversely a negative influence on the prob-
ability of voting for Al Gore: this pattern is visible among both Democrats and
Republicans. The results are robust to various tests, and raise several questions
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The principal driving force behind this thesis is the simple fact that the media, in
all its forms and guises, is everywhere in today’s world. We are constantly being
bombarded with information, be it television programmes, newspapers, online
portals and social media, all available at the touch of a button or the swipe
of a screen, 24 hours a day. News consumption across all forms of media has
never been higher - this is seen in Figure 1.1 (based on a Pew Research Center
2012a survey in the U.S.) which reports that the average number of minutes
dedicated to news consumption per day has increased markedly over the last 15
years across most age groups. Given this ubiquity, a couple of crucial questions
immediately come to mind; this thesis aims to tackle both of them, given that
they are intimately related with the first one having a significant impact on the
other:
1. What type of news content is the media publishing, and what influences its
reporting practices?
2. What influence (if any) does such reportage have on people’s behaviour?
1.1 News Content and Media Reportage
The first question is related to media reportage and content, and is often framed
within the context of biased news. A proper understanding of what influences
media reporting behaviour is crucial since the media has traditionally been seen
as a gatekeeper in society (Williams and Carpini, 2000), chanelling crucial in-
formation to the masses in order to keep politicians in check and ensure that
policies are in line with people’s expectations. In other words, the information
published as news by the media plays a critical role in the proper functioning of
the democratic process.
A crucial assumption underpinning the above discussion is that the media
is independent from any external forces or interest groups which may somehow
influence the level as well as tone of news content. In reality, there has been much
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Figure 1.1: Minutes Spent on News Consumption per day in the U.S. (Source:
Pew, 2012a)
debate about the media’s independence in recent decades, which has called into
question its gatekeeper role. In a recent survey by the Pew Research Center (2013)
on people’s perceptions regarding the media in the U.S., 76% of respondents said
that news organisations tend to be biased towards one political party or another,
while 75% maintained that media reportage is influenced by “powerful people
and organisations”.
Most of this work is related to the literature on media agenda-setting be-
haviour, which promulgates the view that the media’s reporting practices help to
shape public discourse and hence the importance that people attribute to par-
ticular topics or issues. For example, Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston (2008)
state that the U.S. media played a key part in helping to raise public awareness
regarding the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005,
and in particular the shortcomings of the government’s response efforts.
Therefore, agenda-setting behaviour can be thought of as a natural conse-
quence of the media’s work. An independent, free press would tailor its reporting
practices according to public interest (although this notion is somewhat vague);
in the absence of independence then media reportage would cater to the interests
of other external forces (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010). This is where the idea of
media bias comes into play, a concept that in recent years has been the subject
of fierce debate among academics and observers from across the world. In the
next few paragraphs, I shall attempt to organise these arguments in a logically
consistent manner, since in reality the debate on media bias is deceptively diverse.
The first and most prominent type of media bias is political or partisan slant,
whereby a media outlet either covers news stories that are favourable to one side
of the political spectrum (or stories that harm the other), or else wilfully slants
its coverage to the benefit of one party. Over the years, several authors have
attempted to determine whether the news media favours one political ideology or
another, with typically varying results. For example, Groseclose and Milyo (2005)
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report that the U.S. print media has a clear liberal/left-wing bias in terms of its
news reportage, a result contradicted by Niven (2003) who finds no systematic
bias in either direction in the U.S. media.
Various factors have been proposed to explain the incidence of political or
partisan bias in the news media. The most commonly cited argument is that the
media tailors its reportage to suit the opinions or political beliefs of its readers
in order to boost circulation figures. This demand side factor, which has been
used by the likes of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) and Mullainathan and Shleifer
(2005), is the result of a well-known fact in psychology that people tend to prefer
reading information that conforms to their prior beliefs or expectations, rather
than contradictory news (Lord, Ross, and Lepper, 1979). Therefore, under this
scenario partisan slant occurs due to readers’ desire for confirmatory information,
rather than any external or outside forces directing the media’s reportage.
A number of other determinants of political media bias have also been pro-
posed, which can all broadly be classified as supply side factors. These include
the political leanings of the newspaper editor, the beliefs of the owners, as well
as the influence of politically driven advertisers. The common thread with these
supply side factors is that they all involve some sort of deliberate attempt at
manipulating the news to suit the requirements of a particular interest group, as
opposed to simply tailoring reportage to audience preferences in order to boost
market shares. The evidence of such bias is mixed, in part reflecting the diffi-
culty involved in determining both the existence and source of biased news. For
example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) find little to no evidence that political
bias in news reportage is being driven by ownership beliefs in the U.S. print me-
dia, instead contending that this is mainly the result of demand driven concerns.
Conversely, Tella and Franceschelli (2011) find a negative correlation between the
level of monthly government advertising in the four major national newspapers
in Argentina and front-page coverage of government corruption scandals.
The second type of media bias is advertiser driven or commercial media bias,
whereby media reportage is influenced by advertiser interests. In essence this
means that the media would, at the behest of its advertisers, avoid covering
news stories which would somehow be detrimental to the advertiser, and instead
ramp up coverage of stories that paint the advertiser in a positive light. For
example, a media outlet would avoid covering news of any oil spills caused by one
of its oil producing advertisers, and instead focus on more positive elements like
technological innovations or philanthropic initiatives.
An interesting observation to be made is that commercial media bias can be
thought of as a by-product of the media’s political independence. Petrova (2011)
relates how in the nineteenth century, most newspapers in the U.S. were affiliated
with one political party or another due to the fact that a large proportion of their
revenue was coming from political sponsorships. It was only with the advent
of advertising from private firms, which started to increase towards the latter
part of the century, that newspapers emerged as politically independent and thus
capable of fulfilling their gatekeeper role in society without any interferences. In
fact, Petrova (2011) shows that places with higher local advertising rates were
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more likely to have newspapers that were independent from political parties.
Therefore, in many respects advertising has been crucial in allowing media
outlets to acquire independence from political interference. However, many (e.g.
Chomsky and Herman, 1988) contend that although the media may technically
be free from political influence, in reality the rise of advertising has only led to a
shift in influence from the government to the boardroom, with private interests
dictating public discourse via the media.
The existence or otherwise of commercial media bias is open to debate, once
again reflecting the general difficulty involved in analysing such phenomena empir-
ically, as well as more general arguments that question its validity. Sutter (2002)
states that advertising cannot significantly affect media reporting behaviour since
the promotion of pro-industry information (or conversely the suppression of anti-
industry news) is a public good that requires large-scale coordination across firms
in order to succeed. Otherwise, the incentive to free ride would prevent such ac-
tivities from occurring. In addition, news stories that are beneficial to a particular
firm are likely to have a negative impact on another firm, which in turn may lead
the latter firm to promote its own agenda, with the net result leaving the original
status quo unchanged.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence supporting the existence of commercial
media bias in certain situations. For example Fletcher (2003) finds that editorial
positions in the leading North American medical journals are partially influenced
by the requirements of their advertisers, which may lead to conflicting preferences
since many of the leading North American journals within this field only accept
advertisements for medical products in their publications.
The third and final (in this context) type of media bias is sensationalism or
the “dumbing-down” of news content. This is related to the idea that over the
last few decades there has been a marked shift in media content away from factual
or ‘hard’ news in favour of more soft or vacuous content. Thus for example the
media would, under this idea, increasingly focus its coverage on entertainment
or personal interest news stories (like sex scandals or gossip) at the expense of
political news or international affairs.
Various arguments have been cited in order to support this dumbing-down
hypothesis of news content. Recall Figure 1.1, where it was shown that news
consumption across all media has increased over time. This should technically
bode well in terms of how well-informed the public is with regards to current
affairs, which in turn should lead to improved electoral outcomes. However,
Figure 1.2 contradicts this assertion, showing that knowledge of public affairs in
the U.S. (based on a Pew Research Center (2007) survey) is actually shrinking.
This supports the claim that although the news is more accessible and readily
available than ever before, the quality of the news content is on the decline due
to this increased focus on soft news at the expense of hard news.
In addition, Hamilton (2004) finds a distinct shift from hard political news to
entertainment stories in U.S. network evening news programmes over the period
1969 to 1998. The author cites a number of reasons to explain this change in
content, including deregulation of media markets in the U.S., higher concentration
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Figure 1.2: Knowledge of Current Affairs in the U.S. (Source: Pew, 2007) 1
of media ownership and advertising. In fact, advertising has garnered increased
attention within the scope of dumbed-down news content. Bagdikian (2000)
argues that the media’s main tradeable service is not the provision of news but
rather the provision of potential consumers for its advertisers. Therefore, the
media will avoid any news that may somehow antagonise its advertisers and
instead focus on uncontroversial content, i.e. soft news. Hence, the dumbing-
down of news content can be considered as a subtle subset of commercial media
bias.
To summarise, the concept of biased media reportage has generated a vibrant
debate among academics and the general public alike, and is set to continue in
the future due to the media’s ever-growing presence. Recent advances in auto-
mated content analysis and computational linguistics, such as those described in
Hansen et al. (2014), coupled with improvements in online news archiving, should
assist in the derivation of more reliable media bias measures (across all forms of
bias). Although plenty of attention has been afforded to the media’s supposed
partisan/political slant, there are still several aspects of media bias that are ripe
for further research. In particular, much work still needs to be done in terms of
understanding the complex relationship between the media and its diverse array
of advertisers, often with conflicting publication preferences, both from a the-
oretical and empirical perspective. In addition, a more thorough treatment is
required of the underlying causes and existence of dumbed-down news content
across all media forms.
1.2 Media Influence and Individual Behaviour
So far we have dealt with the media’s reporting practices and the main determi-
nants of media bias. I now turn to the second question listed above, namely the
impact of media reportage on individual behaviour. The idea is that although
1In each case, survey participants were specifically asked to name the current Vice-President
of the U.S., their state governor and the current Russian President.
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it is important to assess the reporting behaviour of the media, such an exercise
would be rendered almost futile unless such reportage has any visible effect on
people’s actions or decisions.
The study of media influence, both from a theoretical and empirical perspec-
tive, has a long history across several academic fields. Perhaps the first proper
studies within this context are those by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) and Berelson et al.
(1954) who look at the effects of media communications on the 1940 and 1948
U.S. Presidential elections. In fact, a large proportion of studies dealing with
media influence invariably focus on its effects on voting and electoral outcomes.
Authors like Bartels (1993) and Shields, Goidel, and Tadlock (1995) have all
found that media reportage plays a key role in shaping public opinion regarding
electoral candidates and has a significant impact on final voting decisions.
Over the years, other authors have looked beyond the confines of electoral
outcomes to analyse the effect of media reportage on other types of individual
behaviour. This has created a vast literature on a wide array of topics including
health, violence and government policy. Within the sphere of public health, Agli-
ata and Tantleff-Dunn (2004) find that men who were exposed to media messages
or advertisements espousing ideal body images developed higher levels of muscu-
lar dissatisfaction and became significantly more depressed, relative to a control
group who were only exposed to neutral images. Similarly, Villani (2001) finds
that children and adolescents exposed to violence, alcohol and tobacco abuse, sex-
ual activity and other so-called “risky behaviour” through various forms of mass
media communications are more likely to engage in such behaviour themselves.
At this point one might think that the media is the root of all evil in today’s
world due to the rather depressing portrayal of media influence depicted thus
far. However, it is important to note that a substantial portion of this literature
has also been dedicated to demonstrating the ability of the media to act as an
agent of positive change within society. For example Jaramillo (2001) reports
that mass media communications related to tuberculosis (TB) awareness and
education in Cali, Colombia resulted in a significant increase in the number of
TB smear tests undertaken as well as a 52% increase in the number of new TB
cases diagnosed, although these benefits were relatively short-lived. Similarly,
Stromberg (2004) shows that increased access to to the media leads to higher
government responsiveness and accountability, providing evidence that during
the 1930s the U.S. government allocated higher levels of relief funds as part of
the Depression-era New Deal programme to those counties with greater access to
radio.
Although there is substantial evidence showing that media reportage does
have a tangible and significant effect on behaviour, it is worth noting that this
is by no means the general consensus. Indeed, several authors have sought to
downplay or even dismiss the idea that the media can have any impact on people’s
decisions or opinions. One of the first studies in this vein was by Trenaman and
McQuail (1961) who looked at the influence of television broadcasts on UK voters
in the 1959 General Election, finding no evidence of any change in voter attitudes
towards each political party, although it did increase their general knowledge of
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party politics. In addition, Mermin (1997) finds that media coverage of the 1992
civil war in Somalia did not mobilise U.S. government intervention, contrary to
popular opinion. Rather, it was politicians in Washington who set the agenda for
foreign policy, which in turn resulted in greater media coverage of the crisis.
This discussion raises several interesting points regarding the exact nature of
media influence and the varying forms that it can assume. Firstly, and perhaps
most obviously, does the media have the same impact on all people across all sit-
uations? This question is critical since it seems unreasonable to assume that the
media would have a homogenous, blanket influence regardless of people’s socio-
economic background or the issue being reported. In fact, during the height of
public concern regarding media influence, largely driven by the expansion of tele-
vision across the globe, Klapper (1960) commented on how the media must not
be considered in isolation, but rather within its proper social context and in par-
ticular the way in which it interacts with socio-economic forces and institutional
characteristics.
Therefore, it is important to look at the extent to which media influence varies
across individuals and issues. Iyengar and Kinder (2010) state that traditionally
the bulk of this literature has focussed on heterogeneity of influence on the basis
of education, whereby it is asserted that people with a higher level of educational
attainment are less susceptible to media influence due to their increased cognitive
abilities and skills (collectively referred to as cognitive sophistication). However,
the authors cite various alternative theories that have been proposed over the
years, most of which are related to differences in media consumption patterns.
One such theory is by MacKuen and Combs (1981), whose so-called “atten-
tiveness model” states that people who are highly motivated or engaged by a
particular topic will actively seek out such stories in the media, and will therefore
be more susceptible to their influence. Thus for example, an individual who is
concerned by matters related to obesity or fitness is more likely to read media
stories on nutrition or body image, which in turn may affect his/her behaviour.
Another theory is by Erbring, Goldenburg, and Miller (1980) whose “issue sen-
sitivity” hypothesis explains that people are more likely to be affected by stories
which deal with issues that they consider (both consciously and subconsciously)
to be salient or relevant to their present situation. For example, according to
this hypothesis unemployed people’s perception of the current government may
be significantly influenced by media reports on any cuts or increases in welfare
benefits.
Hence, it is entirely plausible that the extent of media influence depends on
a whole host of factors related to both the individual and the nature of the news
story. A second important question to consider is which media are more influ-
ential in terms of altering people’s behaviour. This question has cropped up
consistently throughout the last century with the introduction of new media like
radio and television, and is particularly relevant in the current context given the
rise of online news portals and social media which have to some degree revolu-
tionised the way in which the news is consumed. In a global survey of media
consumption patterns and the relative importance that people attach to each
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medium, McRoberts and Terhanian (2008) find that the internet is almost twice
as influential (in terms of daily time spent on each medium as well as influence
over purchases) as television and approximately ten times more influential than
newspapers or magazines. Needless to say, these results have important implica-
tions for future research within this field, and highlight the potential sensitivity
of any analysis on media influence to the type of medium under consideration.
One final question to consider is related to the impact of biased media re-
portage (as described above) on people’s behaviour. So far I (and indeed, most of
the literature) have avoided commenting on the actual content of media reports
when discussing their influence on people. However, in light of the extensive
discussion presented above on media bias, this question assumes significant im-
portance since it deals with people’s susceptibility to propaganda (Chomsky and
Herman, 1988) and their ability to carefully consider and filter the information
being presented to them by the media.
In this regard, the literature on the extent to which media bias influences
behaviour is somewhat limited. Certainly, there is a clear paucity of studies on
people’s susceptibility to commercial media bias as well as soft news reportage.
This reflects both the difficulty involved in actually gauging the existence or
otherwise of these two types of biases, as well as identifying the exact causal
relationship between biased coverage and behaviour in such cases. Rather, this
literature is mainly focussed on whether politically biased news reportage has any
impact on people’s voting decisions.
The evidence regarding the electoral implications of partisan media bias is
mixed. On the one hand, Druckman and Parkin (2005) find that the editorial
slant of newspaper electoral campaign coverage has a significant impact on vot-
ing patterns. Similarly, Martin and Yurukoglu (2014) report that watching four
additional minutes of Fox News per week increases the probability of voting Re-
publican by almost one percentage point, echoing the results obtained earlier by
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007).
On the other hand, a number of authors have found no evidence of changes
in people’s voting induced by politically slanted news reportage. For example
Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009) conduct a field experiment in Virginia to as-
sess the impact of exposure to politically biased newspapers (i.e. the Washington
Post versus the Washington Times) on voting in the 2005 gubernatorial election,
finding no significant change in voting patterns across the two treatments. This
fits in with other empirical findings related to the so-called “filter hypothesis”
(Schmitt-Beck, 2003) which postulates that people’s interactions and conversa-
tions with others (family, friends, colleagues, etc.) are crucial to their general
acceptance and interpretation of political information derived from the media,
which could potentially help to filter out the effects of biased news.
The exact nature of the media’s influence over individual behaviour is still up
for debate, providing significant scope for further work within this field. Perhaps
the most glaring gap in the literature is related to the impact of news reportage on
economic choices, which has for some reason been largely neglected. In addition,
more work still needs to be done in order to determine people’s susceptibility to
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biased news coverage, across all forms of media bias as defined earlier, particularly
with regards to more recent phenomena like commercial media bias and soft news
reportage.
1.3 Overview of Thesis
Chapter 2 deals with the material covered in Section 1.1 above, by looking at how
advertisers may influence media reporting behaviour. The focus is specifically
on the advertiser-media relationship since advertising revenue accounts for the
majority of media organisations’ annual income, thereby indirectly bestowing
significant clout and influence on these firms. In this chapter, I develop a simple
model whereby a monopolist media firm receives a noisy signal regarding the true
state of the world, and must decide whether to publish the news or withhold it.
We then have two horizontally and vertically-differentiated advertisers who have
conflicting incentives with regards to the publication or not of the news signal -
one firm benefits, while the other would be worse off.
This represents a clear departure from the literature on commercial media
bias, and mirrors the real-world situation where each media firm has a plethora of
advertisers with differing preferences regarding which stories to publish and which
to withhold. Similarly, consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their horizontal
preferences for each advertiser’s goods, but share a common prior belief regarding
the true state of the world, whose realisation will in turn influence the relative
utility they derive from either firm’s product offering. Each firm may influence
the media’s reporting decision depending on the size of the advertising fee offered.
The main result is that extreme or strong news signals that conform to consumers’
prior beliefs will be withheld from publication by the media, while only moderate
stories will be published.
This is because the advertiser who, at face value, would benefit from publica-
tion actually has an incentive to conceal the news story since the strength of the
signal would be sufficient to induce its competitor to switch over and eliminate
vertical product differentiation. In other words, strong news signals lead to more
direct competition for the ex-ante beneficiary firm, which leads to lower profits
than in the non-publication scenario. Thus, our simple model predicts the possi-
ble existence of advertiser-driven media bias, which in turn may help to explain
several documented cases of biased reportage in the news, including newspaper
coverage of climate change issues.
Having looked at one of the key determinants of media reporting practices, we
then proceed to analyse the influence of reportage on people’s choices. In chapter
3 we tackle one particular aspect of individual behaviour by looking at the impact
of media coverage on individual economic choices. More specifically, the focus is
on U.S. newspaper reports on the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami which hit
Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004, and the influence of such coverage on both
the likelihood and size of charitable donations by private U.S. citizens towards
the subsequent relief effort.
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One of the main issues when dealing with this sort of analysis in the literature
is the inevitable endogeneity issues which are likely to be present and which
limit the scope for any causal relationships to be derived from these results.
Therefore, to circumvent such issues I use an instrumental variables approach
(IV), where I instrument for tsunami coverage using county-level growth rates in
average violent crime. The results, which are robust to various additional tests
and specifications, show that newspaper coverage of the tsunami had a modest
impact on the likelihood of donating money, but conversely had a non-trivial
influence on the amount of money donated.
In fact according to the results one additional tsunami-related news story per
week published by the average American newspaper, over the 6-month period
immediately after the disaster, would have boosted average donations by around
7%, translating to approximately US$131 million. In addition, further analysis
shows that this impact was larger for young adults within the 25-34 age bracket,
consistent with the marketing literature on the responsiveness of different demo-
graphics to advertising messages. The results therefore serve to highlight the
growing influence of the media over people’s economic choices.
Finally, chapter 4 looks at the political economy aspect of media influence by
analysing the extent to which soft or sensationalistic news coverage affects voting.
The focus is on soft news since this refers to entertainment or personal interest
stories that provide limited information regarding the suitability of electoral can-
didates or policy efficacy, meaning that it is unclear whether media coverage of
such stories should have any impact on voting. To this end, I look at U.S. news-
paper coverage of the infamous Monica Lewinsky scandal and individual voting
patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election between Al Gore and George
W. Bush.
Firstly, I take a closer look at what influenced the level of Lewinsky coverage
across newspapers, concluding that this is uncorrelated with the individual news-
paper’s political slant or indeed the beliefs of their target audience. This helps
to eliminate the possibility that any relationship between coverage and voting
is merely a reflection of the newspapers’ political beliefs, instead enabling us to
focus solely on the impact of (soft) media reportage. I then move on to the main
part of the analysis, namely the impact of Lewinsky coverage on the outcome
of the 2000 election. Once again, I circumvent any potential endogeneity issues
by employing an instrumental variables approach, using cross-county variation
in the number of deaths caused by extreme weather events as an instrument for
Lewinsky coverage.
The results show that Lewinsky coverage had a positive and significant impact
on the likelihood of voting for Bush, and a negative effect on the likelihood of a
Gore vote. More importantly, this pattern was consistent across both Democrats
and Republicans, as well as those who had voted for Bill Clinton in the previous
election. In fact, a 5% increase in newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky scandal
could have increased the likelihood that a non-Republican voted for Bush in the
2000 Presidential election by around 1.9%, with a similar decline reported in the
probability of voting for Gore. Although small, these magnitudes were sufficient
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to swing the election given the tightness of the actual results, and raise several
questions regarding the media’s role in the democratic process as a conduit of
information.
Therefore, this thesis incorporates ideas from several fields within the broader
economics literature, like industrial organisation, public economics and political
economy, and applies them to the economics of media reportage and its influence
over individual behaviour. The study of media economics has grown substantially
in recent years, and has spawned a diverse and intellectually stimulating litera-
ture. I hope that this thesis continues in this tradition and serves as a modest
contribution to this burgeoning field.
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Chapter 2
When is No News Good News?




The media’s reporting behaviour has come under intense scrutiny in recent years,
in line with its growing presence within modern society. Increasingly, the focus
has been on the potential influence of advertisers on media reportage (Chomsky
and Herman, 1988), with several cases used to highlight these concerns, from the
impact of the pharmaceuticals industry on editorial positions in medical journals
(Fletcher, 2003) to the alleged influence of automotive advertising on the under-
reporting of climate change issues in the mainstream media (Oreskes and Conway,
2010).
The mounting evidence of advertiser-driven media bias seems somewhat odd
given that the media relies on a wide variety of advertisers, who in turn often have
conflicting interests in terms of which stories to publish or suppress. For example
although traditional fossil fuel vehicle manufacturers may have an incentive to
conceal or distort evidence of man-made climate change, other manufacturers
that produce hybrid or alternative fuel vehicles would actually benefit from full
disclosure. One may argue that the influence of certain interest groups may be
larger due to their relative size and clout; however this argument fails to account
for the persistence in biased news coverage documented in various cases. For
example Toyota, the leading hybrid car brand in the world, is one of the top ten
advertisers in the U.S. with an annual expenditure of well over US$860 million
(Kantar, 2014). Therefore, the continued under-reporting of several news stories
like climate change is surprising given the existence of key industry players who
would, at least at face value, benefit from their publication.
This paper contributes to the ever-growing literature on commercial media
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bias by considering how the media’s decision to publish a news report is influenced
by the nature of the story as well as the nature of its advertisers. More specifically,
this paper recognises the fact that the media typically has several advertising
relationships with various firms, and that a news story may thus have contrasting
implications for different advertisers. Using a simple model of horizontal and
vertical product differentiation, we look at a duopolistic situation where each
firm produces a similar yet differentiated good, and where consumer tastes are
heterogeneous.
The novelty of this paper is that consumers also share a common belief regard-
ing a particular state of the world (for example the likelihood that global warming
is being caused by human activities). The realisation of this state has an impact
on consumer utility and hence the choice over which product to consume. We
assume that the media receives a noisy signal regarding the state of the world,
with varying degrees of intensity and strength, and that its decision to publish
this signal is dependent on the advertising fee offered by either firm, given that
both firms have divergent interests in terms of the publication or concealment of
the story since one firm would nominally benefit from its publication while the
other would not.
The main result is that for extreme or strong news signals that conform to
people’s prior beliefs (indexed by specific parameter values in the model), the me-
dia would always have a strictly positive incentive to withhold publication of the
news story. The reason for this outcome is that the firm who benefits most from
the publication of the story actually has an incentive to conceal strong signals
since such stories would induce the other firm to change its product offering (i.e.
remove vertical product differentiation) and compete directly with it (provided
that the fixed costs associated with switching are sufficiently low). Hence as a
result strong news that would be highly beneficial to one firm would be withheld,
since (paradoxically) it stands to lose from publication due to increased compe-
tition. The interaction between consumer priors and the news signal received
by the media (both in terms of direction and strength) plays a key role in our
model, since different permutations of priors and signals alter the relative publi-
cation incentives of each firm substantially as well as the size of their advertising
fees.
The model’s results must be seen in light of the vital importance of advertising
for the continued survival of private media firms, precipitated by the rise in online
news media and free-to-air TV news channels. This is seen in Figure 2.1, which
shows the composition of newspaper revenues in the U.S. over the period 1990
to 2009; as seen in the chart, advertising accounts for an average of 75-80% of
newspapers’ total revenue.
The model’s results shed light on a new kind of commercial media bias, one
that emerges due to competitive concerns even though the news may (at face
value) seemingly favour the advertiser in question. The results underscore the
complexity of the advertiser-media relationship and raise several questions re-
garding the potential effectiveness of any regulations in this regard. The model
also suggests that increased media competition and decentralisation of ownership
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Figure 2.1: Newspaper Revenue in the US, 1990-2009 (Source: Newspaper Asso-
ciation of America)
may assist in mitigating this form of commercial media bias, provided that the
media’s reputation concerns are sufficiently high, in contrast with recent policy
efforts by the U.S. government relaxing media merger and ownership regulations.
This paper fits in with the growing economics literature on the determinants
of media bias, which can broadly be divided into two categories - those driven
by demand side considerations, and others primarily driven by supply side fac-
tors.1 In demand side models media firms tailor their reports in order to suit
the beliefs or opinions of their target audience (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005,
and Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010), given that consumers are more likely to read
news reports that are in line with their prior beliefs. On the supply side, biased
reporting emerges from various other sources that act as inputs in the provision of
news, including rent-seeking journalists with career concerns (Baron, 2006) and
advertising (Germano and Meier, 2010; Gal-Or, Geylani, and Yildirim, 2012 and
Blasco, Pin, and Sobbrio, 2015).
Within this context, a closely related paper to ours is by Ellman and Germano
(2009), who propose a model of advertising whereby the media must strike a bal-
ance between consumer preferences and advertiser interests in order to maximise
its profits. The results show that the media will under-report stories that may
be damaging to its advertisers, although this bias disappears as the size of the
advertising increases. As mentioned earlier, this paper differs in that we intro-
duce the idea of a news report that may be beneficial to one party and harmful
to another, thereby leading to diverging incentives for advertising firms in terms
of their preferences for publication/non-publication. This leads to a distinct (yet
1For a detailed survey of the relevant literature, refer to Prat and Stromberg (2011) and
Blasco and Sobbrio (2012).
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complementary) channel through which commercial media bias can arise, namely
via competitive concerns.2
2.1.1 Media Reportage and Advertiser Incentives: Moti-
vating Examples
To shed light on the potential impact of advertiser-media relations on news re-
porting, we introduce two real world examples which will also help illustrate the
main results derived in this paper. One of the most cited cases of media bias
concerns the under-reportage of the scientific evidence on anthropogenic climate
change in the U.S. (e.g. Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). Many (e.g. Oreskes and
Conway, 2010) have linked this bias to the relative influence of the U.S. automo-
tive industry in terms of the volume of advertising undertaken each year - Borell
Associates estimate that total advertising expenditure by the U.S. automotive
sector totaled US$22.6 billion in 2011, the second largest amount by industrial
sector in the country.
However, it is also true that there are several firms and industries who would
benefit directly from the publication of climate news stories, most notably those
who specialise in alternative energy solutions. In fact, the U.S. is the leading
market for hybrid vehicles in the world, with total sales exceeding 2 million units
over the period 1997-2011 (Wards, 2011), with several U.S. auto manufacturers
like Ford and Lincoln introducing their own hybrid models to compete with the
likes of Toyota and Honda.
Thus, within this context it would seem as though the publication of news
stories confirming the existence of anthropogenic global warming would be benefi-
cial for a growing number of automakers. And yet according to the Pew Research
Center, only 58% of Americans believe that there is solid evidence that global
warming is occurring, while coverage of climate change issues in the U.S. print
media has plummeted by over 80% since 2006 (Pew, 2012b).
Another example is related to the ‘pink slime’ scandal that rocked the U.S.
beef industry in March 2012. Briefly, pink slime or ‘lean, finely-textured beef’
as it is known within the industry, is a mixture of beef-related trimmings that
is processed and used as an additive in various beef products.3 Pink slime was
originally intended for use in dog food, however it has also been used in burger
patties, mince meat and other products since the 1990s (even though it was
only approved for human consumption by the USDA in 2001). Given that meat
manufacturers are not required by law to disclose the pink slime content of their
beef products on any labeling, the vast majority of consumers were unaware of
the existence of pink slime or its ubiquity in beef products.
2The modeling environment also differs significantly in our paper, since in Ellman and Ger-
mano (2009) the setup closely follows the two-sided market specified in Rochet and Tirole
(2003), while in this paper we develop a model of horizontal and vertical product differentia-
tion.
3ABC News reported that, just before the story broke in March 2012, around 70% of ground
beef sold in U.S. supermarkets contained pink slime.
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Nonetheless, it was only after a social media campaign which kicked off after
the airing of an episode of Jamie Oliver’s Food Revolution in April 2011 that con-
sumer awareness regarding pink slime started growing, culminating in a March
2012 exposé by ABC News. In the aftermath of this news report, Harris Inter-
active (2012) found that over 76% of American adults were ‘at least somewhat
concerned’ with the inclusion of pink slime in everyday beef products, while ma-
jor supermarkets and food chains like McDonald’s and Taco Bell ceased using
pink slime in their products. On the other hand, several firms are expected to
have benefited from the publication of this news story4, in particular organic beef
manufacturers since their products are clearly labeled by the USDA (vegan and
vegetarian food producers would also have benefited from this scandal). Despite
all this, the story was only exposed some 20 years after the first known use of
pink slime in meat products.
2.2 The Model
There are two firms (hereafter denoted as Firm A and Firm B respectively) op-
erating in a duopolistic market where each firm produces and sells a horizontally
differentiated product. Thus, although firms engage in price competition with
one another, they are essentially monopolists within the specific class of product
attribute that they produce. For example, this scenario could reflect the auto-
motive industry where although each firm produces private automobiles, Firm
A is a European manufacturer while Firm B is a U.S automaker. This means
that each firm will capture a specific portion of the automotive market depending
on consumer preferences and beliefs regarding the automobile’s characteristics,
tastes, etc.
There is a continuum of consumers who are heterogeneous in terms of their
preferences for each respective firm. More specifically, consumer tastes are de-
noted by the variable v, where v is uniformly distributed with support [−1, 1].
Without loss of generality we state that consumers with v ∈ [−1, 0) prefer the
good offered by Firm B, while the remaining consumers with v ∈ (0, 1] prefer
Firm A’s product complement. Furthermore, consumers’ willingness to pay for
each product is strictly increasing in the absolute value of v for both goods.5
However, the relative utility derived from each firm’s goods also depends on
the realisation of a binary random variable Y , where Y ∈ {a, b} denotes the state
of the world. The relative payoffs associated with each state of the world given
the choice of product is summarised in the matrix below.
4These include a wide variety of firms, from the fast-food chain Wendy’s right down to local
butchers (ABC, 2012).
5Although this is akin to the standard Hotelling setting whereby each firm is located at
opposite ends of the ‘linear city’ to maximise differentiation, the key difference is that in our
case there are only two types of goods, meaning that firms cannot position themselves at any
point along the taste space.
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Product Choice




Consumers have a common prior belief regarding the true state Y , where
Pr(Y = a) = θ; this is common knowledge to all participants. Thus if θ > 1
2
, in
the absence of the taste parameter v Firm A would capture the entire market,
and vice-versa for θ < 1
2
. So for example, if we continue the automotive industry
analogy then the taste parameter v may refer to various idiosyncratic preferences
like brand loyalty, country of origin or design, whilst Y may refer to the true
likelihood of climate change due to anthropogenic pollution sources like motor
vehicles, which if high may persuade consumers to switch to hybrid cars. We can
now formally set out the consumers’ utility functions for each product:
EUA(v, θ) = v + γE(Y | θ)− PA (2.1)
EUB(v, θ) = −v + γE(Y | θ)− PB, (2.2)
where γ (0 < γ ≤ 1)denotes the relative importance that the consumers attribute
to the realisation of the state of the world, and Pi denotes the price of good
i = {A,B} respectively. We assume that each consumer can at most buy one
good from either firm.
In addition to the above players, there is also a monopolist media firm who,
with a probability α (where α ∈ [0, 1); this is common knowledge to all par-
ticipants), receives an unbiased yet noisy signal regarding the true state of Y .
More specifically, we parameterise this noisy signal as β ∈ [0, 1], which denotes
the probability that Y = a (and, conversely, where 1− β indicates the probabil-
ity that Y = b). Thus, we can denote the news report (if published) whenever
β ∈ (1
2
, 1] as s = â, and likewise the report when β ∈ [0, 1
2
) as s = b̂. This
is because, by construction, when β ∈ (1
2
, 1] then the media firm’s news report
(if published) would indicate that the true state of the world is likely to be a;
conversely, it would be equal to b when β ∈ [0, 1
2
).
The actual value of β reflects the relative strength of the signal received by
the media (in either direction). So for example if the media receives quasi-
incontrovertible evidence that Y = a then the value of β would be close to 1,
whereas for a weak signal that Y = a then β would be closer to 1
2
.6
For example, Y may refer to the rise in global temperatures and rising sea
levels caused by global warming, which may induce consumers to switch to alter-
native energy vehicles like hybrids over more traditional diesel or gasoline options.
6We depart from the traditional framework employed in the literature (Gentzkow and
Shapiro, 2010) by assuming that the value of β is not fixed and/or dependent on media firm
quality, but rather can vary according to the strength of the signal received, since within this
context it helps to distinguish between a weak signal and a strong signal, which exist regardless
of the media’s reporting capabilities. Perhaps a better measure of a media firm’s capabilities is
α, which reflects the frequency with which a media firm receives signals from its sources.
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Y could also represent the presence of pink slime in various beef products, which
if true would harm those beef manufacturers who use pink slime to keep costs
down, whilst also benefiting those producers who use pure beef ingredients, like
organic food stores.
We postulate that the value of β is fully-revealed by the media when it decides
to publish a news report s ∈ {â, b̂}, and thus serves as a basis through which
consumers can update their beliefs regarding the true state of Y . Furthermore, the
information received by the media is ‘hard’ as defined by Milgrom (1981), meaning
that it cannot be misrepresented or tampered with, although it is possible to
withhold its publication. This highlights the fact that, within the context of this
paper, the term ‘media bias’ refers to the deliberate concealment of information
by the news media as opposed to the outright garbling of news signals. We also
assume that consumers do not receive any ex-post feedback regarding the true
realisation of Y , and hence cannot assess the veracity of the news report published
by the media. This assumption is consistent with various kinds of news stories,
ranging from the suitability of a political candidate to run the country to the
severity and/or cause of climate change (see Anderson and McLaren, 2012).
In this paper, the media’s only source of revenue is through advertising from
either firm. This assumption broadly reflects the modern media landscape where
the advent of digital news sources and declining newspaper circulation have meant
that media firms must increasingly rely on advertising receipts in order to main-
tain profit margins. In fact, as highlighted in the introduction, the Newspaper
Association of America (2011) estimates that on average advertising revenue con-
stitutes around 75-80% of total newspaper turnover, with this figure rising sub-
stantially for other kinds of media like TV news stations and online news portals.
More importantly, in this model advertising will also determine whether the
news story is published or not, depending on the relative payoffs under each
scenario for both firms. So for example if Firm A believes that it stands to
benefit from the publication of a news story, it will advertise in the media in
order to ensure that the story is indeed published (and vice-versa for Firm B).
The monopolist media firm will then decide whether to publish or withhold the
news story on the basis of which firm offers the higher advertising fee. In case of
a tie, or if neither firm decides to advertise, then the media would be indifferent
between publishing and withholding the news story: we assume, without any loss
of generality, that in such instances the media will opt to publish the story.7
For the remainder of this paper we shall proceed, without any loss of gener-
ality, with the case where consumer prior θ ∈ [1
2
, 1]. In other words, we consider
the case where consumer prior regarding the true state of Y is skewed in favour
of Y = a, and thus Firm A’s product offering. This is done since, due to the sym-
metric nature of the game, the results derived in this paper are equally applicable
to the case where θ ∈ [0, 1
2
] by simply re-labelling the notation (e.g. in this case
7In this model we largely ignore the informative/persuasive aspect of advertising on con-
sumers, since the main focus is on the impact of advertising on media reports. Nonetheless, we
can easily extend the model to include such elements without compromising the validity of our
results. For further discussion regarding the role played by advertising in this model, refer to
Section 2.4.2.
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a news signal s = b̂ conforms to people’s prior belief, rather than contradicts it
as in the θ ∈ [1
2
, 1] case). Thus, all the conclusions derived hereunder regarding
the equilibrium reporting strategies for news signals that confirm or contradict
people’s prior remain unchanged.
Both firms A and B can fully observe the signal received by the media, and on
the basis of this signal they must formulate their optimal advertising strategies.
The media’s decision to publish or not will depend on whose advertising fee is
higher. We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as our equilibrium concept in this
paper. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state of the world Y ∈ {a, b};
2. With probability α the media receives an imperfect signal s ∈ {â, b̂} regard-
ing the true state of Y ; this is also observable by Firms A and B, although
consumers cannot directly observe it;
3. Firms A and B decide individually whether to advertise in order to ensure
that the news signal is published or withheld by the media;
4. The media firm decides which advertisement to accept on the basis of the
fee proposed, and hence decides whether to publish the news report or not;
5. Consumers observe whether a news report has been published or not, and
update their beliefs regarding Y according to Bayes’ Rule (wherever possi-
ble);
6. Firms A and B set their respective produce prices PA and PB, and consumers
decide which good to purchase;
7. Payoffs are realised.
2.2.1 Consumers
As highlighted above, consumers will use the information inferred from the publi-
cation or otherwise of a news report by the media in order to update their beliefs
regarding the true state of the world Y , which will assist in their purchasing de-
cision from either firm A or B. If a news report is published such that s ∈ {â, b̂},
then from the firms’ perspective consumers will update their beliefs regarding Y
according to Bayes’ Rule:
ψ = θβ
θβ+(1−θ)(1−β) ,
where ψ represents the consumers’ (common) posterior probability that Y = a.
Hence, the expected utilities derived from Firm A or B can be rewritten as:
EUA(v, ψ) = v + γ(2ψ − 1)− PA (2.3)
EUB(v, ψ) = −v + γ(1− 2ψ)− PB. (2.4)
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If a news report is not published, then consumers will still update their prior
on the basis of what they know regarding the optimal advertising strategies of
each firm, weighted by the probability (1−α) that the media did not receive any
news story. We denote, by assumption, this updated belief by ω:
ω = (1− α)θ + αθτ
θτ + (1− θ)(1− τ)
, (2.5)
with τ representing the implied value of β that consumers associate with the
deliberate non-disclosure of information by the media, which in turn depends on
the firms’ incentives to publish/withhold the news story. Thus, with probability
(1 − α) consumers will believe that no news story has been published since the
media has not received a news signal s: in this case, the consumers’ prior will be
equivalent to their posterior. Conversely, with probability α consumers believe
that news signal s is being purposely withheld from publication, inferring a value
of τ for the strength of the withheld signal.
Hence in determining the value of ω, consumers will evaluate the conditions
under which each firm would seek to get any potential news story published or
withheld. Beginning with Firm A, it is clear that any news report s that results
in an upward revision in the consumers’ prior belief would be beneficial, thus
creating an incentive to advertise. More formally, this incentive to publish would
arise whenever
ψ ≥ θ ⇒ β ≥ 1
2
.
Hence if β ≥ 1
2
Firm A would have a positive incentive to advertise in order
to ensure the publication of the news story, for any value of θ; this condition will
hold for any s = â (the opposite would be true for any s = b̂). Similar arguments
can also be made for Firm B; in this case, B would always have an incentive
to withhold the news report when β ≥ 1
2
since this would result in a decline in
consumer demand for B’s product (once again, the opposite also holds for s = b̂).
Therefore, both firms are in direct conflict with one another, with the ultimate
winner dependent on who offers the highest advertising fee, based on the relative
strength of their respective incentives to publish/withhold news. We shall return
to the consumers’ updating in the non-disclosure case later on after analysing the
firms’ strategy profiles. Using the above expressions we derive the condition under
which a consumer would be indifferent between Firm A and Firm B, regardless
of whether the news report is published or not. Setting EUA = EUB, we can
characterise the indifferent consumer type as
v∗ =
PA − PB + 2γ − 4γΘ
2
, (2.6)
where Θ = ψ if a news report is published, and Θ = ω if no news report is
published. Therefore, given the distribution of v, we can derive the quantity
















We now proceed to analyse the firms’ respective advertising strategies which
shall form the basis of the media’s decision to publish a news report or withhold
it. Both firms are assumed to be profit maximisers, where as usual profit πi
(i = {A,B}) is a function of price Pi, quantity demanded Di and a constant
marginal cost which we normalise to zero. For exposition purposes we also set
γ = 1 and proceed accordingly.
2.2.2.1 Firm A
We start by analysing Firm A’s strategy profile. In this case, the firm seeks to
maximise profits, πA = PADA, with DA corresponding to (2.7) above. Thus, as
expected Firm A’s strategy also takes into account Firm B’s actions. When news
story s ∈ {â, b̂} is published, then the resulting price, quantity demanded and











where the superscript K is used to denote the firm’s price, demand and profit
functions given the publication of the news story s ∈ {â, b̂}. From the above
equations, it is evident that PKA ′(ψ) > 0 and DKA ′(ψ) > 0, while the profit function
πKA is strictly convex in ψ (π
K
A ′(ψ) > 0, πKA ′′(ψ) > 0). Thus, the stronger the
signal s = â received by the media (corresponding to a high level of β), the higher
will Firm A’s profits be since consumers will update their prior belief by a larger
degree, resulting in higher quantity demanded and a higher price.
If on the other hand the news report is not published, Firm A’s profit function





where ω is used to denote the non-publication or withholding of the news story.
As seen above, π∅A(ω) is almost identical to π
K
A (ψ) above, with the only difference
being that now profit is a function of posterior belief ω, which is formulated on
the basis of no media report being published. Comparing the two profit functions,
it is straightforward to see that πKA (ψ) ≥ π∅A(ω) whenever ψ ≥ ω. The intuition
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behind this result is simple - whenever the media publishes a news report s
with associated signal strength β that raises consumers’ posterior belief ψ above
the level that would have been attained under no publication (ω), then it is in
Firm A’s best interest to ensure that the news story gets published. Given our
assumptions regarding the value of β, this will happen when s = â. Hence,
whenever ψ ≥ ω Firm A will advertise in order to ensure that the news story is
published. Whether the news report gets published or not will also depend on
the actions taken by Firm B, given its own incentives to conceal information that
may have a detrimental impact on its profits.
2.2.2.2 Firm B
We now move on to Firm B’s strategy profile. Given the conclusions reached
in the previous section, Firm B knows that, regardless of its actions, whenever
ψ ≥ ω Firm A’s (weakly) dominant strategy is to advertise in order to encourage
the publication of the news story.
If Firm B decides to advertise, then the media will compare each firm’s max-
imum willingness-to-pay for advertising and select the highest offer, followed by
a decision to publish or not depending on which offer is accepted. Conversely, if
Firm B decides not to advertise then the news report will be published via Firm
A’s advertising activities. Firstly though, it is necessary to establish if Firm B
would advertise when a news report is either published or withheld. The reason-
ing here is analogous to that employed for Firm A, with B’s strategy taking Firm
A’s choices into account. If the news report is withheld, then Firm B’s price,











We can observe that in this case both P ∅B and D
∅
B are decreasing in ω, whilst π
∅
B
is convex in ω. On the other hand, if the news report is published then we obtain





Once again, comparing the two profit functions it is clear that the optimal
outcome for Firm B will largely depend on the value of ψ and ω. More specifically,
π∅B(ω) ≥ πKB (ψ) if and only if ω ≤ ψ. The rationale in this case is also fairly
straightforward - if the consumers’ posterior regarding the probability that Y = a
is higher if the news report is published, then Firm B would have a clear incentive
to ensure that the story is withheld. Since it knows that under this scenario Firm
A will advertise in order to ensure publication, then Firm B’s best response
would also be to advertise, albeit to encourage nondisclosure of information by
the media. Conversely, if ψ < ω then Firm B would prefer the publication of the
story since it would result in a lowering of consumer beliefs in B’s direction.
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2.2.3 Publication of News
We now have a full characterisation of the two firms’ optimal strategies. In
equilibrium, whenever ψ ≥ (≤)ω Firm A would advertise in order to ensure the
publication (withholding) of the news story, whereas Firm B would advertise in
order to induce the concealment (publication) of the signal. This means that the
ultimate decision regarding whether to publish or not lies with the media, who
will decide on the basis of which firm offers the highest advertising fee R. For
each firm, R reflects the maximum additional benefit that the firm would accrue
if it decides to advertise, relative to the no advertising alternative, given their
opponent’s strategy. It is therefore possible to derive the maximum advertising
fee payable R by each firm
RA = π
K
A (ψ)− π∅A(ω) (2.9)
RB = π
K
B (ψ)− π∅B(ω). (2.10)
It is useful to define ∆A,B = RA − RB which captures the difference between
the two maximum advertising fees of firms A and B respectively, where ∆A,B > 0
denotes that Firm A’s advertising fee exceeds that offered by B. By comparing
RA and RB, we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 1. When the news report received is s = â and with signal strength
β ∈ [1
2
, 1], the media publishes the report. Conversely, when s = b̂ and β ∈
[0, 1 − θ], there exists a cut-off value βL such that for any β ∈ (βL, 1 − θ] the
media withholds publication of the report; for any β ∈ [0, βL] the media publishes
the news report.
Proof. See Appendix
The result follows directly from our original specification of the news signal
β as well as the convexity of RA and RB in consumer posterior beliefs ψ and
ω. This implies that when the news signal received is s = â, the consumers’
prior belief is already skewed in Firm A’s direction (θ > 1
2
), meaning that the
advertising fee offered by A in order to ensure publication will always exceed
that offered by its opponent. When s = b̂, initially Firm A still holds the upper
hand for weaker news signals β > βL, which will be suppressed since they would
shift consumers’ belief in Firm B’s direction if published. Below βL, then due to
convexity the posterior belief under publication ψ would be low enough to make
Firm B’s advertising fee higher than that offered by Firm A, leading once more
to publication of the news signal.
To summarise, Proposition 1 predicts mixed results in terms of the existence
of commercial media bias, and that this largely depends on people’s prior belief
regarding state Y . Briefly, when the news report conforms to people’s prior belief,
then it will always be published by the media. Conversely, when signals contradict
people’s prior, then only ‘strong’ news stories will get published as parameterised
by β. This seems somewhat at odds with the real-world experience, particularly
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the examples described in Section 2.1.1 where in the case of both anthropogenic
climate change and the pink slime debacle the news stories were either toned
down or concealed for several years. For example, if we accept the findings from
Proposition 1 then any pro-climate change story received by the media should
be published since it would conform to people’s prior, given that as mentioned
earlier 57% of Americans believe that global warming is occurring (Pew, 2012b).
Clearly, one element which is missing from the model is the fact that one party
may be larger or more influential than the other in terms of the number of firms
involved and hence the advertising revenue on offer. In the model we assume that
there are only two firms operating at either end of the spectrum - for example one
gasoline automaker and one hybrid car manufacturer - but in reality things may
be rather more lop-sided. For example in the automobile case although, as stated
earlier, the number of hybrid/electric car manufacturers is on the rise, they are
still heavily outnumbered by the more traditional gasoline/diesel producers (very
often an automaker would have several gasoline/diesel car models and only one
hybrid model).8 The same can also be said with regards to the US beef industry,
since as seen earlier an estimated 70% of ground beef products in supermarkets
contained pink slime (as at March 2012).
And yet despite this evident imbalance, in both of these cases there is still
enough clout, both in terms of influence and indeed advertising potential, to com-
bat this perceived bias to withhold in media reporting. For example as mentioned
earlier, Toyota is one of the leading advertisers in the U.S. with over US$860 mil-
lion spent annually, and the second largest automotive advertiser (Kantar, 2014).
In the next section we shall take a closer look at why media bias persists in such
situations by analysing Firm B’s incentives to switch over and compete more
directly with Firm A in the face of a potentially damaging news story.
2.3 Good News Gone Bad
We now extend the basic framework of the model in order to account for the
possibility that a firm may decide to eliminate vertical product differentiation
(based on the realisation of state Y ) in light of a potentially damaging news story
being published. More specifically, we allow for the possibility that whenever s =
â, Firm B has the option to overhaul its processes and eliminate vertical product
differentiation, in order to avoid the backlash caused by dwindling demand and
prices as a result of the publication of the news story. Similarly, it is also entirely
possible for Firm A to switch over whenever s = b̂ is published by the media.
Note that although the vertical differentiation element of the two firms’ prod-
ucts would be completely eliminated, they still retain the horizontal differentia-
tion element characterised by the parameter v. For example, if Firm B decides
to switch over when s = â is published, the consumers’ utility functions would
change slightly, such that
8In fact, LMC Automotive (2012) estimate that electric/hybrid cars only constituted around
3.1% of total vehicle sales in the U.S. in 2011.
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EUA(v, ψ) = v + γ(2ψ − 1)− PA (2.11)
EUB(v, ψ) = −v + γ(2ψ − 1)− PB. (2.12)
Similarly, if Firm A were to switch over in response to the publication of a news
story s = b̂, consumer utility from the consumption of either good would now be
equal to
EUA(v, ψ) = v + γ(1− 2ψ)− PA (2.13)
EUB(v, ψ) = −v + γ(1− 2ψ)− PB. (2.14)
There are several ways to interpret the nature of this switch over. Considering
the automotive case, this would be akin to a gasoline automaker deciding to
produce hybrid cars in light of a considerable change in public perception of
anthropogenic global warming (represented by θ) following a serious nationwide
news story about the negative impact of automotive emissions on human health
and climate change. In this case, although the switch in production to hybrid
cars eliminates the vertical product differentiation aspect (i.e. environmental-
friendliness), the two cars would still be horizontally differentiated in terms of
brand, country of origin, etc., which could all be parameterised by v.9
This fact is perhaps even more stark in the beef industry example, since
although McDonald’s decided to cease using pink slime in its products (thereby
regularizing its position in relation to organic food producers), the overall nature
of its product offering did not change. McDonald’s is still nominally a fast food
restaurant that caters to a specific target market which is manifestly distinct from
that targeted by organic beef burger manufacturers.
Therefore, under this modeling environment both firms have the option to
switch their production processes and eliminate vertical product differentiation.
This switch over entails a fixed cost, denoted by F SW , reflecting the fact that
overhauling a firm’s production process requires a non-trivial investment in new
technology, research and development, and other setup costs.10
Alternatively, F SW could also capture the extent to which one firm’s produc-
tion processes are safeguarded by patents and other Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR) protection. In any case, the purpose of F SW is to show that switching
over is not a costless process, and must be factored in the switching firm’s profits
before deciding to proceed. Once again, variable costs are assumed to be constant
and equivalent across both firms, and are thus normalised to zero to facilitate the
exposition.
9When Ford decided to produce hybrid and electric cars it still retained its brand and U.S.-
made characteristics; the same can be said for other manufacturers like Lincoln, Chevrolet,
etc.
10We assume that both firms face the same (fixed) switching cost FSW . The value of FSW
is common knowledge to all participants
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At this point it is necessary to consider the conditions under which either firm
would decide to switch over after a news signal s has been received by the media.
In case of a switch over then the price, quantity demanded and profit for each
firm are now










1− F SW (for firm that switches over)
1(for other firm),
where i ∈ {A,B}. Firstly, we look at a firm’s switching decision when the news
story s is published by the media. In this case, we compare the profit earned
by the firm if it did not switch over to the profit earned above if it decided to
proceed with the switch over. Denote the difference between πSWA and π
K
A (ψ) by






5− 8ψ − 4ψ2
9
− F SW (2.15)
ΣB =
16ψ − 7− 4ψ2
9
− F SW . (2.16)
A simple manipulation of the expressions yields the following result:
Lemma 1. When news report s = {â, b̂} is published by the media, there exists









When s = â, Firm B switches over if and only if β > βSW and F SW < 5
9
.
Conversely, when s = b̂ Firm A switches over if and only if β < 1 − βSW and




Hence, for a sufficiently small F SW , Firm B would eliminate the vertical prod-
uct differentiation element previously present in the market whenever the media
publishes a strong (high β) signal for s = â. Similarly, when a strong (low β)
contrary signal s = b̂ is published Firm A would be induced to switch over and
mimic its competitor, eliminating vertical product differentiation, provided that
switching costs are low. The intuition behind this result is relatively simple -
stronger news signals published in the media will induce a significant shift in con-
sumer beliefs regarding the realisation of Y in one firm’s favour, to the detriment
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of the other, thereby leading the latter to switch over in order to earn higher
profits.
However this is only one part of the story, since a firm may still opt to switch
over even when no news report is published in the media. The reason is that in the
absence of a published story, consumers may still update their beliefs sufficiently
in the direction of one firm in order to render a switch over attractive to the other,
relative to the status quo. When a story is withheld, a firm has two options -
either stick to its current production process (earning a payoff of π∅i ) or switch
over (resulting in a profit of πSWi ). If we compare the two payoffs it is easy to
show that a firm will always (at least weakly) prefer to switch over whenever
(denoting posterior belief under no publication by ω)













for a sufficiently-low value of F SW . Again, the logic behind this result is clear -
if consumers update their beliefs regarding Y very strongly in one firm’s favour,
even in the absence of any published news signal, then it would make sense for
the other firm to switch over and eliminate vertical product differentiation.
Since we allow for switching over, we require a different expression to represent
the posterior belief under no publication ω to the one used in the previous section.
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Briefly, when no news report is published consumers believe, with probability
(1−α), that this is due to the fact that no news report has been received by the
media, in which case consumers’ posterior belief will simply be equal to their prior.
With probability α consumers believe that the media is purposely withholding
the news signal: with a probability of θ this withheld signal is such that s = â,
and with probability (1− θ) the signal is s = b̂.11.
Therefore, we can find the conditions under which each would prefer to switch
over even when no news story is published. The following result is obtained:
Proposition 2. Given that no news story is published in the media, there exists a
unique threshold prior belief θSW (α, F SW ) ∈ [1
2
, 1], such that when θ > θSW Firm
B switches over and eliminates vertical product differentiation, for any switching












What this result shows is that for a sufficiently large prior belief θ ∈ [1
2
, 1]
such that θ > θSW (α, F SW ), when no news story is published consumers will
update their beliefs regarding Y such that Firm B is compelled to switch over
in order to avoid a drastic decline in demand and profits. The idea behind the
result is that if consumer prior belief is already skewed towards Firm A’s product
offering then, based on our formal definition of ωθ> 1
2
above, the non-publication
of news will only serve to strengthen these slanted beliefs in Firm A’s favour, to
the detriment of Firm B’s current status quo. This would therefore induce Firm
B to mimic Firm A and eliminate vertical product differentiation.12
Notice that θSW is strictly decreasing in α (the probability that the media
receives a news signal), since for higher levels of α consumers would become
increasingly suspicious that the media is purposely withholding information, re-








threshold. Conversely θSW is strictly increasing in the
value of F SW since a higher switching cost reduces the likelihood that Firm B
would undertake the switch-over, thus lowering the probability that the news
story (if received) was purposely withheld in order to prevent the switch-over
(which would occur if β ≥ βSW , where βSW is also increasing in F SW ).
Clearly, a switch-over by one firm would have an impact on the other firm’s
profits. A simple comparison of πKi (ψ) (the profits earned if the story is pub-
lished, under no switch over) with πSWi (where, as usual, i ∈ {A,B}) reveals that
πKi (ψ) ≥ πSWi whenever
• For s = â and Firm B switches over: ψ ≥ 1
2
;
• For s = b̂ and Firm A switches over: ψ ≤ 1
2
,
which, by definition (given our assumptions regarding the value of β in either
case) will always hold true. Therefore, whenever a news story s = â is published,
Firm A is always better off when Firm B does not switch over, since the increase
in direct competition brought about by the switch-over results in an inevitable
decline in A’s profits (and vice-versa for s = b̂).
Next, we look at the non-publication scenario, and more specifically we com-
pare a firm’s profits under no publication (π∅i ) to the profit level when the news
story is published and the firm’s competitor decides to switch over (πSWi ). De-
note RSWi as the difference between these two profit levels, where once again it is
straightforward to show that RSWi ≥ 0 whenever
• For s = â: RSWA ≥ 0 if ω ≥ 12 ;
• For s = b̂: RSWB ≥ 0 if ω ≤ 12 .
12Note that when θ < 12 , by symmetry we can derive an equivalent condition for ωθ< 12 ,
whereby if prior belief is such that θ < 1− θSW then Firm A would prefer to switch over even
in the absence of a published signal.
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Based on our definition of ωθ≥ 1
2
given above, it is easy to see that since con-
sumer prior θ ≥ 1
2
, it follows that the first condition will always hold, whereas
the second condition will, by definition, never hold. Once again this is due to the
fact that when no news report is published, consumers are uncertain as to the
true value of Y meaning that their posterior belief in the face of such uncertainty
will invariably skew in the direction of their prior (θ ≥ 1
2
). Hence, an immediate
corollary that emerges from this result is that when θ ≥ 1
2
Firm B would always
weakly prefer the news story s = b̂ to be published, even if this leads to Firm
A’s switch over. This is because when θ ≥ 1
2
consumer prior belief is slanted
in favour of Firm A’s product, meaning that if no news report were published
then consumer posterior belief will still remain (due to Bayesian updating) in A’s
direction, to the detriment of Firm B, meaning that publication (and Firm A’s
switch-over) would be preferable to no publication.
Combining these results, we can state without proof the following lemma
(assuming, as always, that switching costs are F SW ∈ [0, 5
9
)):
Lemma 2. When a news report s = â with signal strength β > βSW is received
by the media, Firm A advertises in order to conceal the news report for any
θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ). Conversely, if s = b̂ and β ∈ [0, 1
2
) Firm B advertises in order to
ensure that the news story is published.
The rationale behind this lemma is clear. Whenever a published news signal
s = â is strong enough (i.e. β > βSW ) to induce Firm B to switch over, Firm
A has an incentive to ensure that the news story is withheld from publication
via advertising, even though the news story s = â is at face value favourable for
Firm A. Note that when θ > θSW it would make no sense for Firm A to attempt
to conceal the news story, since regardless of whether the story is published
or not Firm B will always switch over as consumer updating will skew heavily
towards Firm A’s product offering, inducing the switch-over by B. On the other
hand, when s = b̂ then Firm B will always have a positive incentive to ensure
publication, even when signals are strong enough to induce a switch-over by Firm
A, since otherwise consumers’ posterior belief under no publication would skew
in A’s favour.
We have already seen the conditions under which a firm would be induced
to switch over: now it is worth analysing the potential switcher’s advertising
strategies. In this case, we compare the profit level under no publication and no
switching (π∅i ) with profits under publication and switching (π
SW
i ). We denote
the difference between the two by RSW∗i . It can be shown that, for F
SW ∈ [0, 5
9
):




• When s = b̂: Firm A would also prefer non-publication (RSW∗A (ω) ≥ 0) for
any θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ).
The intuition behind this outcome is also relatively straightforward. In the
first instance, switching over entails both a fixed cost F SW as well as a more
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direct competitor in Firm A, both of which would lead to lower profits relative to
the status quo where no news story is published and consumer updating under
no publication does not skew too strongly in Firm A’s favour. On the other
hand, when θ ≥ θSW then Firm B would be indifferent between publishing or
withholding the news story, since as seen from Proposition 2 consumer updating
under no publication would still be strong enough to induce Firm B to switch
over. For s = b̂ the situation is more straightforward - Firm A would always
prefer non-publication since in this instance consumers’ posterior belief would
still skew in A’s favour, as opposed to the publication scenario.
2.3.1 Equilibrium Reporting
We can now utilise the results derived in the previous section in order to determine
the media’s equilibrium reporting behaviour. This will largely be determined by
the interaction between each firm’s optimal advertising strategies, based on their
relative incentives to publish the story or not, as well as consumers’ posterior
beliefs under each scenario.
The first result presented here is in relation to strong news signals that conform
to people’s prior belief - i.e. where β ≥ βSW when s = â since θ ∈ [1
2
, 1] - and
can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 3. When switching costs F SW ∈ [0, 5
9
), if the news signal s = â is
such that its strength β > βSW , then for consumer prior θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ) the media
withholds the signal from publication.
This result, which is one of the key findings in this paper, follows directly
from the results derived in the previous section. In essence, given the conditions
set out above, we showed how both Firms A and B would always have at least a
weakly positive incentive to ensure that strong news stories are not published by
the media, meaning that both firms would advertise in order to conceal the story.
Therefore the outcome in this case is unambiguous, since regardless of which firm
offers the higher advertising fee the result would be the withholding of strong
news signals.13
It is worth highlighting that the above only holds true for θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ). When-
ever the consumers’ prior belief is such that θ ≥ θSW then both firms would be
indifferent in terms of the publication or withholding of the news signal, since the
consumers’ posterior belief would still induce a switch over by Firm B in either
case, meaning that there is no incentive for either firm to advertise in order to
ensure any particular outcome.
Continuing with our analysis of confirmatory (in terms of people’s prior) news
stories, we now move onto more moderate signals where β ∈ [1
2
, βSW ). Once again,
the focus is on prior θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ). In this case, as stated earlier Firm B would not
switch over, implying that the profit levels under publication for firms A and B
13In the case when θ ≤ 12 and s = b̂ the result is reversed such that whenever β ≤ 1 − β
SW
these signals are withheld from publication (where a low β is equivalent to a strong signal in
B’s favour).
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are πKA and π
K




B under no publication. As discussed
earlier, each firm’s preference over the publication or withholding of the news
story depends on the relative values of ψ and ω. With these factors in mind, we
can formally state the following result:
Proposition 4. When a news signal s = â is received such that signal strength
β ∈ [1
2




), there exists a unique value of β,
denoted as βT (α, θ) ∈ [1
2
, 1]. If βT > β the media withholds publication of the
news report. Conversely, for βT < β the media publishes the news report.
Proof. See Appendix
What this result implies is that weak news signals that conform to people’s
prior may, under certain conditions, be withheld from publication. The reason for
this is that in the absence of any news report consumer posterior would actually
be higher relative to the case where the (weak) signal is published. This over-
updating of beliefs mainly comes about due to the result described in Proposition
3 earlier, where extreme or strong confirmatory news signals would be withheld
from publication, meaning that posterior belief under no publication would now
have to take this possibility into account.
We now turn our attention to news signals that contradict people’s prior
belief - in this case, s = b̂. As shown earlier, when θ ∈ [1
2
, 1] and s = b̂ we have
a misalignment of incentives for both firms since Firm A’s dominant strategy
would be to withhold the story whereas Firm B would always prefer to have it
published. We therefore have a similar situation to that described in Proposition
1, which leads to the following result:
Proposition 5. When a news signal s = b̂ is received by the media with signal
strength β ∈ [0, 1−θ], and with consumer prior θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ), there exists a cut-off
value βL such that for any β ∈ (βL, 1 − θ] the media withholds the news report
from publication: conversely, for any β ∈ [0, βL) the media publishes the news
report.
Proof. See Appendix
Therefore, whenever the news signal contradicts consumer prior, then weaker
stories (where β ∈ (βL, 1 − θ]) will not get published, while stronger signals
(β ∈ [0, βL)) are published. As with Proposition 1, the result is driven by the
convexity of advertising fees RA and RB in consumer posterior belief, which means
that for weak signals the ‘losing’ firm (in this case Firm A) has a stronger incentive
to withhold the signal that the winner (Firm B), with the opposite holding true
for stronger signals. A direct implication of this result is that, contrary to to the
situation where the consumers’ prior is aligned with the media’s news signal (e.g.
θ > 1
2
when s = â), in this case only stronger news signals (β < βL) are published
in the media.
We now have a complete characterisation of the equilibrium advertising strate-
gies adopted by both firms (given consumer belief regarding Y ) as well as the
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media’s equilibrium reporting behaviour. The key findings can be summarised as
follows:
• For news stories that conform to people’s prior belief (e.g. s = â and
θ ∈ [1
2
, 1]), strong news signals will be withheld from publication by the
media, while moderate signals will be published;
• For stories that contradict people’s prior (e.g. s = b̂ and θ ∈ [1
2
, 1]), weak
signals will be withheld from publication, while stronger signals will be
published.
These results provide an alternative rationale for the continued bias and/or
under-reporting in the news media, since they suggest that even the advertiser
who stands to benefit most from the publication of the news story has an incentive
to keep the report under wraps. Therefore in the automotive case considered
in Section 2.1.1, hybrid/electric automakers would seek to withhold any strong
evidence of anthropogenic climate change from publication in the news media,
since this may result in even more automakers introducing rival hybrid/electric
models, eroding the incumbents’ profit margins. The same can also be said for
the US beef industry and the pink slime scandal, since ‘pure’ or organic beef
producers/sellers would, according to this paper, have benefited from keeping the
story hidden given that this would have prevented other mass-market firms from
switching over to 100% beef products, hence enabling them to maintain their
leadership within their specific market segment.
2.4 Discussion and Extensions
In this section we look at how the model’s main findings relate to the real-world,
with a particular focus on U.S. media coverage of global warming issues over the
last few years. We then consider a number of extensions to the model in order
to assess the robustness of our results, including a discussion on the role played
by advertising as a source of information/persuasion for consumers, the impact
of media competition, as well as reputational concerns of media firms.
2.4.1 U.S. Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change Issues
In this section, we show how the main theoretical findings predicted by our model
can be used to explain real-world media reporting patterns. Specifically, we
compare the model’s predictions regarding climate change reportage to data from
the U.S. print media. Figure 2.3 below plots annual reporting on climate change
issues in the leading U.S. newspapers over the period 2004-2010, and U.S. public
opinion regarding the man-made origins of climate change over the same period.
The survey data is taken from the 2011 Environment Poll by Gallup (2011).14 For
14The exact question posed in this survey was:“And from what you have heard or read, do
you believe that increases in the Earth’s temperature over the last century are due more to the
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newspaper climate coverage, we collect data on the total number of articles related
to the scientific evidence on global warming published by a sample of 144 leading
U.S. newspapers, accounting for around 60% of total newspaper circulation in the
country (NAA, 2012), using the NewsLibrary online database and the ProQuest
library as our main sources.Full details regarding the data collection process are
provided in Appendix B.
Figure 2.2: U.S. Public Belief in Anthropogenic Origins of Climate Change and
No. of Published Newspaper Articles on Global Warming, 2004-2010 (Sources:
Gallup (2011), NewsLibrary, ProQuest)
As seen from Figure 2.2, public perception regarding the anthropogenic ori-
gins of global warming has been fairly steady over the last few years, with an
average of around 55% of Americans agreeing with the assertion that human ac-
tivities are the main contributors to climate change. Based on this, our model
predicts that coverage of climate issues in the media should mainly consist of sto-
ries that include moderate evidence supporting this view, or conversely of stories
that strongly contradict this belief. This is partially supported by the findings
in Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) as mentioned earlier, with the vast majority of
climate-based news reports presenting a relatively balanced view regarding the
man-made nature of global warming. Clearly, the idea of news ‘strength’ cannot
be derived from our coverage dataset, since it only reports the number of pub-
lished articles on climate-related evidence. Nonetheless we can see that, with the
anomalous exception of 2007 aside (which was mainly driven by reports regarding
effects of pollution from human activities, or natural changes in the environment that are not
due to human activities?”.
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Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’), climate coverage in the leading U.S. news-
papers was largely unchanged over the period under review, and in fact dipped
slightly towards the end of the decade.
What is also clear from the graph is that in 2010 both coverage of climate
evidence and public opinion dipped. This may have been due to the eruption of
the so-called climategate scandal in 2009, when leaked email exchanges among
leading climatologists from the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit
purportedly showed that global warming data had been manipulated and that
scientific evidence which downplayed the extent of rising temperatures and other
implications of global warming were wilfully suppressed. These allegations were
strongly rebutted by the scientists involved, who claimed that the emails were
purposely taken out of context to distort the truth.15 Hence, this type of news
story would constitute a ‘strong’ contradictory signal in terms of people’s prior
belief, which our model predicts would be published in the media due to the
beneficiary’s strong incentives. In fact, Oreskes and Conway (2010) state that
the mainstream media preferred to focus on the initial furor surrounding the
scandal with very little coverage afforded to the subsequent exoneration, pointing
the finger at the closeness of the relationship between the fossil fuel industry (as
advertisers) and the media.
This seems to be supported by the data, since apart from the dip in evidence-
based news reports on climate change in 2010 we also observe a significant drop
in public opinion regarding the human origins of global warming, from 54% to
50%. In addition, a quick search for news stories related to climategate over the
period 2009 to 2010 shows that in total around 300 articles were published on the
subject, which equates to approximately 5% of total newspaper climate coverage
over the period. This figure is significant, particularly when considering the fact
that by mid-2010 all investigations had been completed and any allegations of
impropriety or fraud summarily dismissed. Nonetheless, it appears as though the
climategate story may have had the desired effect in terms of tempering public
belief in anthropogenic climate change.
2.4.2 Informative Advertising
In this paper the only role played by advertising is to influence the media’s pub-
lication decision. We therefore ignore any other direct impact of advertising on
consumers as described in the literature. In our setup, advertising does not pro-
vide any information regarding product attributes (Telser, 1964 and Dukes, 2004),
nor does it directly persuade consumers to purchase it (Bloch and Manceau,
1999 and Johnson and Myatt, 2006). Similarly, in the model advertising has no
signalling value whereby higher advertising fees are reflective of higher product
15Furthermore in the aftermath of the scandal various investigations were initiated in both
the U.S. and the UK in order to establish whether the leaked emails demonstrated any sort of
fraud or misconduct on the part of the scientists involved, with each investigation dismissing
the allegations.
34
quality (Nelson, 1974 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).16 We omit such consider-
ations since the primary aim of this paper is to look at the impact of advertisers
on media reporting behaviour. The only information that consumers can glean
from advertising is when no news report is published, since this would be indica-
tive of a purposely withheld news report, although s/he would still not be able
to accurately tell whether the withheld signal is s = â or s = b̂.
Nonetheless, a couple of points are worth mentioning. Firstly, the model can
easily be generalised to incorporate informative advertising. More specifically, we
can readily think of the media report s as being an advertisement that indicates
some product attribute which affects consumer payoffs. For example, in our
automotive case we can think of Y as being the probability that Firm A’s cars
are more environmentally-friendly or energy efficient than Firm B’s offering, with
s = â being an advertisement highlighting the impressive green features of Firm
A’s vehicles (e.g. hybrid technology, fuel efficiency ratings, etc.). In this case,
Firm A’s incentive to withhold this signal stems from its desire to prevent Firm
B from switching over and adopting its now-advertised technology or product
features (provided that consumers’ prior is already skewed in A’s favour).
Similarly, we can easily incorporate more formal informativeness/persuasiveness
features of advertising in our baseline model without altering the results obtained.
For example, it is possible to allow for advertising to directly augment the utility
derived by consumers from purchasing either good depending on who decides to
advertise. There are several potential ways of doing this. Denote the ‘persuasive’
value of advertising by either firm as λ, where λ > 0. The most straightforward
way of incorporating this effect would be to include λ additively in both (1.3)
and (1.4), interacted with a binary indicator variable Mi (MA in (1.3) and MB
in (1.4)) such that Mi = 1 when firm i advertises, and 0 otherwise. Thus, when
Firm A advertises, this would raise the expected utility that consumers obtain
from product A by λ.
Another way of doing this would be to interact λMi with the taste parameter
v in (1.3) and (1.4), in order to capture the idea that advertising will only raise
the expected payoff of consumers whose tastes are already skewed in favour of
the product’s horizontal attributes. For example, an advertisement by Firm A
will only raise the expected utility derived from consuming product A for those
people whose taste parameter v ∈ (0, 1], as shown below:
EUA(v, ψ) = (1 + λMA)v + γ(2ψ − 1)− PA .
In this setup the advert simply serves to underscore the product’s attributes
(e.g. the automobile’s American origins), which may appeal to some people and
not to others. Notice that when v ∈ [−1, 0) advertising would actually have a
negative impact on expected utility from consuming Firm A’s product. This re-
flects the fact that consumers may derive disutility from advertising, particularly
if the information being highlighted in the advert does not conform to people’s
16For a detailed treatment of the extensive advertising literature in economics, see Bagwell
(2007)
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tastes (a refinement of the ‘nuisance’ effect of advertising as described in Peitz
and Valletti, 2008 and Crampes et al., 2009).
Alternatively, it is also plausible to assume that a firm’s advertising will only
increase expected utility if it conforms to people’s beliefs regarding the state of
the world Y . For example, Firm A’s advertising would raise expected utility from
consuming A’s products if and only if posterior beliefs ψ (under publication) or
ω (under no publication) ∈ (1
2
, 1], as shown below:
EUA(v, ψ) = v + γ(2ψ − 1) + λMAψ − PA .
Once again, the basic idea is that advertising that highlights the product’s ver-
tical qualities (e.g. its environmentally-friendly credentials) would only raise ex-
pected payoffs if consumers actually value these attributes: if not, then once again
advertising will lead to a reduction in expected utility due to nuisance factors.
Hence, based on the above discussion, we have shown how we can extend the basic
model described in this paper to incorporate the informativeness/persuasiveness
of advertising as traditionally described in the literature. More importantly, it
is also straightforward to see that including any (or a combination of) these ele-
ments in our analysis would not have any meaningful impact on the main results
derived in this paper, since the relative incentives to publish or withhold news
stories would remain largely unchanged, yielding the commercial media bias pat-
terns described above.
Finally, one may argue that our current specification closely resembles a model
of bribery or corporate lobbying, since in effect the firms are paying in order to
influence the media’s reporting behaviour without any of the other canonical
features of advertising cited in the literature. Although this is valid, in reality it
would be more appropriate to interpret such payments as advertising rather than
bribery. Firstly, commercial bribery is illegal in several countries including the
UK (the 2010 Bribery Act) and the U.S., where it is punishable as a felony in
36 out of 51 states and forms part of the definition of ‘aggravated felony’ under
federal immigration law. Therefore, in many countries the most straightforward
(and legal) way that firms have of influencing media reportage would be through
advertising, particularly since as mentioned earlier such revenues are crucial for
the continued survival of private media firms.
Secondly, there are numerous real-world cases of this kind of advertiser-influenced
media reportage. For example Warner, Goldenhar, and McLaughlin (1992), in
a study on magazine reportage of tobacco news stories over the period, state
that magazines that did not contain any cigarette advertisements were circa 40%
more likely to contain news stories that related the health hazards of smoking to
readers compared to other magazines that contained cigarette advertising. There
are also several well-documented cases of firms ending their advertising relation-
ships with certain media organisations in response to the publishing of critical or
potentially-harmful (yet factual) news reports. For example Bagdikian (2000) re-
lates how in 1957 tobacco companies ceased their advertising activities in Readers’
Digest following the publication of an article on the negative effects of smoking
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on health. Therefore, based on the above it seems reasonable to interpret the
payments described in this paper as advertising fees.
2.4.3 Media Competition
In this section we relax the assumption of a media monopolist in order to assess
whether competition affects the conclusions derived so far in this paper. We start
off with the case where media firms are identical to each other in terms of the
magnitude of α, meaning that media firms are of equivalent quality in terms of
their likelihood of receiving a news signal.
In this case, an immediate observation is that, for any N > 1 media firms in
the market then this would ensure the publication of weak news signals (corre-
sponding to β ∈ [1
2
, βSW )) that conform to people’s prior even when θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ).
This is because with competition Firm A cannot afford to suppress weak sig-
nals in all media outlets and take advantage of consumer over-updating whenever
βT > β. For example, if N = 2 and we have a duopolistic media market then
Firm A can, at most, suppress such signals in one media firm. This is because it
is relatively easy to show that RA, which is the advertising fee offered by Firm
A, is always less than double the advertising fee offered by Firm B (RB), for
β ∈ [1
2
, βSW ). Hence, although one media firm may have an incentive to withhold
publication of the news story, the other would accept Firm B’s advertising fee
and publish the story. A similar argument can also be made for contradictory
news signals s = b̂ such that β ∈ (βL, 1− θ], since although in this case Firm A’s
advertising fee would exceed B’s, the existence of N > 1 media firms will ensure
its publication.
Therefore, media competition ensures the publication of weak news stories,
both when s = â and s = b̂. However, in terms of extreme or strong signals
where β ∈ [βSW , 1]) then things are unchanged - these stories would still not be
published whenever θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ). The reason is that both firms have the incentive
to withhold the news story, meaning that both firms will advertise towards this
end. In practice this will simply mean that each firm will split their advertising
fees accordingly across each of the N > 1 media firms operating in the market.
The end result would be that strong news signal would still be withheld from
publication, regardless of the level of media competition.
Similar results are also achieved when considering heterogeneous media firms
that differ in terms of the likelihood of receiving a news signal, α. Once again, the
existence of more than one media outlet breaks the suppression of weak signals,
and yet strong signals are still withheld from publication due to the congruence of
each advertiser’s interests. Nonetheless, a couple of additional interesting insights
are worth noting.
For exposition purposes we consider the duopolistic media market situation
with one high-quality media outlet, denoted by αH , and a low-quality outlet with
αL, where αH > αL. For simplicity, we also assume that despite the quality
difference, both media firms have received an equivalent news signal s = â. If we
assume that each outlet has a fixed number of consumers who cannot read the
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other outlet’s news, then when media signals are weak, such that β ∈ [1
2
, βT ), it
is always optimal for both Firms A and B to advertise in the high-quality media
outlet (αH) rather than the low-quality outlet (αL). The reason is that since
βT is increasing in α, Firm A knows that when the high-quality media outlet
withholds a news signal its consumers will over-update their prior more than the
low-quality media outlet’s consumers, who will tend to rely more on their prior
(hence τT → 1
2
).
Therefore Firm A will have a strong incentive to advertise with the high-
quality media outlet to withhold the news story, while Firm B will also opt for the
same media outlet, except in this case the aim would be to ensure publication. In
this scenario, the model predicts that the high-quality media outlet will withhold
the news signal, while the low-quality outlet will publish it. Next, we consider
the case of moderate news signals where β ∈ [βT , βSW ). Now, it is optimal for
both Firms A and B to advertise with the low-quality (αL) media outlet. The
rationale is similar to that expressed before, in that Firm A knows that consumers
of the high-quality media outlet will still update their prior more than those for
the low-quality outlet, given that βT is increasing in α.
2.4.4 Reputation Concerns
So far we have omitted any demand-side media considerations from the market
for news, focusing instead on how advertising (a supply-side factor) influences
media reporting behaviour. We now introduce reputation effects into our model,
reflecting the fact that the willful suppression of information by media outlets is
detrimental to consumers. The broad idea in this case is that whenever the media
does not publish a news story s, consumers (regardless of their taste parameter
v) can ‘punish’ the media, either by reducing their actual consumption of news
or else by reducing their trust in the media. Regardless of the exact nature of
the punishment, the non-publication of a news story has a negative impact on
the media’s profits.
To keep things as general as possible, assume that when no news story is
published, the media incurs a disutility of LR = L(α), where LR denotes the
reputation cost associated with non-publication. Note that L′(α) > 0 since the
higher the value of α then it is even more likely that a non-publication is the
result of a deliberate withholding of information rather than the lack of an actual
signal.
Once again, we assume that θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ). The key to determining whether
the media would still opt to withhold news signals lies in comparing the revenue
accrued from non-publication to the reputation cost LR. Since the media’s sole
source of revenue is from advertising, then whenever
Ri ≥ L(α) ,
provided that Ri is being paid to withhold the news signal, the media will always
prefer to do so. In our main results, the media had at least a weakly positive
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incentive to withhold the news report s = â for θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ) in two instances,
namely when signals are either weak (β ∈ [1
2
, βT )) or strong (β ∈ [βSW , 1]).
In addition, when s = b̂ the media would also have an incentive to withhold
publication whenever β ∈ (βL, 1− θ]. Clearly, the presence of the reputation cost
reduces the likelihood of the suppression of weak signals when s = â since this
renders Firm A’s advertising fee less attractive relative to Firm B’s, who in this
case would prefer the story to be published. Therefore, if RA − L(α) < RB then
the news signal β ∈ [1
2
, βT ) will be published by the media. Similarly, reputation
costs also render Firm A’s advertising fee less attractive in the s = b̂ case where
β ∈ (βL, 1 − θ], which in turn reduces the probability that such signals will be
withheld.
Matters are a little different when it comes to the strong signal s = â case,
i.e when β ∈ [βSW , 1]. This is because of the congruence of both advertisers’
incentives, who both wish to withhold the news signal. Therefore, in order for
the news report to be published, then the reputation cost must exceed the higher
of the two advertising fees. It is straightforward to show that RA > RB for
θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ): therefore the publication of strong news signals s = â depends on
whether RA < L(α).
Both situations clearly demonstrate that even in the presence of some form of
reputation effect for the media, commercial media bias as described in this paper
may still be present, particularly with regards to the withholding of strong news
signals. Note that our current general specification for reputation costs may easily
be incorporated in a more complicated two-sided market framework as described
in Ellman and Germano (2009) whereby advertising yields additional benefits to
Firms A and B in terms of raising consumer’s willingness to buy their products,
and where the effectiveness of this type of advertising is strictly-increasing in the
media’s reputation (decreasing in LR). The results would be similar to those
described above.
It would also be interesting to combine two of the extensions discussed so far,
namely media competition and reputation concerns, given their natural comple-
mentarity. If we start with the simple duopolistic media setting, then although
RA ≥ L(α) it may still be the case that the strong news signal is published, so
long as RB < L(α). This is because although Firm A would successfully advertise
in order to withhold the news signal in one media outlet, Firm B’s advertising
fee would be rejected by the other media outlet in favour of publication, in or-
der to avoid the negative reputation cost LR. It is straightforward to observe
that when the number of competing media outlets N increases, the minimum
threshold for the reputation cost LR required in order to induce the publication
of strong signals β ∈ [βSW , 1] falls.
Hence competition among media outlets reduces the likelihood of withheld or
suppressed news signals due to the individual reputation concerns of each media
outlet. It is interesting to note that in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) reputation
concern is the main driver behind their form of demand-side media bias where
reports are skewed towards the consumers’ prior: in this paper, such concerns,




This paper has sought to analyse the advertiser-media relationship within the
context of conflicting incentives to publish/withhold a news story. Using a simple
model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation in a duopolistic setting,
we showed that in equilibrium when news signals conform to people’s prior beliefs,
only intermediate or moderate news signals are published in the media; the more
extreme or ‘strong’ news stories are withheld from public consumption. This
result is brought about because more extreme news stories result in a significant
shift in consumer demand across the duopoly, meaning that the firm who suffers
as a result of publication would have an incentive to switch over and eliminate
the vertical product differentiation element, thereby competing on a more direct
basis with the other firm (for sufficiently-low levels of switching costs). Hence,
the beneficiary firm would experience a decline in its profits due to this increased
competition, thus providing an incentive to ensure that the extreme news story
is withheld via advertising.
This result provides an alternative insight into the various empirical and anec-
dotal evidence related to the under-reporting of news stories within the media
(e.g. Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004) in relation to numerous issues like anthropogenic
climate change and the US beef industry’s reliance on additives like pink slime.
The paper also shows that this type of media bias is eroded as competition be-
tween media firms increases and concerns for reputation are introduced in the
model.
Therefore, under certain conditions this paper predicts that media bias due
to advertiser influence will indeed arise, which can have an impact on public
perceptions regarding important issues like climate change and the nutritional
value of food. An interesting outcome of this paper is that, unlike previous
efforts in the literature (e.g. Ellman and Germano, 2009) the policy prescriptions
in terms of regulating the influence and/or role of advertisers are somewhat more
ambiguous since in this simple model media bias (partially) arises in a more subtle
manner due to the beneficiary firm’s incentive to avoid increased competition.
One clear policy conclusion that emerges from this paper is that effective IPR
and patenting protection may help to eliminate this form of media bias by raising
the fixed costs associated with switching over, thereby ensuring that regardless of
the strength of the news story the beneficiary firm would still continue to enjoy
a dominant role in the market. Furthermore, apart from encouraging increased
investment in research and development, this paper also implies that stringent
IPR also promotes the diffusion of new ideas and knowledge via a wide variety
of media (not simply newspapers/TV/radio/etc.) since innovators would know
that their creations or discoveries would be protected from illicit replication by
third parties.
Evidently, such considerations must be weighed against the relative merits
40
of encouraging increased competition among firms, since this paper has nothing
to say in this regard; for example, increased competition may lead to increased
investment in research and development to improve the product and re-establish
vertical product differentiation.
Another interesting point that emerges from this paper concerns the role
played by media competition in reducing the likelihood of advertiser-driven media
bias. This outcome is broadly in line with a number of other studies related to
media competition and media bias. For example, Kerkhof and Muenster (2015)
report that increased competition increases the welfare gains from a cap on adver-
tising introduced by the government, thereby reducing the extent of commercial
media bias by enhancing the alignment between media content and viewer pref-
erences.
Historically, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has strongly
advocated the proliferation of competition in media markets, with regulations in
place barring a single media entity from reaching more than 35% of U.S. house-
holds by TV. However, in recent years there has been a notable shift in FCC
policy towards deregulation of media ownership laws and media mergers. Among
these measures, in 2003 the FCC relaxed this limit to 45%, and in 2007 voted
to eliminate the provision that previously forbade a single company from owning
both a TV station and newspaper or radio station in the same city. Predictably,
many of these policies have been met with stern criticism, since according to
several authors (e.g.Bagdikian, 2000) they have led to increased concentration of




Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by solving ∆A,B for ψ and ω. It is straightforward to see that ∆A,B ≥ 0
if and only if:
ψ
{
≥ ω(s = â)
≤ 1− ω(s = b̂).
The rationale behind this result is as follows. When s = â, if ψ ≥ ω then
Firm A has a clear incentive to ensure that the news story gets published, and will
hence advertise towards this end. From the above expression, this willingness-
to-pay on A’s part (RA) will exceed Firm B’s advertising fee RB, meaning that
∆A,B ≥ 0 and the media would publish the news story. This occurs because
when θ > 1
2
, demand and profits are already skewed in Firm A’s favour due to
the magnitude of consumers’ prior, which combined with the convexity of ∆A,B
in both posterior beliefs ψ and ω, results in Firm A’s advertising fee exceeding
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that offered by Firm B.
When s = b̂, this means that the news signal is contrary to consumers’ prior
(θ > 1
2
), which given the assumptions we made earlier regarding the strength of β
would be sufficient to completely alter consumer beliefs and move them in Firm
B’s direction (ψ ≤ 1
2
). In this scenario, due to convexity of ∆A,B, Firm A stands
to lose more from the publication of s = b̂ than Firm B gains, resulting in the
withholding of the news story. This persists up to the point where the strength
of the news signal β is such that ψ ≥ 1−ω (i.e. for relatively ‘weak’ news signals
s = b̂). Beyond this point (for ‘stronger’ signals s = b̂) Firm B would now have
more of an incentive to ensure publication than Firm A’s willingness to withhold.
Hence, the decision to publish or not hinges on the values of ψ and ω. We
now consider consumer’s updated beliefs when no news report is published (ω).
If no news report is published (as always, for θ > 1
2
), then consumers know that
this situation would arise if either no news report was received by the media
(with probability 1− α) or else if a news report were purposely withheld by the
media (with probability α). It is important to note that ex-ante, consumers have
no idea whether this allegedly-withheld news report is s = â or s = b̂. In the
former case, the willful withholding of news would only make sense if somehow
Firm A believes that the posterior belief under no publication (ω) exceeds the
posterior belief following publication (ψ). Since this implies that β ∈ [1
2
, 1], then
by induction it would be optimal for consumers to pick τ = 1
2
as their imputed
value of β whenever they believe that s = â is being purposely withheld, since this
ensures that ψ ≥ ω, thus preventing the deliberate concealment of such signals.
On the other hand, whenever a signal s = b̂ is being purposely withheld,
consumers know that this may occur for any news story with signal strength β
such that ψ ≥ 1 − ω . Therefore, when θ > 1
2
and no news report has been
published, consumers’ posterior belief can be characterised as follows















All that remains is to check that the optimal advertising strategies specified
earlier for each firm are consistent with such beliefs. When s = â this entails
checking whether the posterior belief under publication (ψ) exceed that under no
publication (ω). From the above expression it is evident that this holds true for
any value of θ > 1
2
given that ωθ> 1
2
≤ θ∀θ ∈ (1
2
, 1], while for any s = â, ψ ≥ θ.
Similarly when s = b̂ we know that since (by assumption) β ≤ (1−θ) then ψ ≤ 1
2
,




whenever θ ≥ 1
2
.
Therefore, whenever the strength of the news signal β is such that ψ > 1−ω,
the media will withhold the news signal provided that the consumers’ prior is
contrary to the received signal s.We can now derive the cut-off value of β such









When β < βL, the posterior belief under publication are high enough to raise
Firm B’s incentive to publish the story sufficiently to ensure that its advertising
fee exceeds that offered by Firm A, resulting in the publication of the story.
Proof of Lemma 1














(for Firm A switching over when s = b̂) ,
where it is easy to see that ψSWA = 1− ψSWB due to symmetry.
Given that our consumers are assumed to be Bayesian, we can express ψ in
terms of their updated beliefs, which enables us to derive the following expression









where βSW corresponds to the strength of the media signal s = â such that the
posterior belief (when the news story is published) is equal to ψSWs=â. Similarly,
1−βSW refers to the point where, if news signal s = b̂ is published by the media,
consumers’ posterior belief would be equal to ψSW
s=b̂
.
It is easily verifiable that whenever F SW = 0 then ΣA,B ≥ 0 will always hold





. As seen before,
when s = â then β ∈ [1
2
, 1] meaning that ψSWs=â ≥ 12 will always hold true. Hence,
Firm B would always have an incentive to switch over whenever a negative news
story s = â is received by the media. Similarly, when s = b̂ then we know that





For F SW > 0, the only conditions that must be satisfied are that in the case














we arrive at the stated result, whereby in order for both of the above to hold,
F SW ≤ 5
9
.
Proof of Proposition 2
Firstly, note that since we are dealing with the case where the prior belief is such
that θ ∈ [1
2







. Hence in this case we need not consider the possibility of Firm
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A switching over, since posterior belief under no publication will never be low
enough to induce Firm A to switch over. The reason behind this result is that
when no news report is published, consumers’ posterior belief will be skewed in
the direction of their prior since they are uncertain as to the true realisation of
Y as well as the value of β.
Therefore, we can focus solely on ωSWs=â. Firstly, note that ωθ> 1
2
is continuous
in θ over the interval [1
2




















the following expression for our cut-off value of θ:
















Proof of Proposition 4
As discussed earlier, when θ ∈ [1
2
, θSW ), we can formally specify consumers’ pos-














We have already seen that when s = â, Firm A’s advertising fee exceeds that
on offer by Firm B given that the consumers’ prior belief is already skewed in
A’s favour. Furthermore, we showed that whenever ψ ≥ ω then it is in Firm
A’s best interest to ensure that the story is published. The key here is therefore
to determine whether this holds true given our specification of posterior belief
under no publication ωθ∈[ 1
2
,θSW ) above, and given that the news signal is weak or
moderate (β ∈ [1
2
, |βSW ). We know that ψ > θ whenever β > 1
2
for θ > 1
2
, so in
this case it suffices to show whether ωθ∈[ 1
2
,θSW ) < θ. From the above expression
it is straightforward to show that ωθ∈[ 1
2
,θSW ) < θ iff θ ∈ (34 , 1), meaning that for




) it is possible that the posterior belief under no publication would
actually exceed that under publication (ψ). In this case, Firm A would prefer to
suppress the news signal due to this over-updating by consumers.
Therefore, it is necessary to show the conditions under which consumers with




) would over-update their beliefs regarding state Y when
the news signal is withheld relative to the situation where a news story is in-
deed published. To do this, we compare posterior beliefs under publication and
withholding, as shown below:
θβ
θβ+(1−θ)(1−β) ≤ ωθ∈[ 12 ,θSW ).














which indicates the cut-off point for signal strength β such that when β ∈ [1
2
, βT )
Firm A will prefer to withhold the news story rather than have it published due
to over-updating of the consumers’ prior. Thus, the media will withhold such
news stories from publication.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is somewhat similar to (part of) the one provided in Proposition 1.
When θ ≥ 1
2
















Firstly, recall that since β ∈ [0, 1− θ] consumers’ posterior belief under pub-
lication (ψ) would always be weakly less than 1
2
when θ ≥ 1
2
. Secondly, from







whenever s = b̂ and θ ≥ 1
2
, Firm B (A) would have an incentive to advertise in
order to ensure (no) publication. By Proposition 1, we know that when θ ≥ 1
2
Firm A’s advertising fee is at least weakly greater than B’s when the strength of
the news signal β is such that ψ ≥ 1− ω. As before, we denote this cut-off value








with the only difference being that now our expression for ωθ≥ 1
2
is the one derived
above, where firm switch-over is allowed.
Appendix B - Details regarding Number of Cli-
mate Change Articles in U.S. Newspapers, 2004-
2010
Data on the annual number of published newspaper articles related to global
warming issues (over the period 2004-2010) was collated using two main resources
- NewsBank’s NewsLibrary website, which is a searchable online repository of
newspaper articles in the U.S. covering over 4,000 newspapers across the country,
and ProQuest17. For the purposes of searching for relevant climate change news
stories in each newspaper, an appropriate Boolean string-search protocol was em-
ployed, whereby articles containing the words “global warming”, “climate change”
or “greenhouse gas” in either the headline or lead paragraph were sought out,
excluding those articles containing the words “climategate”, “skeptic”, “hoax”,
17These sources have been widely-used in numerous other studies within the literature, like
for example Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).
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“global cooling”, “myth”, “denier”, “denial”, “conspiracy” or “swindle” in the
headline or lead paragraph, for each year over the period January 1, 2004 to De-
cember 31, 2010. The search protocol used can be justified on the basis of the
following points:
• Restricting the search terms “global warming”, “climate change” and “green-
house gas” to just the headline or lead paragraph automatically eliminated
several news stories which had no link to global warming issues;
• The adopted approach also minimised the number of climate-related news
stories appearing as part of a ‘News in Brief’-type section, where the actual
story would only form a small part of the overall content. Furthermore, this
also helped to minimise those articles which simply alluded to global warm-
ing briefly as part of some turn-of-phrase within the scope of an altogether
distinct story;
• The rather exhaustive list of exclusion terms was used in order to eliminate
any overtly climate-skeptic articles which question the scientific validity of
global warming, since the aim of this paper is to gauge the level of coverage
afforded to the scientific facts or developments on global warming over the
period under review. This list of terms was compiled on the basis of content
analysis of climate-skeptic news articles which showed up in our sample
when the search protocol omitted the exclusion terms listed above.
To further ensure reliability and consistency, the search results obtained for
each newspaper were then individually perused for any invalid articles which
should have been excluded but which somehow evaded the search protocol, with
the main focus being on climate-skeptic news stories. In reality the stringency of
the string-search protocol employed meant that very few articles were excluded
on this basis.
Figure 2.3 shows the top 50 newspapers on the basis of the number of climate-
related news stories published in the period under review. From the diagram it
is clear that the largest newspapers in the country dominate the list, with the
Washington Post leading the way with 1,993 articles, followed by the New York
Times (1,687 articles) and the Boston Globe (1,683 articles).
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Figure 2.3: Top 50 U.S. Daily Newspapers by Number of Climate-Related News




(Non-)Random Acts of Kindness:
Media Coverage of the 2004
Indian Ocean Tsunami and
Charitable Donations in the U.S.
3.1 Introduction
The rise of the news media as the Fourth Estate has raised several questions
regarding both its reporting activities as well as its influence on people’s beliefs.
The longstanding view of the media as a neutral supplier of information to the
masses has regularly been challenged, with mounting evidence of slanted or biased
reporting (e.g. Groseclose and Milyo, 2005). And yet none of this debate would
have any importance to society unless the media exerted any sort of influence
over its audience’s decisions, something that has been shown in various contexts
ranging from women’s attitudes towards their ideal body shape (Park, 2005) to
the level of homicides in the U.S. (Phillips, 1983). In this paper the primary focus
is on how the level of media reportage affects individual economic behaviour,
abstracting away from all considerations related to bias. More specifically, we
study the causal link between media coverage of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
in the U.S. on American people’s donations towards the tsunami relief effort,
both in terms of the decision to donate or not as well as the magnitude of these
disbursements.
In order to identify the underlying causal link between newspaper articles
and charitable donations, we use county-level growth rates in violent crime for
the year 2005 as an instrument for tsunami coverage. The basic idea behind
this instrument is that a spike in violent crime in 2005 (relative to the previous
year, or even the average of the previous 5 years) would have generated a surge
in media coverage of such stories, at the expense of tsunami-related articles.
The results show that the number of tsunami-related news stories published in
U.S. newspapers had a statistically significant effect on both the probability and
size of private donations. The estimates indicate that media coverage only had a
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modest impact on the average U.S. citizen’s final decision to donate money or not.
By contrast, the results imply a non-trivial relationship between media coverage
and donation levels since they suggest that if the average daily newspaper had
published one additional tsunami-related news story per week over the 6-month
period immediately after the disaster, this would have boosted average donations
by around 7%, translating to approximately US$131 million (based on estimates
for total private donations towards the tsunami relief effort - see Becker and
Strom, 2005).
In addition we also provide evidence that the media had a larger impact
(in terms of encouraging higher donations) on individuals who had previously
undertaken some form of voluntary work in 2004 as well as people in the 25-34
age bracket. This result is of particular interest for media advertisers since it
implies that young adults are more responsive to information derived from the
media relative to other age groups and controlling for a whole host of respondent-
specific characteristics.
The selection of the Indian Ocean tsunami was motivated both by the scale
of the disaster and the extensive media coverage afforded, as well as the fact that
2005 Center of Philanthropy Panel Study (CPPS), which forms the basis of this
paper, includes a special section on charitable donations related to the tsunami.
We combine this with data on newspaper reportage of the tsunami in the six
months after the disaster (covering 386 newspapers in counties from all across the
50 states and Washington DC). The results underscore the heightened importance
of the media within today’s society, as well as its influence over people’s economic
choices. The results may also be important for the design of future charitable
fund raising campaigns as well as media advertising strategies, by enabling the
careful targeting of specific population subgroups who would be more likely to
respond to any information received via the media.
This paper forms part of the growing economics literature on the behaviour
and impact of the media. For the most part, the main focus of the literature so far
has been on media bias and how such reportage may influence political outcomes.
For example DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) find that the introduction of Fox
News in the U.S. led to a significant increase in the proportion of Republican
votes during both the Presidential and Senate elections, while Chiang and Knight
(2011) look at how newspaper endorsements of political candidates in the U.S.
affect voting behaviour. On the other hand, the non-political impact of the media
has been afforded relatively scant attention in the literature, which is where
this paper fits in. For example Dyck, Volchova, and Zingales (2008) look at
how increased media coverage of corporate governance violations perpetuated by
public limited companies in Russia can induce these companies to change their
policies or attempt to redress the situation in order to mitigate the potential
fallout with shareholders and consumers.
A closely-related paper to ours is by Eisensee and Stromberg (2007), who
look at the U.S. government’s relief efforts in response to various natural dis-
asters over the period 1968 to 2002, concluding that such decisions are mainly
driven by media coverage of these disasters. By contrast, this paper adds to the
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existing literature by focusing on the impact of media reportage on private indi-
viduals’ economic behaviour rather than voting/political choices or government
interventions. Given the pervasiveness of the modern-day media, particularly via
new channels like social media and online portals, such analysis may have signifi-
cant repercussions in terms of consumer sentiment/preferences as well as the level
of economic activity within a country (Doms and Morin, 2004). In addition, this
paper also differs from the existing literature in that it adopts an instrumental
variables strategy in order to determine the causal link between media reports
and individual behaviour.
The paper also represents one of the first attempts at analysing the influence
of media reportage on people’s choices within the context of charitable gift-giving.
The literature on voluntary contributions is relatively vast, and is mainly con-
cerned with the theory of public goods and contribution design mechanisms (see
for example Andreoni, 1990). Nonetheless, a number of empirical studies have
focussed on identifying the main determinants of charitable gift-giving in the
economics literature, including income and age (Kitchen, 1992), tax incentives
(Randolph, 1995), religious beliefs (Andreoni, Payne, et al., 2011), as well as ed-
ucation levels and prior donations towards charitable causes (Brown, Harris, and
Taylor, 2012). By contrast, despite the wealth of anecdotal evidence, the role of
the media as a potential determinant for charitable gift-giving has been afforded
quasi-negligible attention in the literature. Lobb, Mock, and Hutchinson (2012)
analyse the relationship between coverage of the 2010 Haiti earthquake in tradi-
tional and social media and total donations towards the subsequent relief effort in
the U.S., with results showing a positive and statistically significant correlation
between the two. As highlighted earlier, this paper is concerned with identifying
the causal impact of media coverage on both the likelihood and level of individual
charitable disbursements.
3.1.1 The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and Relief Effort
On December 26, 2004 an earthquake of magnitude 9-9.3 struck the Indian Ocean
seabed, some 100 miles off the coast of Sumatra in Indonesia. The earthquake,
which is officially the third largest recorded in human history, led to massive
wave formations in the ocean, with some waves reaching 98 feet and traveling at
significant speeds. The aftermath of the earthquake and subsequent waves (or
tsunami) was devastating - a total of 185,000 people were confirmed to have died,
although it is estimated that the true death toll was in reality closer to 250,000.1.
Fatalities were recorded in no fewer than 14 countries across South East Asia
and Africa, with the worst-hit being Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and
the Maldives, while a significant number of foreign nationals perished due to the
popularity of these countries as tourist destinations during the winter period. In
fact, a total of 2,307 foreigners were reported as dead or missing in the aftermath
of the tsunami from 47 different countries, including some 571 people from Sweden
1According to the US Geological Survey the earthquake vibrated the entire world by ap-
proximately 1cm, and created an 800 mile fault-line in the Earth’s seabed.
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and around 552 from Germany. In addition, the physical damages caused by the
disaster in terms of destroyed homes, schools and infrastructure systems were
catastrophic; it is estimated that over 1.6 million people were displaced as a
result of the tsunami2.
In the wake of the devastation caused by this disaster, an unprecedented
international relief effort was launched by the UN in tandem with several countries
and aid organisations. As seen in Figure 3.1 the U.S. was by far the largest
donor with an estimated US$2.9 billion in aid, followed by Australia (US$1.3
billion - the highest amount relative to GDP) and Germany (US$1.1 billion).
Note that the figures shown reflect amounts pledged by each country rather than
actual disbursements - an important distinction since a number of countries were
reportedly lagging behind in terms of honoring their pledged donations (UN,
2005). The U.S. relief effort, which was spearheaded by former Presidents George
H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, consisted of around US$350 million in donations by
the Federal government (together with the deployment of military assistance to
coordinate the distribution of resources), with the rest of the money coming from
the private sector, boosted by the government’s announcement that any private
donations would be eligible for tax deductions3.
Figure 3.1: Top 20 Donor Countries for the Tsunami Relief Effort (Source: United
Nations Development Program, 2005)
2The financial cost of such damages in the Maldives alone amounted to a reported US$470
million, or 62% of the country’s GDP, according to the UN.
3The general response to the U.S.’s relief efforts by the international community was some-
what mixed, with the UN accusing it (and other Western countries) of being ‘stingy’, while on
the other hand a number of organisations like the US Burroughs Wellcome Fund argued that
the high levels of private donations (fueled by the aforementioned tax deductions) for tsunami
victims was coming at the expense of other causes like African malaria aid.
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3.2 Data
The data on charitable donations towards the tsunami relief effort were obtained
from the 2005 Center of Philanthropy Panel Study (CPPS), which is a wide-
ranging bi-annual national survey on charitable gift-giving conducted by Indiana
University-Purdue University Indianapolis’s Center of Philanthropy in conjunc-
tion with the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research’s Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). A unique feature of the CPPS is that it has been fol-
lowing the same households across the U.S. since 1968, with children and siblings
added on over time; in fact the 2005 survey included a total of 8,041 households
(this figure was reduced to 7,215 observations after accounting for data omissions
and other shortcomings). The CPPS includes extensive data on charitable do-
nations and volunteer work undertaken by each household in the preceding year
across all categories of charities, including religious, environmental, international
aid, medical, arts and culture and educational causes. The 2005 CPPS also in-
cluded a separate section on charitable donations towards the 2004 tsunami relief
effort; data on the dollar amount donated for such purposes were also included,
and this forms the basis of the empirical work conducted in this paper. In addi-
tion, the CPPS also includes a detailed record of the households’ socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics, like educational background, age, and gender,
and these are also used in the subsequent analysis as control variables. Figure
3.2 shows the average donation per household towards the tsunami relief effort in
each of the 50+1 States according to the 2005 CPPS data. A cursory glance at
the diagram shows that Delaware recorded the highest donation per household of
US$150, followed by Kansas and Montana.
Figure 3.2: Average Tsunami Donations per Household by State (Source: CPPS,
2005)
Data on the number of published newspaper articles related to the tsunami
in the 6-month period immediately after the disaster (from December 26, 2004 to
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June 26, 2005) was collated using two main resources - NewsBank’s NewsLibrary
website, which is a searchable online repository of newspaper articles in the U.S.
covering over 4,000 newspapers across the country, as well as the individual news-
papers’ print archives.4 This dual approach was employed in order to maximise
the reliability and accuracy of the data; in case of a discrepancy between the two
sources, the source with the highest number of verifiable articles was selected.
In practice this was rarely the case since: (i) a large proportion of newspapers
use NewsLibrary as their official print archive database, and (ii) in most other
cases (with a few notable exceptions, like all Gannett-owned newspapers) the in-
dividual newspapers’ archives were either incomplete or inaccessible. This meant
that, effectively, NewsLibrary was the main source of data for news articles in
this study. For the purposes of searching for relevant tsunami news stories in
each newspaper, an appropriate Boolean string-search protocol was employed,
whereby articles containing the words “tsunami” or “earthquake” in either the
headline or lead paragraph were sought out, excluding those articles containing
the words “letter” or “letters”, over the period December 26, 2004 to June 26,
2005. The search protocol used can be justified on the basis of the following
points:
• Restricting the search terms “tsunami” and “earthquake” to just the head-
line or lead paragraph automatically eliminated several news stories which
had no link to the events of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (in fact many
sports-related articles routinely use these words allegorically to emphasise
a victory or defeat);
• The adopted approach also minimised the number of tsunami-related news
stories appearing as part of a ‘News in Brief’-type section, where the actual
story would only form a small part of the overall content. Furthermore, this
also helped to minimise those articles which simply alluded to the disaster
briefly as part of some turn-of-phrase within the scope of an altogether
distinct story (this was particularly valid in the case of editorials and opinion
pieces, which regularly used the disaster to emphasise some point, like for
example the then-President’s perceived shortcomings);
• The exclusion of articles containing the words “letter” or “letters” was done
to eliminate all letters to the editor, since it was felt that despite their
ubiquity they do not constitute news stories within the context of media
coverage as defined in this study.
To further ensure reliability and consistency, the search results obtained for
each newspaper were then individually perused for any invalid articles which
should have been excluded (such as news in brief or letters to the editor) but
which somehow evaded the search protocol. This entire process was conducted
for a total of 386 daily newspapers covering all 50+1 States, including national,
state-wide and local newspapers. Figure 3.3 shows the top 50 newspapers on the
4NewsLibrary has been used as the principal source of news-related data in various other
studies, such as Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).
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basis of the number of tsunami-related news stories published in the six month
period immediately after the disaster.
Figure 3.3: Top 50 US Daily Newspapers by Number of Tsunami-Related News
Stories Published from December 26, 2004 to June 26, 2005 (Source: NewsLibrary,
newspaper print archives, 2013)
The choice of newspapers was largely dictated by the demographic character-
istics of the survey respondents in the 2005 CPPS survey, which records both the
State and the Beale code associated to each respondent (city/county codes are
omitted from the final survey due to data protection issues, meaning that for the
purposes of this study it was necessary to focus on newspapers pertaining to each
respondents’ reported Beale code). The Beale coding system is a county-level
geographical classification designed by the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) used to identify the size and degree of urbanisation of the county
in question. The code ranges from 1 to 9, with 1 denoting a central county
within a metropolitan area with a population of over 1 million people, while 9
denotes a completely rural county with no adjacent metropolitan area nearby
and a population of under 20,000 inhabitants. For each State, it is possible to
identify which counties correspond to which Beale code using the USDA’s Rural-
Urban Continuum Codes (for the purposes of this study, the 2003 Continuum
Codes were used) - so for example Los Angeles County pertains to Beale code
1 in California, whereas Woodruff County pertains to Beale code 9 in Arkansas
(in general each Beale code contains around 5-8 individual counties per State).
Hence for every single Beale code entry in the 2005 CPSS, each relevant county
was listed together with (wherever possible) its corresponding highest-circulating
daily newspaper using data compiled by the Alliance for Audited Media; this
search process was conducted for each of these newspapers5.
5In some cases (for example New York State) more than one top newspaper was listed per
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To obtain the final figure for the number of news articles per Beale code (for
each State) a weighted-average was taken based on the relative population of
each county within each code. This was done since, in the absence of any data
related to each respondent’s newspaper of choice or city/county of origin, obtain-
ing a weighted average for the number of tsunami-related articles per Beale code
(per State) represented the most straightforward manner through which to esti-
mate the level of tsunami coverage that each respondent was exposed to over the
period under review. In order to ensure robustness, a second weighted average
was also calculated, this time on the basis of the newspaper’s daily circulation
figures. Both weighted averages are used in the subsequent empirical analysis;
in either case the results obtained are almost identical. An example will help to
clarify matters. Consider the State of New Mexico, where Dona Ana (population
of 174,682 inhabitants based on 2003 data), San Juan (113,801 inhabitants) and
Santa Fe (129,292 inhabitants) counties are all classified as belonging to Beale
code 3, defined as a “county in a metropolitan area of fewer than 250,000 popula-
tion” (USDA, 2003). The top-circulating daily newspaper in each of these coun-
ties is the Las Cruches Sun-News (average daily circulation of 19,641 copies), the
Farmington Daily Times (circulation of 113,801) and the Santa Fe New Mexican
(22,000) respectively, and the number of tsunami-related news stories published
in each of these newspapers over the period December 26, 2004 to June 26, 2005
was 6, 6 and 19 respectively. Hence if we consider the weighted average on the
basis of population, the average number of tsunami-related articles pertaining to
Beale Code 3 in New Mexico is 10 articles, whilst if the circulation-based weighted
average is employed this figure rises to 11.
Table 3.1 presents a brief summary of the main descriptive statistics for each
of the key variables described above. The mean donation to the tsunami relief
effort of US$29.08 is somewhat misleading since this also includes a significant
number of zero donations; in fact from the total sample of 7,215 respondents only
1,726 actually donated money (among those who did donate money, the mean
donation was of US$121.55). The mean number of tsunami-related articles is
64.71 or 69.64 depending on the weighting method employed, which shows the
relative congruence of the two approaches. Due to limited space, in subsequent
sections we shall present the estimates derived using population-weighted tsunami
articles as our explanatory variable of interest. Results using circulation-weighted
tsunami articles have also been computed, and are quantitatively similar to those
shown in the following sections (these are available on request).
3.3 Empirical Analysis and Results
In this section we describe the econometric strategy adopted in this paper. As
alluded to earlier, we are interested in analysing both the impact of tsunami
coverage on the individual’s decision to donate money or not, as well as on the
actual amount donated. We start with the first question. LetDYi refer to a binary
variable indicating whether respondent i donated any money or not as observed
county due to the size of the newspapers and/or the unreliability of circulation figures.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Amount donated to tsunami (US$) 29.07789 142.2636 0 6000
No. of articles (by population) 64.70926 54.75623 1 283
No. of articles (by circulation) 69.64075 58.11173 1 283
N 7,215
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the two main variables of inter-
est in this paper. Data on the amount donated towards the tsunami relief effort
are from the 2005 Center of Philanthropy Panel Study (CPPS), whilst the num-
ber of tsunami-related articles were collated via the NewsLibrary website and
newspaper print archives. The two different measures of tsunami articles relates
to the fact that the CPPS codes each respondent’s home county according to
the level of urbanisation as specified in the USDA’s Beale code system, thereby
incorporating more than 1 county. Therefore for each Beale code we identified
the top newspapers for each county and obtained the number of tsunami arti-
cles for each newspaper. To calculate the associated tsunami coverage for each
Beale code we used two different weighting measures - one on the basis of the
population size of each newspaper’s home county, and the other based on each
newspaper’s average weekly circulation in 2005.
in our data (where DYi ∈ {0, 1}), while DY ∗i is the corresponding latent variable
based on the unobserved propensity to donate money towards the tsunami relief
effort. We can therefore express the individual’s decision to donate money or not
in terms of the following latent variable formulation:





1 if Y ∗i > 0
0 if Y ∗i ≤ 0
where Ai is the number of tsunami-related news articles published by the top
newspaper/s in respondent i’s county over the period December 26, 2004 to June
26, 2005, Xi is a vector of covariates
6 and εi is a random error term. Under the
assumption that εi is normally and independently distributed with zero mean
and a constant variance, the above can be estimated consistently using a Probit
model.7
We next turn to modelling the decision regarding the level of charitable dis-
bursements, which is somewhat complicated by the fact that our donations data
contains a significant number of zeros. Let Yi denote the amount (in U.S.$) of
money donated to the tsunami relief effort by respondent i as observed in our
data, where Y ≥ 0, while Y ∗i represents the corresponding (unobserved) latent
variable for tsunami donations. We can express the amount of money that indi-
vidual i decided to donate towards the relief effort by the following specification:





Y ∗i if Y
∗
i > 0
0 if Y ∗i ≤ 0
6A full description of the control variables used, including summary statistics, is provided
in Appendices A1 and A2.
7Logit estimates were also produced, yielding very similar results; these have been omitted
due to space limitations.
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where υi is a random error term. Under the assumptions that υi is ho-
moskedastic and normally-distributed with mean zero, then applying a Tobit
model to the above relationship would yield consistent estimates for our slope
coefficients.8
The reduced-form equations which form the analytical core of this paper are
thus specified as follows, where (3.1) is estimated using a Probit model while (3.2)
is estimated using a Tobit model:
DYi = ψ + γAi + X
′
iδ + υi (3.1)
Yi = µ+ βAi + X
′
iα + εi (3.2)
Table 3.2 reports the initial results for Equations 3.1 and 3.2 respectively.
Note that standard errors are clustered according to each respondent’s Beale
code within each state, corresponding to a total of 459 clusters. This specifica-
tion is used throughout the rest of the paper. As seen from the results, media
coverage is positively and significantly-related to both the likelihood of donating
money (column 1) as well as the magnitude of charitable disbursements (column
2). It is interesting to note some of the other variables which manifest a positive
and statistically significant relationship in both equations, namely whether the re-
spondent made any charitable donations (above $25) in the previous year, higher
education, marital status, age and the respondent’s participation in voluntary
work in 2004.
Nonetheless, the estimates obtained must be treated with some degree of
caution due to a number of econometric issues. The first problem relates to the
potential reverse-causality that may exist between our dependent variables and
the explanatory variable of interest, namely media coverage of the tsunami. It is
entirely plausible to expect that although increased media coverage may influence
the likelihood and extent of charitable gift-giving, the reverse relationship may
also hold true. This is because if the newspaper realises that donations among its
core readership are high (or that readers have a strong propensity towards such
gift-giving), then it is likely that it will increase its coverage of the tsunami due
to readers’ apparent interest in the subject, in the hope that this will result in
higher circulation figures (as alluded to in Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). This
issue is further exacerbated by the fact that certain news stories detail fund-
raising activities undertaken within the communities served by the newspaper
in question, and which although may compel readers to donate/increase their
donations, are primarily driven by the existing extent of charitable giving.
8In this case it would not be necessary to implement a double hurdle model as proposed
by Cragg (1971) since as we shall see later on the key explanatory variable of interest, namely
newspaper coverage of the tsunami, exhibits a statistically significant relationship with both the
likelihood as well as the level of donations. In fact, this is also observable for most of the other
explanatory variables used in both equations. This means that the factors related the decision
to donate money or not are very similar to those related to the amount of money donated,
which is implicitly-assumed in a Tobit specification.
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In addition, it is likely that our estimates are further compromised by potential
measurement errors which may bias our results downwards. This is because
although we have taken various steps to maximize the validity of our tsunami
coverage variable in terms of the content of each story, no information is available
regarding the actual position of the individual news articles within the newspaper.
The importance of a news article’s position in a newspaper has been looked at
by various authors (e.g. Bogart, 1989), both in terms of page number as well
its relative position on the actual page, and the impact of such positioning on
the likelihood that the article is read. This means that our tsunami articles
variable may contain several stories which could have been overlooked due to
their unfavorable position within the newspaper, thus limiting their influence on
charitable giving within this context.
Table 3.2: Basic Regression Results
(1) (2)
Donation > 0 Amount donated to tsunami
Tsunami Articles 0.000902*** (0.000372) 0.231** (0.111)
More than $25 0.721*** (0.0328) 207.6*** (13.67)
Total family income 0.000000512*** (0.000000159) 0.000296*** (0.0000989)
Wealth 1.46e-08 (1.87e-08) 0.0000208*** (0.00000502)
Voluntary work 0.309*** (0.0404) 88.60*** (6.542)
High School 0.0779 (0.0644) 11.10 (20.91)
Undergrad 0.186** (0.0918) 45.81* (25.21)
Postgrad 0.254*** (0.0598) 77.69*** (23.06)
Catholic 0.0200 (0.0436) 0.137 (7.518)
Jewish 0.418*** (0.108) 118.1*** (23.85)
Protestant -0.0239 (0.0587) 6.285 (11.49)
Other 0.161** (0.0819) 101.8*** (34.09)
Between 25-34 -0.0871 (0.0627) -30.59 (19.41)
Between 35-44 0.0965** (0.0451) 28.13*** (10.73)
Between 45-54 0.0320 (0.0574) 13.98 (20.21)
Between 55-64 0.160*** (0.0393) 38.28*** (9.912)
Gender head 0.202*** (0.0580) 44.85** (18.46)
Marital Status 0.139*** (0.0498) 29.25 (19.44)
Working status head 0.217*** (0.0561) 61.62*** (15.12)
Working Wife 0.0244 (0.0338) 15.81 (10.98)
Retired status head 0.177* (0.0971) 54.14** (25.89)
African American -0.0694** (0.0292) -6.293 (11.23)
Hispanic 0.0341 (0.0910) 23.15 (21.57)
Northeast 0.304*** (0.0498) 82.68*** (16.96)
South 0.141*** (0.00964) 29.94*** (5.230)
West 0.174*** (0.0469) 70.95*** (15.80)
Constant -1.982*** (0.102) -645.9*** (34.80)
Observations 7208 7208
Notes: Column 1 reports Probit coefficients where the dependent variable is a dummy
which takes a value of 1 if the survey respondent donated money towards the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami relief effort. Column 2 reports Tobit coefficients where the dependent
variable denotes the value in US$ individual donations towards the tsunami relief effort.
In both cases the explanatory variable of interest is the number of tsunami-related articles
published in the leading newspapers for each survey respondent’s home county. All data
are from the 2005 Center of Philanthropy Panel Study (CPPS), with the exception of
the tsunami articles data which were collated from the NewsLibrary website and individ-
ual newspaper archives. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Beale code level, are
reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.3.1 Instrumental Variables Approach
In this section we develop an instrumental variables (IV) framework in order
to account for the endogeneity problems cited above. For the purposes of this
paper, the identification strategy employed is to exploit variations in county-
level growth rates in violent crime9. The rationale behind the selection of this
instrument is that a newspaper has a limited amount of space in which to publish
news stories, with several potential articles vying for publication. Violent crime
is one of the most widely-reported news topics in the U.S., and its ubiquity in
American newspapers has been studied at length by the likes of Barak (1994)
who contends that such stories help to sell a significant number of newspapers
which is ultimately the primary aim of any news editor. The immense popularity
of crime-related news stories, according to Barak (1994), is firmly rooted in the
general public’s continued fascination with the salacious and the macabre. In fact,
some authors like Williams and Dickinson (2003) contend that in the pursuit of
higher circulation figures the media often exaggerates the extent or magnitude of
violent crime instances in order to render the news article more attractive to its
audience.
It is therefore entirely likely that over the period December 26, 2004 to June
26, 2005 violent crime and tsunami-related news stories would have both been
vying for column inches in U.S. newspapers. Assuming that there is some rela-
tionship between the incidence of violent crime in a particular county and violent
crime news reportage, we can reasonably expect that newspapers would have fo-
cussed more on such stories if the rate of violent crime had increased relative to
the previous period/s; this would have come at the expense of other news stories
including tsunami-related articles. Therefore we expect a negative relationship
between the growth in violent crime rates and media coverage of the tsunami, as
newspapers would dedicate more space towards crime stories. It is also reason-
able to expect that the selected instrument would not be correlated with either
the likelihood or extent of charitable giving since we are considering the change
in violent crime rates across counties in 2005 rather than the actual level of vio-
lent crime. The latter is more likely to be correlated with some omitted variable
like neighbourhood affluence, educational attainment, etc. (which are controlled
for in our analysis), while the former is mainly dependent on any idiosyncracies
related to a given year (in this case, 2005).
Moreover, the use of growth rates in violent crime as our instrument allows
us to directly tackle the problem of measurement error caused by the lack of
information regarding each article’s positioning in a newspaper. This is because
as mentioned above, violent crime is a key news topic in the U.S. media, both in
terms of actual coverage but also the prominence given to such stories in newspa-
pers (Barak, 1994). Therefore, the use of this instrument will help us to identify
only those tsunami-related stories that feature prominently in a newspaper, since
only those stories would exhibit the kind of negative relationship described above;
other non-prominent tsunami articles would simply not be in competition for col-
9As per the FBI’s definition, violent crime includes all reported cases of murder, non-
negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery and aggravated assault.
59
umn inches with violent crime stories. As a result, we expect the IV estimates
to be higher than those obtained using simple Probit/Tobit, thus correcting for
measurement error.
To further ensure the validity of this point, we use two distinct measures of
violent crime growth rates: one which considers the annualised growth in violent
crime in 2005 relative to 2004, and one which compares violent crime rates in 2005
to the average rate across the preceding 5 years (for each county). Data on county-
level annual violent crime were obtained from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting
Statistics for the years 2000 to 2005. Ideally, since we are only considering the
six-month period after the tsunami it would perhaps have been more appropriate
to compare violent crime rates between December 26, 2004 to June 26, 2005 with
the rates in the preceding months; however only annual data pertaining to each
calendar year are available.
Table 3.3 Panel B reports the first-stage results of the linear regression of me-
dia coverage on both average and annual change in county-level violent crime for
the year 2005. As expected, growth rates in violent crime incidence are negatively
and significantly related to the number of tsunami-centered news articles, irre-
spective of the instrument used or the weighting method employed. The results
show that a one percentage-point increase in the growth rate of violent crime
across counties is associated with a decline in tsunami-related media coverage by
around 23 or 50 news articles, depending on the instrument used.
3.3.2 Results
Table 3.3 Panel A shows the results of our instrumental variables (IV) estimates
for Equations 3.1 and 3.2 respectively, using average changes in violent crime
rates in 2005 as our instrument. Due to limited space we only report results
for the IV estimates in Panel A using changes in violent crime relative to the
5-year average; the results pertaining to annualised changes in violent crime are
reported in Appendix B (the two sets of estimates are quantitatively-similar for
both equations).
We start with the estimates reported in column 1, where the dependent vari-
able captures the decision to donate money or not. Once again, media coverage
is positively and significantly-related to the likelihood of donating money. The
corresponding marginal effect of media coverage at the mean10 is approximately
0.001, which implies that an additional news story on the tsunami would have, on
average, increased the probability of donating money by 0.1 percentage points,
which shows that despite the statistically significant relationship the actual im-
pact of media coverage on an individual’s decision to donate or not was relatively
modest. Apart from various demographic characteristics like age and educa-
tional background, the results also reflect the strong correlation between prior
gift-giving or voluntary work and the individual’s decision to donate or not. 11
10The marginal effects for all estimates in Table 3.3, evaluated at the mean, are provided in
Appendix C.
11Consistent with the findings reported in Brown, Harris, and Taylor (2012).
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In fact, the marginal effects obtained for both variables imply that donating more
than US$25 to charitable causes in 2004, or undertaking some form of voluntary
work, is correlated with a higher probability of donating towards the tsunami
relief effort by 18.7 and 9 percentage points respectively.
As expected, the coefficient on family income is statistically significant, al-
though the estimate for wealth is not. Also of note is the impact of geographical
location, since the results imply that living in the South, North-East and West of
the country was correlated with a higher likelihood to donate money than living
in the Midwest12. This may be due to the fact that a large proportion of terri-
tories within these regions have coastal borders or are located in close proximity
to the coast, meaning that people living in these places would be more likely
to empathise with the plight of the tsunami survivors given their location and
susceptibility to such disasters.13
In terms of the estimates reported in column 2, yet again we find that media
coverage is positively and significantly related to the size of the donations made
to the tsunami relief effort. The marginal effect, evaluated at the mean, of media
coverage on the amount of money donated is 0.27, which implies that an addi-
tional tsunami-related news story published in a newspaper could have raised the
average donation by around US$0.27. Unlike the previous case in column 1, the
result shows that media coverage did have a relatively substantial impact on the
magnitude of donations disbursed. Consider that, as mentioned previously, the
average conditional donation as reported in the survey was of US$121.55; then by
extension (assuming linearity) an additional tsunami-news story published in the
average American newspaper per week (over the six-month period immediately
after the tsunami) could have, according to the results, increased the mean value
of donations by almost 7%, which in aggregate translates to around US$131 mil-
lion, based on estimates for private donations towards the tsunami effort supplied
in Becker and Strom (2005).
Once again, we observe the relative importance of both prior donations and
prior voluntary work - the marginal effects estimates show that donating over
US$25 to charitable causes in 2004 or undertaking voluntary work is correlated
with an increase in average donations of some US$41 or US$19 respectively rela-
tive to others who did otherwise. Similarly, the role of geographical location on
gift-giving is also significant, as are the personal income level and wealth of the
individual concerned, which shows that although the decision to donate or not
may have been motivated by non-monetary factors, the size of the donation was
still related to financial considerations. It is also interesting to note the impact of
religious beliefs as highlighted in Andreoni, Payne, et al. (2011), since in this case
it seems that belonging to the Jewish faith and other religions (which includes
12Geographical regions have been allocated on the basis of the regional divisions provided by
the U.S. Census Bureau’s designated areas.
13In fact in the aftermath of the tsunami many of these coastal areas launched various initia-
tives like tsunami survival training, general tsunami public awareness information campaigns
at local universities and tsunami-preparedness assessments. In addition, following the 2004
tsunami the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center expanded its scope of coverage
to include the U.S. and Canada’s Atlantic coasts.
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various religions like Buddhism and Hinduism) is correlated with higher average
donations relative to Atheists, Catholics and Protestants.
To summarise, the instrumental variables approach (IV) estimates show that
media coverage of the 2004 tsunami had a positive and significant impact on both
the decision to donate money or not as well as the amount of money donated. In
the former case, the results indicate that despite the statistical significance of the
results, media coverage only had a modest effect on the individual’s likelihood of
donating money. On the other hand, the results in column 2 show that media
coverage did indeed have an important and non-trivial impact on the size of
charitable donations.
3.3.3 Interaction Terms
So far this paper has mainly focussed on how media coverage of the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami influenced charitable donations from an aggregated perspective.
However, it is also possible to assess how media coverage influenced the donating
behaviour of different sub-groups within our dataset. This will enable us to
determine which sub-groups or individuals are more responsive to media messages
in terms of their observed behaviour in relation to the content of the news signal.
Due to space limitations we shall only consider Equation 3.2 in the subsequent
analysis; this is justified on the basis that as mentioned previously the estimates
obtained for Equation 3.1 suggest that media coverage only had a minor impact
on the likelihood of donating money.
The results are shown in Table 3.4, whereby each interaction term is included
on a one-by-one basis in Equation 3.2, with the exception of those variables
pertaining to the same broad class (for example the education interaction terms
are all included in the same regression; the same applies for age, religion, race and
geographical location). The estimates show that only two interaction terms have
statistically significant coefficients, namely those pertaining to participation in
voluntary work and the 25-34 respondent age group.14 This implies that increased
media coverage of the tsunami had the highest level of correlation with charitable
disbursements for people who undertook some form of voluntary work in 2004
(relative to those who did not) as well as young adults in the 25-34 age bracket
(relative to the under 25 and over 64 age groups). The slope coefficients for
the voluntary work and 25-34 age group interaction terms are 0.443 and 0.5235
respectively, which in both cases is more than double the coefficient obtained on
media coverage in the original model estimated in Table 3.2 (column 2).
Therefore, the inclusion of various interaction terms suggests a stronger cor-
relation between media coverage of the tsunami and the level of charitable do-
nations among people who undertook some sort of voluntary work in 2004 as
well as individuals in the 25-34 age bracket (relative to the omitted age groups).
The former effect is fairly predictable since one might expect people with volun-
teering tendencies to be more aware of, and possibly respond more emphatically
to, any information related to a charitable cause, but the latter effect is some-
14Where the omitted reference categories are the under 25 and over 64 age groups
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Table 3.3: IV Regression Results
Panel A: Second-Stage IV Results (1) (2)
Donation > 0 Amount donated to tsunami
Tsunami Articles 0.00411*** (0.00106) 1.284*** (0.462)
More than $25 0.696*** (0.0322) 202.7*** (12.61)
Total family income 0.000000436*** (0.000000142) 0.000273*** (0.0000878)
Wealth 1.31e-08 (1.85e-08) 0.0000204*** (0.00000499)
Voluntary Work 0.310*** (0.0410) 90.47*** (6.259)
High School 0.0944 (0.0687) 16.81 (22.09)
Undergrad 0.172** (0.0849) 42.14* (23.48)
Postgrad 0.226*** (0.0708) 69.33*** (23.84)
Catholic 0.0139 (0.0456) -1.675 (7.603)
Jewish 0.295*** (0.101) 80.22*** (26.51)
Protestant -0.00423 (0.0612) 12.70 (13.44)
Other 0.147* (0.0772) 98.00*** (33.86)
Between 25-34 -0.0850 (0.0631) -30.23 (20.15)
Between 35-44 0.0955** (0.0478) 28.27** (11.61)
Between 45-54 0.0254 (0.0572) 11.95 (19.96)
Between 55-64 0.157*** (0.0398) 37.90*** (10.03)
Gender head 0.191*** (0.0512) 42.27** (17.40)
Marital Status 0.144*** (0.0492) 31.31 (19.29)
Working status head 0.209*** (0.0559) 60.10*** (15.11)
Working Wife 0.0342 (0.0322) 19.36* (10.31)
Retired status head 0.169* (0.0952) 52.39** (26.07)
African American -0.142*** (0.0382) -30.33* (16.80)
Hispanic 0.00831 (0.0922) 14.83 (22.81)
Northeast 0.297*** (0.0511) 81.70*** (20.47)
South 0.229*** (0.0347) 59.53*** (10.90)
West 0.276*** (0.0492) 105.0*** (22.53)
Constant -2.187*** (0.101) -722.1*** (46.36)
Panel B: First-Stage IV Results (1) (2)
Average change violent crime -48.52*** (2.752)
Yearly change violent crime -21.35*** (1.078)
Constant 65.47*** (0.654) 66.46*** (0.668)
Observations 7215 7215
Notes: Panel A shows the second-stage results of the instrumental variables (IV) regression analysis. Column
1 reports IV Probit coefficients where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the survey
respondent donated money towards the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief effort. Column 2 reports IV Tobit
coefficients where the dependent variable denotes the value in US$ of individual donations towards the relief
effort. In both cases the explanatory variable of interest (which is ‘instrumented out’) is the number of
tsunami related articles published in the leading newspapers for each survey respondent’s home county. All
data are from the 2005 Center of Philanthropy Panel Study, with the exception of the tsunami articles which
were collated from the NewsLibrary website as well as individual newspaper archives. Panel B shows the first
stage IV results where in both columns the dependent variable is the number of tsunami articles and both
explanatory variables are the instruments based on changes in violent crime. The first row shows results
using growth rates in 2005 county-level violent crime relative to the average from the previous five years as
the instrument (which is used as the instrument of choice in Panel A) while the second row utilizes growth
rates in 2005 county-level violent crime compared to 2004 (used as the instrument of choice in Appendix
B). Data for both instruments are from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics 2000-2005. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the Beale code level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Inclusion of Interaction Terms
Amount donated to tsunami








Between 25-34 0.5235∗ (0.2784)
Between 35-44 0.1358 (0.3412)
Between 4554 0.3202 (0.2758)
Between 5564 -0.0234 (0.2787)
Gender head -0.2724 (0.2059)
Working status head 0.2039 (0.2167)
Retired status head -0.2354 (0.2832)
Working wife 0.2448 (0.2212)
African American -0.1746 (0.2109)
Hispanic 0.0529 (0.3534)




Voluntary Work 0.4430∗ (0.2322)
Notes: The table above estimates a standard Tobit
model, where the dependent variable used in this
table is the value in U.S.$ of individual donations
towards the tsunami relief effort. The explanatory
variables are obtained by multiplying each variable
by the number of tsunami articles in order to obtain
cross-partials. Each cross-partial is included sepa-
rately or as part of its broader class (for example the
age variables are all included together), as explana-
tory variables in the standard Tobit model estimated
in Table 3.3. All estimates reported are Tobit coeffi-
cients. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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what more suggestive. The value of such analysis is twofold - firstly, it may
assist charitable organisations in the design of appropriate donation solicitation
campaigns by identifying precisely which types of individuals are more likely to
increase their disbursements in response to information related to the charitable
cause in question. So in this case, it appears that such information campaigns
should be targeted at people with prior volunteering propensities (a somewhat
self-evident conclusion) and, crucially, young adults. Secondly, the analysis also
has wider implications for the study of the media’s role in society as a whole
since it enables us to identify which individuals or cohorts are more likely to be
susceptible to news signals received from the media, although clearly one can-
not infer any causal linkages from the above analysis. The importance of these
findings go beyond the current framework of newspaper reports related to the
2004 tsunami, and extend to other issues like articles related to climate change,
Obamacare and obesity, across a wide variety of media outlets. Various studies
(primarily in the psychology literature) have shown the extent to which young
adults are influenced by media reports in relation to various issues. For example,
Harrison and Cantor (2006) find a positive and significant relationship between
exposure to media content on ideal body shape and college women’s negative self-
perceptions and the incidence of eating disorder symptoms. This paper therefore
complements this literature by suggesting that the young adult segment of the
population (25-34) exhibited a stronger correlation between exposure to media
content and their economic choices (as gauged by the increase in tsunami dona-
tions) relative to other age groups and controlling for a whole host of factors like
education, religion, gender and prior donating/volunteering behaviour, although
once again we must caution against any causal interpretations.
3.4 Robustness Tests
The preceding section showed how media coverage of the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami influenced both the private individual’s decision to donate money or not
as well as the magnitude of such disbursements. These results hold under various
conditions, including the use of alternative weighting methods for calculating
media coverage in each U.S. county (i.e. by population vs. by circulation) and
the use of annual change in county-level violent crime (from 2004 to 2005) as the
instrumental variable of choice as opposed to the change in 2005 crime relative
to the previous 5-year average. In this section we present a number of robustness
checks designed to further test the validity of our results.
3.4.1 Additional Variables
The first set of robustness checks involve the inclusion of a number of additional
variables which may somehow be correlated with our instrumental variable of
choice as well as the likelihood of donating money and the amount donated.
Local community donations: The first variable we consider is related to
the incidence and level of charitable donations towards community and neigh-
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bourhood causes. It might be the case that a spike in violent crime during 2005
in a particular county may have fueled concerns regarding the well-being of local
communities, which in turn may have led individuals to donate more money to-
wards neighbourhood causes or other similar charities, at the expense of tsunami
donations (and irrespective of the coverage afforded by the media to either topic).
In this case there would still be the negative relationship between changes in vi-
olent crime rates and the likelihood/level of tsunami contributions as postulated
above, albeit through a patently-different mechanism. Hence, the existence of
such a relationship may lead to justifiable concerns regarding the reliability of
our identification strategy as well as any results obtained in the previous section.
It is therefore necessary to address such concerns via the inclusion of an addi-
tional variable that captures charitable donations towards neighbourhood causes
in our IV regression models. Fortunately, data on the incidence as well as the
level of donations towards neighbourhood and community improvement organi-
sations in the U.S. for 2005 are readily available via the same 2005 CPPS dataset
from where the tsunami donation data were derived, thus ensuring some degree of
harmonisation and compatibility. We utilise this data to construct two variables
- one is a dummy variable denoting whether the survey respondent donated any
money towards neighbourhood/community causes in 2005, and another which
reflects the amount of money donated by each respondent in 2005 towards such
causes, with each variable included as part of the IV regressions estimated in
Table 3.3, columns 1 and 2 respectively.
Population size: Secondly, we include the population size of each respon-
dent’s county of residence. The idea behind this inclusion is that people from large
urban counties may be more likely to donate money to international aid causes
such as the Indian Ocean tsunami. This is due to various factors like greater ex-
posure to foreign cultures due to the cosmopolitan nature of large cities, greater
awareness of international affairs and relief efforts due to increased media cover-
age, and an inherent predisposition to donate to such causes since urban dwellers
may have innate characteristics that are compatible with such behaviour (Rudzi-
tis, 1999). Therefore, it is likely that population size is correlated with both the
amount of media coverage devoted to the tsunami as well as the likelihood/size
of tsunami donations. More importantly, it is also possible that population size
may be systematically correlated with changes in violent crime rates. Although
the actual direction of the correlation may not be immediately clear ex-ante, a
simple regression of changes in violent crime on population size in our data re-
veals a negative relationship whereby larger cities experienced the largest decline
in violent crime rates in 2005; a trend that has largely persisted over the last 10
years (FBI, 2015) . It is therefore possible that population size may be driving
our results even after the use of our violent crime instrument.
Asian population: The third additional variable is the proportion of people
of Asian descent living in the survey respondents’ county of residence. As men-
tioned earlier the tsunami’s devastation was mainly concentrated in South East
Asia, both in terms of fatalities as well as damages incurred. It is reasonable to
expect that a higher proportion of Asian residents within a given county would
have resulted in both a higher probability of donating money as well as higher
66
average donation levels. This is because such a disaster would, in all likelihood,
have resonated to a larger extent among people of Asian origin, and thus in-
creasing the likelihood and extent of any charitable disbursements. In addition,
the presence of a large Asian community within a county may also have induced
other residents to donate money or increase their contribution due to possible
peer effects which could have led to a heightened awareness of the tsunami’s im-
pact. However, this variable may also have an acute impact on media coverage
of the tsunami, since newspaper editors in such areas would have been expected
to maintain a consistently high stream of tsunami-related news stories given the
level of interest among the local community. We therefore introduce a variable
based on US Census Bureau data from 2000, which measures the proportion of
residents of Asian descent within each county.
International awareness: Finally, we also include a variable that seeks
to capture respondents’ awareness or concern with regards to international aid
causes. The importance of innate non-monetary factors was evident in the results
presented above; nonetheless it can reasonably be argued that prior donations and
voluntary work are insufficient for the purposes of capturing respondents’ inter-
national concern given that these two variables (particularly the voluntary work
variable) may simply be reflecting domestic charitable activities. This interna-
tional awareness or concern may be important not just in terms of its relationship
with the dependent variable/s, but also due to the fact that a newspaper whose
core readership holds an active interest in international relief issues would not
diminish its coverage of the tsunami even in the face of rising violent crime in-
stances. On the other hand, the opposite is also likely to hold true - a newspaper
would be more likely to reduce its tsunami coverage and replace it with crime
stories (which would be decidedly local affairs) if its readers are mainly concerned
with domestic issues. To estimate respondents’ international concern we use data
on individual charitable donations towards international development agencies in
2005, which is collected as part of the CPPS survey. A central issue with this
data is that it may also include donations made towards the tsunami relief ef-
fort, since technically it would still count as international aid. Hence we subtract
any tsunami-related donations from the international aid figures, and construct a
dummy variable which assumes a value of 1 if the net international aid donations
(i.e. international aid less tsunami donations) are greater than US$0.
The IV results with the additional included variables are shown in Table 3.5.
As seen from the results, both sets of estimates are largely unchanged from those
obtained in the previous section. The coefficient on media coverage in column
1 is very close to the previous estimate, while the same coefficient in column
2 is still quantitatively close to 1 as before. Note that the coefficient on the
neighbourhood/community donations dummy variable in column 1 is statisti-
cally significant. This indicates that people who donated money to neighbour-
hood/community charities were also more likely to donate money towards the
tsunami relief effort, thus negating the alternative causal mechanism postulated
in this section where higher violent crime fuels higher incidence of such contri-
butions at the expense of tsunami-related disbursements. Conversely, the size of
neighborhood/community donations had no impact on the level of tsunami do-
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nations as seen in column 2. Similarly, population size had a negative influence
on the likelihood of donating money (column 1), although the magnitude of the
estimate itself is negligible, but had no impact on the amount of money donated
(column 2). Note that neither the variable denoting the size of the Asian popu-
lation in each county nor the dummy for international concern yield statistically
significant coefficients in both of the models estimated.
3.4.2 Validity of Identification Strategy
In this section, we further assess the validity of our first-stage IV results (and
the underlying assumptions underpinning the relationship observed) by running
a similar regression, only this time using the number of sports-related stories as
our dependent variable. The reliability of the IV strategy employed rests on the
assumption that a sudden surge in county-level violent crime rates in 2005 relative
to previous years led to a spike in crime-related stories within a newspaper’s main
circulating county, which in turn would have been published at the expense of
more tsunami-related coverage. Hence, in essence our story is one where crime
news stories, fuelled by a surge in violent crime, crowd-out newspaper coverage
of the tsunami due to limited newspaper column inches.
In reality there may be other hypotheses which could reasonably explain this
negative relationship between growth in violent crime and tsunami articles other
than crowding-out, and which in turn may somehow be correlated with the de-
cision to donate money towards the relief effort. In the previous subsection we
sought to tackle some of these potential alternative stories through the inclusion
of additional explanatory variables, like for example respondents’ international
concerns and the proportion of people of Asian descent living in each county.
However, it is entirely possible that there are other potential explanations not
taken into account in the previous set of robustness tests, and which may raise
concerns regarding the IV strategy employed.
Therefore, we propose a more direct way of testing the validity of our first-
stage results. This is based on the idea that if crime stories do indeed ‘crowd-out’
tsunami articles, then it must also be the case that they crowd-out other news
stories too. We therefore test to see whether we observe the same qualitative
relationship when using the number of sports-related news stories as our depen-
dent variable. If this were not the case then it may easily be argued that the
first-stage results reported above are either spurious or else evidence of some al-
ternative identification story than the one proposed in this paper. For example, it
could simply be capturing variations in the international outlook or openness of
the newspaper/readers in question, which in turn may reasonably be correlated
with the individual decision to donate money or not towards the tsunami relief ef-
fort.15 By running the first stage regression on another, completely-different type
of news story, namely sports, we may directly test whether the crowding-out story
15As mentioned earlier, we have already sought to address this issue through the inclusion of
the international aid dummy, although in reality this may constitute a poor proxy for actual
international awareness of respondents.
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Table 3.5: IV Results with Additional Variables
(1) (2)
Donations > 0 Amount donated to tsunami
Tsunami articles 0.00546** (0.00233) 1.708** (0.832)
More than $25 0.664*** (0.0390) 200.6*** (12.65)
Total family income 0.000000403*** (0.000000136) 0.000261*** (0.0000889)
Wealth 1.20e-08 (1.94e-08) 0.0000190*** (0.00000383)
Voluntary work 0.293*** (0.0469) 89.28*** (7.545)
High School 0.0852 (0.0712) 15.14 (22.47)
Undergrad 0.149* (0.0871) 38.25* (21.84)
Postgrad 0.194** (0.0783) 63.64** (24.84)
Catholic 0.0173 (0.0455) 0.791 (8.588)
Jewish 0.258*** (0.0943) 74.49** (34.03)
Protestant 0.00103 (0.0629) 14.86 (14.95)
Other Religion 0.137* (0.0738) 97.40*** (35.67)
Between 25-34 -0.0698 (0.0606) -29.63 (19.95)
Between 35-44 0.111** (0.0452) 30.56*** (10.52)
Between 45-54 0.0293 (0.0549) 11.88 (19.82)
Between 55-64 0.167*** (0.0386) 38.69*** (10.09)
Gender head 0.178*** (0.0513) 40.79** (17.06)
Marital Status 0.146*** (0.0491) 32.00* (19.28)
Working status head 0.207*** (0.0577) 60.83*** (16.16)
Working Wife 0.0403 (0.0284) 21.74** (9.043)
Retired status head 0.166* (0.0966) 54.73** (27.61)
African American -0.144*** (0.0390) -31.06* (17.89)
Hispanic 0.0110 (0.0796) 15.80 (20.19)
Northeast 0.227*** (0.0624) 69.93*** (26.28)
South 0.231*** (0.0577) 62.10*** (16.27)
West 0.343*** (0.103) 130.3*** (34.05)
Dummy community donations 0.254*** (0.0322)
Level of community donations 0.0780 (0.0507)
Population -5.91e-08** (2.87e-08) -0.0000138 (0.0000112)
Asian population 0.0168 (0.0118) 2.408 (2.849)
Dummy int aid 0.129 (0.102) 4.084 (20.93)
Constant -2.242*** (0.144) -744.9*** (58.04)
Observations 7208 7208
Notes: Column 1 reports IV Probit coefficients where the dependent variable is a dummy which
takes a value of 1 if the survey respondent donated money towards the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
relief effort. Column 2 presents IV Tobit coefficients where the dependent variable denotes the value
in US$ of individual donations towards the relief effort. In both cases the explanatory variable of
interest is the number of tsunami-related articles published in the leading newspapers for each of the
survey respondents’ home counties. Once again we use growth rates in county level violent crime in
2005 relative to the previous five year average as our instrument for the tsunami articles variable.
The key difference between this table and the results reported in Table 3.3 above is the inclusion
of 4 additional variables - charitable donations towards neighborhood/local community causes (a
dummy is included in column 1, which assumes a value of 1 if the survey respondent donated money
to such causes; while in column 2 the US$ value of such donations is included), population size,
the Asian population in each county, as well as a dummy denoting international aid donations. All
data are from the 2005 Center of Philanthropy Panel Study, with the exception of the tsunami
articles data which were collated from the NewsLibrary website and individual newspaper archives
as well as the violent crime data, which are from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics for
the period 2000-2005. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Beale code level, are reported in
parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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proposed above is valid or not.
The use of sports stories as our new dependent variable can be justified on
several fronts.Apart from being completely different from violent crime stories,
sports stories can largely be classified as local news rather than international
affairs, meaning that we can directly observe whether a surge in violent crime
crowded out all news stories, or simply those related to international incidents
(like the tsunami).16 Once again, we collect our sports news data using NewsLi-
brary as well as the individual newspapers’ online print archives, over the period
December 26, 2004 to June 26, 2005. In this case, we searched for articles contain-
ing the words “sports”, “football’, “basketball”, “baseball”, “soccer”, “hockey”,
“golf”, “tennis”, “wrestling”, “NASCAR”, “IndyCar” or “UFC” in either the
headline or lead paragraph, once again omitting articles containing the words
“letter” or “letters”. The rather exhaustive list of search terms was used in order
to cover the entire spectrum of popular sports across the U.S.. This process was
conducted for each of the 386 newspapers covered in the previous section, using
the same weighting methods described above.
Table 3.6: Changes in Violent Crime & Sports Coverage
(1)
Sports Articles





Notes: In this table we present an alternative
first-stage regression to the one specified in Ta-
ble 3.3 (Panel B), this time using the number
of sports-related stories published in each of the
respondents’ leading newspapers over the period
December 26, 2004 to June 26, 2005 as our de-
pendent variable. Data on the sports articles
data which were collated via the NewsLibrary
website, while the violent crime data are from
the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics
2000-2005. Robust standard errors, clustered at
the Beale code level, are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results are shown in Table 3.6. We can observe a clear, negative re-
lationship between changes in violent crime and newspaper coverage of sports
news, similar to the one observed for tsunami articles in our first stage IV re-
sults. Hence, this supports the argument that a sudden spike in violent crime
and therefore crime-related stories in 2005 led to less coverage of the tsunami,
and indeed less coverage of other major stories, due to crowding out resulting
from the newspaper’s limited column inches.
16In 2005 no major international sporting events were held, like for example the Olympic




This paper has sought to examine the causal link between media coverage of
a news story and people’s responsiveness to the informational content of the
article. More specifically, we looked at the influence of newspaper coverage of
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami on both the likelihood as well as the magnitude
of individual private donations. As part of the analysis, we used county-level
survey data on charitable gift giving in the U.S. for the year 2005 as well as data
on the number of tsunami-related news stories published by the top-circulating
newspapers pertaining to each county in the six-month period immediately after
the disaster (December 26, 2004 to June 26, 2005). The first set of results showed
a positive and statistically significant correlation between media coverage and
the probability/size of charitable disbursements, although the reliability of these
estimates was called into question due to endogeneity concerns. Therefore, it
was decided to adopt an instrumental variables (IV) approach to estimation,
with county-level changes in violent crime rates in 2005 employed as our main
instrument.
Based on this approach, the results showed that newspaper coverage only
had a modest (albeit, statistically significant) effect on the likelihood of donating
money. By contrast, we observe that coverage of the tsunami had a non-trivial,
positive and statistically significant impact on the amount of money donated. In
fact, the results imply that an additional tsunami-news story per week published
in the average American newspaper (over the six-month period under review)
could have increased the mean value of donations by around 7%, which translates
to approximately US$131 million - an amount which demonstrates the relative
influence of the media in terms of encouraging higher levels of charitable donations
from private individuals. The results are consistent under a number of different
specifications, namely the type of weighting method used in order to calculate the
newspaper coverage variable (by population vs. by circulation) as well as the type
of change in violent crime rates employed as our instrument (i.e. changes in 2005
violent crime relative to violent crime in 2004 vs. the average of the preceding
5 years). Furthermore, the inclusion of various interaction terms constructed
using the media coverage variable and several categorical controls showed that
the media had a larger impact, in terms of encouraging higher donations, on
people with prior volunteering experience as well as young adults in the 25-34 age
bracket. A number of robustness checks were then performed in order to further
test the reliability of the results; this involved the inclusion of additional control
variables for the incidence and size of community/neighbourhood donations, the
proportion of the county-level population of Asian descent and international aid
donations as well as a test on the validity of our identifying relationship.
Therefore, the evidence strongly suggests that the media has a direct and
significant impact on people’s behaviour and decision-making processes. This
point is further highlighted by the fact that although this paper is solely concerned
with newspaper coverage of the tsunami, the magnitude of the media’s influence
on the size of charitable donations was still relatively high. The newspaper is a
relatively passive form of media consumption when compared to other channels
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like television or online news portals which include audio-visual news reports
and other immersive content, in contrast with the standard articles found in the
print media. In fact, McRoberts and Terhanian (2008) find that in the UK,
France and Germany online content is almost twice as influential as television
and approximately ten times more influential than newspapers or magazines.17
Hence the results shown in this study merely represent a lower bound in terms
of the media’s impact on people’s behaviour, and may in aggregate be much
higher than reported, which further underlines the growing role of the media in
society. The potential impact of biased media reportage on individual behaviour
is well-documented and has already been discussed; however, what this paper
suggests is that even the amount of coverage given to a particular news story
or topic can influence people’s perception of the subject matter and ultimately
their behaviour. In this paper the topic in question was the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami, a relatively uncontroversial and decidedly non-partisan issue which was
characterised by the global nature of the subsequent relief effort. Although this
goes beyond the current scope of the paper, it would be interesting to consider
the implications of such findings on the impact that media coverage could have
on various other issues ranging from health (for example the incidence of obesity)
to public perceptions regarding global warming (and all that entails in terms of
buying environmentally-friendly products).
Another key result from this paper is the fact that young adults in the 25-34
age bracket were more responsive to media coverage of the tsunami, in terms of
raising the amount donated, relative to other age-groups, even after controlling
for various factors like income, wealth, education and prior donating tendencies.
As mentioned earlier, this complements numerous studies from psychology which
show the extent to which young adults are influenced by media reportage in re-
lation to various issues like concern for body image (Harrison and Cantor, 2006).
What this paper suggests is that the impact of the media on young adults’ in-
dividual behaviour also extents to their economic choices, which has important
implications from an industrial organisation point of view in terms of the formula-
tion of media advertising strategies. This is because although the results indicate
that 25-34 year old individuals are more responsive to media content, this may
easily be extended to include advertising messages. In fact, other studies have
also shown the responsiveness of young adults to advertising messages in the me-
dia - for example Lamont, Hing, and Gainsbury (2011) find that young people
in general are more likely to engage in sports-related gambling activities follow-
ing exposure to advertisements promoting gambling in Australia. Hence, media
outlets with a large proportion of its audience in the 25-34 age bracket could use
this information in order to generate greater advertising revenue, which is of vital
importance given the decline in traditional sources of income like paid subscrip-
tions (particularly for newspapers) and the predominance of advertising-driven
media firms like free-to-air TV channels and online news portals. The 18-34 age
group has long been considered as the key advertising demographic (Stabile and
17Whereby the authors define the level of ‘influence’ as the total amount of time that con-
sumers spend on each medium, combined with the importance that respondents attribute to
each medium in terms of influencing their daily purchasing decisions via advertising.
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Harrison, 2003) across various media due to the fact that this cohort typically
has more disposable income and less brand loyalty than other age groups, and
thus more receptive to advertising. What this paper suggests is that even after
accounting for income and other individual characteristics, the young adult seg-
ment is still more likely to respond to media messages relative to others, which
implies that this tendency may be driven by non-monetary factors like cognitive
or psychological considerations.
In addition, the results also highlight the potential role of the media as an
effective fund-raising tool for charitable causes. The relative merits of various
solicitation techniques for charitable donations have been studied at length by
various authors - for example Diamond and Iyer (2007) look at the numerous
considerations related to the use of direct mail in order to solicit funds from the
public, with response rates often as low as 0.5%. This paper suggests that while
increased media coverage of a particular issue would only have a minor impact
in terms of convincing people to donate money to the corresponding charitable
cause/organisation, it may nonetheless prove to be a viable and relatively cost-
effective means of increasing the monetary value of donations, particularly given
today’s technological landscape where several social media and online tools can
be mobilised almost instantly in order to raise funds.
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3.6 Appendices
Appendix A1: Description of Variables
Variable Name Description of Variable Source
Donations ¿ 0 Dummy Variable denoting whether re-
spondent has donated money to the
tsunami relief effort
CPPS 200518
Amount Donated Amount (in US$) of money donated to-
wards the tsunami relief effort
CPPS 2005
More than $25 Dummy denoting whether respondent
donated more than $25 to charitable
causes in 2004
CPPS 2005
Family income Income (in US$) of household in 2005 CPPS 2005
Wealth Value (in US$) of household’s net asset
holdings, including property
CPPS 2005
High school Dummy denoting whether respondent
ceased formal education at High School
level
CPPS 2005
Undergrad Dummy denoting whether respondent
ceased formal education at undergrad-
uate level
CPPS 2005
Postgrad Dummy denoting whether respondent
ceased formal education at postgradu-
ate level19
CPPS 2005
Catholic Dummy denoting whether respondent
is a Catholic
CPPS 2005
Jewish Dummy denoting whether respondent
is Jewish
CPPS 2005
Protestant Dummy denoting whether respondent
is a Protestant
CPPS 2005
Other Dummy denoting whether respondent
belongs to another formal religious or-
ganisation (including Hinduism, Bud-
dhism, etc.)20
CPPS 2005
Between 25-34 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 25 and 34 years
CPPS 2005
Between 35-44 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 35 and 44 years
CPPS 2005
Between 45-54 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 45 and 54 years
CPPS 2005
Between 55-64 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 55 and 64 years21
CPPS 2005
Gender head Dummy denoting whether the respon-
dent is male
CPPS 2005




19Omitted category in this case is for respondents with no recognised educational qualifica-
tions.
20Omitted category in this case is for respondents with no religious beliefs (i.e. Atheists).
21In this case due to lack of data we have two omitted categories, namely respondents below
the age of 25 and those above the age of 65.
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Variable Name Description of Variable Source
Retired status head Dummy denoting whether respondent
is retired from work
CPPS 2005
Working wife Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s wife is gainfully occupied
CPPS 2005
African American Dummy denoting whether respondent
is African American
CPPS 2005
Hispanic Dummy denoting whether respondent
is Hispanic22
CPPS 2005
Marital status Dummy denoting whether respondent
is married
CPPS 2005
Northeast Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the North
East of the U.S.
US Census Bureau
South Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the South
of the U.S.
US Census Bureau
West Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the West of
the U.S.23
US Census Bureau
Voluntary work Dummy denoting whether respondent
undertook any voluntary work in 2004
CPPS 2005
Dummy int aid Dummy denoting whether respondent
donated any money towards interna-
tional aid relief in 2005
US Census Bureau
Community donations Amount (in US$) of money donated
towards neighbourhood or community
improvement causes in 2005
CPPS 2005
Asian population Proportion of each county’s population
defined as being of Asian descent
US Census Bureau
22Omitted category in this case is all other ethnic backgrounds (the CPPS only indicates
whether respondent is African American, Hispanic or Other in the survey).
23Omitted category in this case is counties located in the Midwest.
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Appendix A2: Descriptive Statistics of Explana-
tory Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Donations ¿ 0 0.239 0.427 0 1 7215
Amount Donated to Tsunami 29.078 142.264 0 6000 7215
More than $25 0.617 0.486 0 1 7215
Total family income 63486.141 107568.903 -39000 5500000 7215
Wealth 233800.901 958876.278 -363000 42000000 7215
Voluntary work 0.279 0.474 0 8 7215
High school 0.235 0.424 0 1 7215
Undergrad 0.224 0.417 0 1 7215
Postgrad 0.048 0.214 0 1 7215
Catholic 0.196 0.397 0 1 7215
Jewish 0.02 0.14 0 1 7215
Protestant 0.609 0.488 0 1 7215
Other 0.055 0.229 0 1 7215
Between 25-34 0.234 0.423 0 1 7215
Between 35-44 0.215 0.411 0 1 7215
Between 45-54 0.227 0.419 0 1 7215
Between 55-64 0.119 0.324 0 1 7215
Gender head 0.302 0.459 0 1 7215
Marital status 0.501 0.5 0 1 7215
Working status head 0.751 0.432 0 1 7210
Working wife 0.38 0.485 0 1 7213
Retired status head 0.112 0.315 0 1 7210
African American 0.346 0.476 0 1 7215
Hispanic 0.075 0.264 0 1 7215
Northeast 0.146 0.353 0 1 7215
South 0.407 0.491 0 1 7215
West 0.192 0.394 0 1 7215
Community donations 12.307 166.419 0 10000 7215
Asian population 3.281 3.287 0.171 49.529 7215
Dummy int aid 0.027 0.162 0 1 7215
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Appendix B: IV Regression Output - Yearly Change
in Violent Crime
(1) (2)
Donations ¿ 0 Amount donated to tsunami
Tsunami Articles 0.00445*** (0.00161) 1.117** (0.479)
More than $25 0.693*** (0.0390) 203.7*** (13.30)
Total family income 0.000000427*** (0.000000139) 0.000277*** (0.0000906)
Wealth 1.27e-08 (1.86e-08) 0.0000204*** (0.00000501)
Voluntary work 0.310*** (0.0407) 90.13*** (6.330)
High School 0.0958 (0.0712) 15.91 (22.29)
Undergrad 0.170** (0.0842) 42.67* (23.61)
Postgrad 0.223*** (0.0722) 70.76*** (24.58)
Catholic 0.0125 (0.0456) -1.635 (7.514)
Jewish 0.280*** (0.0974) 85.75*** (25.75)
Protestant -0.00273 (0.0628) 11.43 (13.04)
Other 0.144* (0.0758) 98.35*** (33.84)
Between 25-34 -0.0847 (0.0627) -30.32 (20.01)
Between 35-44 0.0959** (0.0476) 28.37** (11.39)
Between 45-54 0.0252 (0.0569) 12.41 (19.92)
Between 55-64 0.156*** (0.0400) 38.09*** (9.973)
Gender head 0.188*** (0.0515) 42.32** (17.49)
Marital Status 0.144*** (0.0487) 30.92 (19.13)
Working status head 0.208*** (0.0555) 60.33*** (14.95)
Working Wife 0.0349 (0.0330) 18.62* (10.60)
Retired status head 0.169* (0.0938) 52.73** (25.72)
African American -0.149*** (0.0518) -26.42 (16.69)
Hispanic 0.00630 (0.0913) 16.39 (22.45)
Northeast 0.297*** (0.0532) 82.19*** (19.25)
South 0.239*** (0.0493) 55.03*** (13.98)
West 0.288*** (0.0617) 100.0*** (22.61)
Constant -2.206*** (0.118) -710.1*** (47.73)
Observations 7208 7208
Notes: The table shows the second-stage results of the instrumental variables regression
analysis. Column 1 estimates an IV Probit model where the dependent variable is a
dummy that takes a value of 1 if the survey respondent donated money towards the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami relief effort. Column 2 shows an IV Tobit model where the de-
pendent variable denotes the value in US$ of donations. In both cases the explanatory
variable of interest (which is ‘instrumented out’) is the number of tsunami articles pub-
lished in the leading newspapers for each survey respondent’s home county. For both
models we use growth rates in 2005 county-level violent crime compared to 2004 as our
instrument. All data is from the 2005 Center of Philanthropy Panel Study, with the
exception of the tsunami articles which were collated from the NewsLibrary website as
well as individual newspaper archives, while violent crime data are from the FBI Uniform
Crime Reporting Statistics 2000-2005. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Beale
code level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix C: Marginal Effects for IV Regression
Results
(1) (2)
Donations ¿ 0 Amount donated to tsunami
Tsunami Articles 0.00119*** (0.000322) 0.268*** (0.0970)
More than $25 0.187*** (0.00666) 40.80*** (1.567)
Total family income 0.000000126*** (4.28e-08) 0.0000570*** (0.0000176)
Wealth 3.77e-09 (5.30e-09) 0.00000426*** (0.00000109)
Voluntary work 0.0897*** (0.0105) 18.90*** (1.602)
High School 0.0278 (0.0208) 3.540 (4.752)
Undergrad 0.0515** (0.0259) 8.995* (5.269)
Postgrad 0.0704*** (0.0240) 15.35*** (5.450)
Catholic 0.00402 (0.0134) -0.349 (1.583)
Jewish 0.0942*** (0.0365) 18.01*** (6.052)
Protestant -0.00122 (0.0177) 2.647 (2.799)
Other 0.0446* (0.0249) 22.22*** (8.213)
Between 25-34 -0.0241 (0.0180) -6.223 (4.108)
Between 35-44 0.0282** (0.0141) 5.994** (2.409)
Between 45-54 0.00738 (0.0165) 2.511 (4.221)
Between 55-64 0.0474*** (0.0119) 8.131*** (2.116)
Gender head 0.0568*** (0.0157) 8.968** (3.774)
Marital Status 0.0416*** (0.0148) 6.541* (3.916)
Working status head 0.0578*** (0.0140) 12.22*** (3.193)
Working Wife 0.00993 (0.00932) 4.061* (2.172)
Retired status head 0.0515* (0.0300) 11.37* (6.164)
African American -0.0403*** (0.0103) -6.282* (3.549)
Hispanic 0.00241 (0.0268) 3.134 (4.873)
Northeast 0.0927*** (0.0160) 18.02*** (4.692)
South 0.0674*** (0.0108) 12.57*** (2.276)
West 0.0849*** (0.0167) 23.33*** (4.912)
Observations 7208 7208
Notes: The table above shows the computed marginal effects, evaluated at the mean,
for the second-stage results of the instrumental variables (IV) regression analysis.
Column 1 estimates an IV Probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy
that takes a value of 1 if the survey respondent donated money towards the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami relief effort. Column 2 shows an IV Tobit model where the
dependent variable denotes the value in US$ of individual donations towards the relief
effort. In both cases the explanatory variable of interest (which is ‘instrumented out’)
is the number of tsunami related articles published in the leading newspapers for each
survey respondent’s home county, and the instrument of choice is the growth rates in
2005 county-level violent crime relative to the average from the previous five years.
All data are from the 2005 Center of Philanthropy Panel Study, with the exception
of the tsunami articles which were collated from the NewsLibrary website as well as
individual newspaper archives, while data for the violent crime instrument are from
the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics 2000-2005. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 4
Lewinsky and Gore: The Impact
of Soft Media Reportage on
Voting Behaviour
4.1 Introduction
The debate surrounding the media’s reporting practices has gathered consider-
able pace in recent years, fueled by the perceived influence of such reportage on
voting behaviour as well as government policy choices. Lately there has been
growing concern with regards to the increased coverage of ‘soft’ stories over more
substantive news items in the mainstream media, with the existence of such re-
porting tendencies highlighted in various contexts, including U.S. TV network
evening news (Hamilton, 2004 and Bagdikian, 2000).
This paper represents the first attempt at assessing the impact of media re-
ports on individual voting patterns, and more specifically the role played by soft
or sensationalist news in influencing electoral choices. We use novel data on the
amount of coverage afforded to the infamous Monica Lewinsky scandal over the
period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000 by a sample of 257 leading daily
newspapers in the U.S., and link this to survey data from the American National
Election Studies (ANES) on individual voting behaviour during the 2000 Pres-
idential election. To account for any potential endogeneity issues we adopt an
instrumental variables approach, where the identification strategy exploits differ-
ences in the number of deaths caused by extreme weather events for each of the
newspapers’ main counties of circulation.
The results show that Lewinsky coverage had a positive and statistically sig-
nificant impact on the likelihood of voting for George W. Bush in the 2000 Presi-
dential election and, in contrast, a negative influence on the probability of voting
for Al Gore. This pattern is visible among both Democrats and Republicans,
with the effect strongest among the former subgroup. In fact, a 5% increase in
newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky scandal could have increased the likelihood
that a non-Republican voted for Bush in the 2000 Presidential election by around
1.9%, with a similar decline reported in the probability of voting for Gore. In
79
terms of the other control variables, prior political choices, race, religion and
individual perceptions regarding Bill Clinton also yield a statistically significant
impact on voting behaviour. On the other hand, we find that media coverage of
the scandal had no impact on voter turnout across all subgroups.
A crucial feature of the Lewinsky scandal is that, as further shown in the re-
sults below, newspaper reportage was not driven by any of the demand or supply
side determinants of political media bias proposed in the literature (Gentzkow and
Shapiro, 2010) like readers’ political beliefs, newspaper editorial bias and owner-
ship. This enables us to abstract away from considerations related to partisan-
driven media bias and its effect on voting, which has been dealt with by the likes
of DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), and focus solely on the electoral influence of
soft or sensationalistic reportage. This independence from political bias also helps
in allaying any doubts that an observed relationship between Lewinsky coverage
and voting is merely a reflection of a general anti-Democrat or pro-Republican
newspaper reporting agenda.
The Lewinsky scandal is the ideal case to analyse since, within the context
of the 2000 Presidential election, it fits in perfectly with the idea of ‘soft’ news
reportage. This is because whereas ‘hard’ news yields positive externalities to so-
ciety (in terms of improved policy outcomes and greater accountability) through
the provision of contextually-relevant information, soft news only provides pri-
vate benefits in terms of entertainment or personal interest (Ellman, 2014), with
limited information regarding the suitability of electoral candidates or policy ef-
ficacy. Thus in terms of the 2000 election, the Lewinsky scandal falls squarely
within this latter definition since apart from dealing with the extra-marital activ-
ities of the President Clinton, it provided little or no information regarding either
Al Gore or George W. Bush, the two candidates in the election, in terms of their
presidential credentials. The Lewinsky scandal has long been held up within the
media and journalism literature as the classic example of soft or sensationalistic
reportage (Lawrence and Bennett, 2001), whereby sensationalism primarily refers
to stories that have no relevance to people’s lives and to society at large, typically
related to celebrities, crime, sex and disasters (Stephens, 2007).
A possible contention might be that the Lewinsky scandal was informative
in terms of Clinton’s moral standards and thus reflected the ethical beliefs or
trustworthiness of the entire Democrat-led administration (including Al Gore,
who was Vice-President). However, this claim can be countered on several fronts.
Firstly, it is unclear whether scandals related to politicians’ personal lives has any
impact on their electoral performance (Bhatti et al., 2013), let alone the political
fortunes of their colleagues or successors. In fact, the Lewinsky scandal seemed
to have little impact on Clinton’s own reputation, since his approval ratings at
the end of his Presidency were the highest recorded in 50 years at almost 70%
(higher than the ratings recorded at any point before the scandal erupted in
January 1998). Secondly, we explicitly account for such concerns by exploiting
the richness of our survey data in order to control for respondent approval of
Clinton’s presidency as well as individual perceptions regarding his moral beliefs.
Finally, we explicitly control for people’s moral qualms with Clinton (and, by
association, Gore) by including control variables denoting respondents’ religious
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beliefs as well as their perceptions regarding Clinton’s impact on the country’s
moral climate.
The paper also considers a number of alternative hypotheses which may ex-
plain the observed relationship between Lewinsky coverage and voting. Firstly,
we address concerns regarding the potential biases involved in self-identification
by respondents as Republicans or Democrats by using an alternative sub-grouping
classification system based on prior voting patterns in the 1996 Presidential elec-
tion. The results are largely unchanged, and in particular the swing from Demo-
crat to Republican is also evident among those who had previously voted for Bill
Clinton. Next, we revisit the idea that the results are being driven by newspa-
pers’ political leanings by explicitly including an explanatory variable denoting
editorial slant; the results are once again unaffected and merely serve to confirm
that Lewinsky coverage was not motivated by partisan beliefs.
In addition, we also consider the possibility that our Lewinsky coverage vari-
able is merely a reflection of media scrutiny afforded to several other scandals
that rocked the Clinton administration, and in particular the 1996 Whitewater
investigation on various controversies which, within the context of this paper,
may have been informative in terms of Al Gore’s presidential capabilities. Given
that the investigation was opened prior to the 1996 Presidential election, we run a
placebo treatment in order to assess whether newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky
scandal had any impact on voting in 1996 election. We find no evidence of any
relationship between Lewinsky coverage and 1996 voting patterns. Finally, the
results are robust to a number of additional checks, including including the use
of an alternative weighting system for our media coverage variable, the use of a
different instrument and testing for attrition bias.
The results indicate that soft news stories which provide little or no infor-
mation regarding the capabilities or suitability of electoral candidates may still
have an impact on people’s voting behaviour. This underscores the significance
of media reportage as a determinant of political outcomes and individual choices,
particularly in light of the recent emergence of more immersive forms of media
consumption like social media. A greater focus on soft news stories is a major is-
sue given the positive externalities associated with informative news, particularly
in terms of the selection of high-quality politicians and ensuring government ac-
countability (Prat and Stromberg, 2005). The results thus raise several questions
regarding the media’s evolving role within the democratic process, since although
the media has often been regarded as a conduit of information between the polit-
ical class and the people, thus enhancing government accountability (Besley and
Burgess, 2001), these results also underscore how even soft news reportage may
influence political outcomes.
This paper contributes to the growing literature dealing with the impact of the
media on voting, with existing work firmly focussed on the role played by partisan
media bias. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) analyse how the introduction of Fox
News in the U.S. cable market influenced voting patterns in the 2000 Presidential
and Senate elections, given Fox’s well-documented conservative leanings. The
results show a 0.4-0.7 percentage point swing in favour of the Republican Party
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in the Presidential elections, as well as a 3-28% gain for Republican candidates
in the Senate elections, in those towns where Fox News was launched between
October 1996 and November 2000. Similarly, Chiang and Knight (2011) look at
how newspaper endorsements of political candidates in the U.S. affect voting be-
haviour. The results show that the extent to which endorsements are influential
in terms of affecting voting patterns largely depends on the perceived credibility
of the message; hence endorsements for left-wing candidates are more likely to be
influential if the emanate from neutral or right-wing candidates. Conversely, in a
field experiment conducted in Virginia prior to the 2005 gubernatorial elections,
Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009) find no significant impact of newspaper ex-
posure on individual political behaviour and opinions. As highlighted previously,
this is the first paper to explicitly look at the influence of media reports on voting,
and more specifically the impact of soft news reportage, abstracting away from
all considerations related to partisan bias.
This paper also adds to the political science literature on the impact of scan-
dals on political outcomes, with the results yielding mixed evidence thus far. On
the one hand Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner (2007) find that negative or detrimental
news has no significant impact on voting patterns, although the results suggest
that it may help stimulate interest in the overall campaign. On the other hand,
Blackwell (2012) finds that negative political advertising campaigns may prove to
be effective if the candidate initiating such a campaign is a challenger, but may
backfire if such a campaign is run by an incumbent. Fridkin and Kenney (2011)
encapsulate the current impasse on the subject within the literature, stating that
the impact of negative stories depends on individual voter characteristics - for
example those with a strong political affiliation or interest in the campaign are
less likely to be influenced by negativity.
4.1.1 The Lewinsky Scandal
On January 17, 1998 the Drudge Report published the first news report detail-
ing allegations concerning a sexual relationship between Bill Clinton and Mon-
ica Lewinsky. The report alleged that the affair was conducted over the period
November 1995 to March 1997, and that in 1996 attempts had been made by
White House officials to relocate Lewinsky to the Pentagon amidst growing con-
cerns regarding her relationship with the then-President. At first the President
forcefully denied any allegations of impropriety, claiming that they were part of a
right-wing conspiracy to tarnish his reputation. Despite initial hesitancy, in July
1998 Lewinsky decided to break her silence and testified in front of a grand jury.
Faced with mounting evidence, President Clinton recanted his original stance and
finally admitted to the affair. He was fined US$90,000 for giving false testimony
under oath and had his license to practice law suspended for five years by his
home state of Arkansas as well as the Supreme Court in 1999. Impeachment
proceedings were launched in December 1998 by the House of Representatives
against President Clinton resulting in a 21-day Senate trial, although he was
subsequently acquitted of all charges on February 12, 1999.
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Public interest in the affair was immense, fueled in part by the salacious na-
ture of the details that emerged from the grand jury investigation as well as the
media furore surrounding the trial. As a result, several academic studies have
analysed the scandal from various perspectives, including the impact of the scan-
dal on President Clinton’s approval ratings (Fischle, 2000) and the media’s role
in the entire affair (Williams and Carpini, 2000). The sheer scale of the scan-
dal is part of the reason why it was selected as part of this study. In addition,
despite its infamy, it is unclear whether the scandal had any tangible impact
on the 2000 Presidential elections. In fact as reported in Fischle (2000), during
the height of the Lewinsky scandal in 1999 President Clinton’s public approval
ratings peaked at 73%, and he eventually bowed out of office in 2000 with ap-
proval ratings of 68%, the highest recorded for a U.S. President in almost fifty
years. Several explanations have been forwarded in order to explain this apparent
anomaly, including the fact that the scandal reflected the President’s personality
traits rather than his performance in Office (Kiousis, 2003). Others (Yioutas and
Segvic, 2003) maintain that the media’s incessant coverage of the scandal, and in
particular its focus on the more salacious sexual details of the affair, only served
to alienate the public and discard the information as irrelevant since, according
to the authors, people tend to associate sexual or adulterous stories with gossip
columns or entertainment rather than political news.
4.1.2 Conceptual Framework
Here we discuss the channels through which media reporting of soft news stories
may influence individual voting behaviour. The first mechanism is related to the
private benefits accruable from consuming ‘hard’ news (e.g. details regarding
Al Gore’s proposed environmental policies) and ‘soft’ news (e.g. the Lewinsky
scandal). More specifically, the defining feature of hard news as described by
Prat and Stromberg (2005) is that its consumption generates external benefits
for the rest of society since it directly informs people’s voting choices, leading to
the election of more effective or suitable political candidates. And even though it
is also plausible to assume that the consumption of hard news has some private
benefit attached to it (e.g. satisfying the reader’s desire to be informed or keep
up-to-date with current affairs), a significant part of the benefits generated by
such news is not internalised by readers. In contrast, soft news only generates
private benefits in terms of entertainment, which are fully internalised.
Therefore, apart from the inevitable under-consumption of hard news from
a social welfare standpoint (as pointed out by Ellman, 2014), it is also straight-
forward to see that consumers, faced with a choice between the two news types,
will opt for soft news unless the private ‘informativeness’ benefit from hard news
outweighs the entertainment benefit of soft news. This is particularly relevant
in the Lewinsky scandal’s case, since although it is ‘soft’ in nature it would still
fall under the category of political news given that it dealt with the private life
of the then-President, meaning that these stories would have been published in
the same section of the newspaper as other hard political articles rather than in
the entertainment or gossip section. Therefore, within this context the choice
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between hard and soft political news will largely hinge on individual private ben-
efits from either type; in turn, this choice will have a bearing on individual voting
decisions.
A second, complementary mechanism considers the variation in people’s cog-
nitive capabilities to process different kinds of political news stories. This is based
on the idea that, as stated by various authors (e.g. Bagdikian, 2000), on average
hard news requires more mental resources in terms of processing and attention
time than soft news. This difference in effort/time will further raise the attrac-
tiveness of soft political news relative to hard news. Consider an economic agent’s
choice between consuming ‘hard’ news stories and ‘soft’ news. We can express
the utility derived from both types of stories as UM = u(s)+u(h), where u(s) and
u(h) denote the private benefits obtained from soft and hard news respectively,
and both are concave in s and h. Consumers have a finite amount of time/effort
to allocate between hard (h) and soft (s) news, T . We can express this time
constraint as T = s + (1 + r)h, where r denotes the additional time/processing
effort required when reading hard news stories (r ∈ [0, 1]). It is easy to derive





Briefly, this Euler-like equation states that, faced with the above problem, readers
will consume soft news until the marginal utility from this type of news is equal to
the marginal utility derived from hard news, discounted by the effort parameter
r. This means that as r increases, so does the amount of time allocated towards
soft news due to the additional effort required to process hard news. Therefore
when the cognitive requirements of processing hard political news is high, people
will opt for soft political news like Lewinsky scandal coverage, which will in turn
inform their voting choices.
This effect would be even more pronounced if we consider that the utility
derived from a newspaper UM depends on consuming a bundle of news topics N
that includes political news, sports news, international affairs, etc., with readers
having to allocate time T optimally across each topic. In this case, consumption
of soft political news makes even more sense since it frees up time to consume
other news topics, particularly if the reader’s utility varies across each topic in
the bundle (for example s/he may prefer sports news to political news). Clearly,
the size of r, and hence the reader’s allocation of time towards soft news versus
hard news, depends on several factors including the reader’s level of political
engagement/interest, cognitive capabilities (proxied by educational attainment,
wages, etc.) and, in the case of the Lewinsky scandal, the importance that
s/he attributes to morality or moral behaviour (proxied by religiosity, church
attendance, etc.). This latter factor is important since people who attribute a
strong importance to moral issues may have been more inclined to read Lewinsky-
related stories since they were related to the moral behaviour of President Clinton
(in line with the psychology literature on confirmatory information - see Lord,
Ross, and Lepper, 1979), and in turn may have been more influenced in terms of
their voting choices.
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Apart from the externality/cognitive processing mechanism, there are other
potential channels through which soft news coverage may influence voting. One
alternative is that such stories simply ‘crowd out’ hard political news, given that
newspapers have limited column inches within which to print stories. Thus in this
situation it is not the consumer who is actively choosing the soft story, but rather
it is the newspaper editor who for various reasons (Hamilton, 2004) is consciously
opting to publish such stories at the expense of hard news. Thus, in the absence
of any hard news voters would rely on soft political news in order to inform their
voting decisions.
This argument can be countered on several fronts. Firstly, although there
has been a well-documented rise in the number of soft or sensationalist news
stories over the last few years, evidence suggests that this has not necessarily
been at the expense of hard news. For example Prior (2003) finds that the
number of hard news stories far outweighs that for soft news in the U.S. media
(particularly with regards to newspapers), and that the rise in the latter is mainly
the result of 24-hour news cycles with space to fill up, while Barnett, Ramsay,
and Gaber (2012) find no evidence of a growing trend towards soft reportage in
the leading UK news programs on television. Furthermore, Baum (2003) reports
evidence to show that reading soft news may actually increase the factual political
knowledge of politically-disengaged people, postulating that such stories may
encourage individuals to read harder, more fact-heavy news stories.
4.2 Data
The data on voting behaviour pertaining to the 2000 U.S. Presidential elections
were obtained from the American National Election Survey’s (ANES) Time Se-
ries Study for the year 2000.1 The ANES is a collaborative effort between Stan-
ford University and the University of Michigan (with funding from the National
Science Foundation), with the expressed aim of providing high-quality data on
voting, public opinion and political participation. The ANES conducts several
surveys as part of its remit, although the majority of its work is focussed on
the Time Series studies which take place during years of national elections in
the U.S. (i.e. both Presidential and Congressional elections). The Time Series
studies are wide-ranging surveys which seek to gauge individual voting patterns
and behaviour for the election in question, together with extensive data on var-
ious socio-economic and demographic characteristics, as well as other variables
1Another possible option would have been the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey
(NAES) conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania,
which is a large-scale public opinion survey related to U.S. presidential elections. Nonetheless,
it is important to point out that the NAES is largely aimed at studying the dynamics of
public opinion during the course of an electoral campaign, most of the survey is focussed on
the pre-election months, with only around 7,000 interviews conducted after the election date.
Taking into account data omissions and other factors, like availability of newspaper archives,
it was decided to opt for the ANES Time Series Study due to its larger eventual sample size
and improved reliability in terms of its national representativeness, given that this paper is
primarily concerned with actual voting behaviour rather than voting intentions.
85
pertaining to respondents’ values, predispositions, social ties and religious beliefs.
The 2000 ANES Time Series study was conducted between September and De-
cember 2000, utilising a statistically representative sample of 1,807 households
from across the country. The study consisted of two phases - the pre-election
survey, which was carried out between September 5 and November 6 (prior to the
election on November 7 ) and the post-election survey, which was held between
November 8 and December 18. For the purposes of this study, we are mainly
interested in the latter phase, since the focus is on actual voting behaviour rather
than voting intentions.2
Hence in total our final sample, after accounting for data omissions and other
shortcomings, consists of 1,555 households who participated in the post-election
survey. One interesting feature of the 2000 Time Series study is that, apart
from the standard variables found in each edition of the survey, it also includes
specific questions related to respondents’ perceptions regarding Bill Clinton and
his legacy, including job approval as well as his impact on the country’s moral
climate, although the survey avoids any direct reference to Monica Lewinsky or
the scandal. Figure 4.1 shows the voting patterns across our sample. As seen
below, it appears that our sample is skewed slightly in favour of Al Gore given
that although the Democratic Party did win the popular vote, the gap between
the two parties was of around 0.5 percentage points, in contrast to the difference
of around 4 percentage points reported in the dataset. This may partially be
due to the higher reported turnout in our post-election dataset, where 75% of
respondents claimed to have voted in the Presidential election, which is somewhat
higher than the actual 67.5% turnout estimate.
Figure 4.1: ANES 2000 Voting Patterns in U.S. Presidential Election (Source:
ANES, 2000)
Data on the number of published newspaper articles related to the Monica
2As a robustness check we include the pre-election observations in our dataset, yielding
markedly-similar results to those reported in the subsequent sections.
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Lewinsky scandal over the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000 were col-
lated using three main resources - NewsBank’s NewsLibrary website, which is a
searchable online repository of newspaper articles in the U.S. covering over 4,000
newspapers across the country, the ProQuest database, as well as the individual
newspapers’ print archives.3 This approach was employed in order to maximise
the reliability and accuracy of the data; in case of a discrepancy, the source with
the highest number of verifiable articles was selected. The time period was se-
lected since as mentioned earlier the first mainstream media news story pertaining
to the scandal broke on January 17, 1998, while the end-date coincides with the
commencement of the pre-election ANES 2000 survey period. For the purposes
of searching for relevant Lewinsky scandal news stories in each newspaper, arti-
cles containing the words “Monica Lewinsky” or “Lewinsky” or “Lewinskygate”
or “Monicagate” or “tailgate” or “sexgate” or “zippergate” or “Clinton” in the
headline, and “Monica Lewinsky” or “Lewinsky” or “Lewinskygate” or “Monica-
gate” or “tailgate” or “sexgate” or “zippergate” in the main body of text were
sought out, excluding those articles containing the words “letter” or “letters”,
over the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000.4
This entire process was conducted for 257 daily newspapers from across the
country, including national, state-wide and local newspapers. Figure 4.2 shows
the top 50 newspapers on the basis of the number of Lewinsky scandal news stories
published over the period under review. As expected the large newspapers lead
the way, with the New York Times topping the list with 867 news stories, followed
by the Boston Globe with 768 articles and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel with
709 articles.
The choice of newspapers was largely dictated by the demographic charac-
teristics of the survey respondents in the 2000 ANES Times Series study, which
records both the State and the congressional district associated with each respon-
dent. For each congressional district, we identified (wherever possible) the top
three daily newspapers by circulation, using data compiled by the Alliance for
Audited Media (2000). As mentioned above, this yields a total of 257 newspapers
which collectively account for over 70% of annual newspaper circulation in the
whole country. To obtain the final figure for the number of news articles per
congressional district (for each State) a weighted-average was taken based on the
relative population of each newspaper’s target counties.
An example will help to clarify matters. Consider the State of California,
where the top three circulating newspapers in the 48th congressional district as
defined in the year 2000 were the Orange County Register (circulation of 250,724
copies per week), the San Diego Union-Tribune (296,331 copies per week) and the
Riverside Press-Enterprise (172,593 copies per week). In turn, these newspapers’
main counties of circulation within this district were Orange County (population
of 1,505,116 inhabitants), San Diego (413,493 inhabitants) and Riverside (100,097
inhabitants). The number of Lewinsky scandal news stories published in each of
3NewsLibrary and ProQuest have been used as the principal sources of news-related data in
various other studies, like for example Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).
4For a more detailed explanation of the data collection process undertaken for this paper,
refer to Appendix C.
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Figure 4.2: Top 50 US Daily Newspapers by Number of Lewinsky Scandal News
Stories Published from January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000 (Source: NewsLi-
brary, ProQuest, newspaper print archives, 2014)
these newspapers over the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000 was 227,
264 and 110 respectively. Hence the weighted average number of Lewinsky news
stories for California’s 48th congressional district in this sample is 228.8 articles.5
Table 4.1 presents a brief summary of the main descriptive statistics for each
of the key variables described above. In total 38% of respondents in the ANES
2000 Time Series study reported voting for Democratic candidate Al Gore, with
34% opting for eventual winner George W. Bush while just over 24% of respon-
dents abstained from voting. On average around 226 news stories related to the
Lewinsky scandal were published in each newspaper over the period January 17,
1998 to August 31, 2000, although this value varied considerably as seen from
the quantitatively large standard deviation obtained.
4.3 The Determinants of Media Reporting Be-
haviour
In this section, we take a closer look at what influenced the level of coverage af-
forded by each newspaper to the Lewinsky scandal over the period under review.
5As part of the robustness tests we also consider an alternative weighting system based
on each newspaper’s relative circulation figures within each congressional district rather than
population; the results obtained are quantitatively very similar.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% Votes for Al Gore 0.38 0.485 0 1
% Votes for George W. Bush 0.341 0.474 0 1
% Abstentions 0.242 0.429 0 1
No. of Lewinsky scandal articles 226.274 203.06 5.009 867
N 1552
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the two main variables of
interest in this paper. Data on individual voting patterns are from the 2000
American National Election Survey (ANES), while the number of newspaper
articles related to the Lewinsky scandal was collated using NewsLibrary,
ProQuest and the individual newspapers’ online news archives.
These results are crucial for the subsequent analysis since they enable us to elim-
inate any impact of partisan/political slant in the media (which is the subject
of other related papers like DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007) and focus exclusively
on the effects of soft news reportage on voting behaviour. Moreover, by ensuring
that Lewinsky scandal coverage is independent of partisan bias, we are also able
to directly tackle concerns that any relationship between scandal reportage and
voting patterns is being driven by a higher general level of anti-Democrat or pro-
Republican news stories over the period under review. Given that such reporting
behaviour is typical of right-wing newspapers as discussed by various authors
(Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010), it is therefore possible to uniquely identify the
effect of media reportage (within the context of Lewinsky scandal coverage) on
voting behaviour, irrespective of newspaper partisan slant.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) identify two broad categories of determinants
of media reporting behaviour and political bias, namely demand side factors and
supply side factors. On the demand side, it is argued that newspapers simply
tailor their reportage according to the opinions or beliefs of their target audience;
thus political media bias is a direct consequence of biased readers (Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005). On the other hand, supply side factors are related to the be-
liefs and/or preferences of journalists/editors (Baron, 2006), advertisers (Reuter
and Zitzewitz, 2006) and owners (Germano and Meier, 2010). Within this con-
text, it is possible to directly assess the main demand and supply side factors
for each newspaper and their influence on the level of Lewinsky scandal coverage
over the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000. The motivation behind
this analysis stems from the fact that although the Lewinsky scandal had a clear
political element to it since Bill Clinton was a Democrat President, the somewhat
tawdry nature of the story also lends itself to heightened media coverage across
the board, irrespective of political slant (Sparks, Tulloch, et al., 2000). Therefore,
the analysis may help to shed light on whether the newspapers’ handling of the
scandal was consistent with the demand and/or supply side factors associated
with political media slant or else due to other factors like sensationalism.
The results are shown in Table 4.2. In column 1 we regress the amount of
coverage afforded by each newspaper to the Lewinsky scandal 6 on the “canonical”
6Whereby coverage is denoted as the number of Lewinsky-related articles published over the
period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000 by each newspaper, divided by the total number
of articles published by each paper over that same period.
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demand and supply side factors determining partisan media bias, namely readers’
beliefs (in this case the proportion of people in each newspaper’s home county
who voted for Republican candidate Bob Dole in the 1996 Presidential election),
ownership (where the variables Gannett, Knight Ridder and Advance refer to the
top three media owners in our sample in the year 2000) and newspaper editorial
slant (using data from Groseclose and Milyo, 2005). This latter variable is an
index ranging from 0-100 that compares the number of times a newspaper refers
to a particular think-tank to the number of times these think-tanks are cited
by members of Congress with known political inclinations based on adjusted
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores for partisanship estimated in
Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) for the period 1993 to 1999. Low scores
(below 50) denote that a newspaper has a conservative bias, while higher scores
(over 50) denote a liberal slant.
As seen from the results, none of our explanatory variables yield statisti-
cally significant results. Column 2 introduces a number of additional control
variables, including geographical location, circulation figures for each newspa-
per, a dummy denoting whether the newspaper is a broadsheet or not, and a
proxy for readers’ interest in political matters (as measured by the voter turnout
rate in each newspaper’s home county during the 2000 Presidential election).
Once again, the impact of demand/supply side factors is still non-existent. In
turn, Lewinsky coverage is positively-related to circulation and the East South-
Central region of the U.S. (which includes Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi and
Tennessee), and negatively-related to the broadsheet dummy. These results sug-
gest that coverage of the Lewinsky scandal may not have been due to some desire
by newspapers to bias or slant their news reports in one direction or another, but
rather fueled by other considerations. In fact the negative coefficient obtained
for the broadsheet variable supports this latter argument, since it indicates that
broadsheet newspapers’ coverage of the scandal lagged behind that of tabloid
newspapers, whose predilections for sensationalism are well-documented (Sparks,
Tulloch, et al., 2000).
4.4 Media Reports and Voting Patterns
Having shown that the level of newspaper coverage afforded to the Lewinsky
scandal was independent of political bias considerations, we now turn to analysing
the extent to which reportage of the scandal influenced voting behaviour in the
2000 U.S. Presidential election. In this section, our primary outcome (dependent)
variables of interest are the share of votes acquired by both leading candidates
in the election. Let Gi refer to a binary variable indicating whether respondent
i voted for Al Gore or not as observed in our data (where Gi ∈ {0, 1}), while G∗i
is the corresponding latent variable based on the unobserved propensity to vote
for Gore. We can therefore express the individual’s decision to vote for Al Gore
or not in terms of the following latent variable formulation:




Table 4.2: Determinants of Media Reporting Behavior
Lewinsky Coverage
1996 Republican Votes -0.0110 -0.00979
(0.0115) (0.0116)
Editorial Slant 0.00261 -0.0103
(0.0144) (0.0160)
Ownership: Gannett -0.255 -0.318
(0.240) (0.261)
Ownership: Knight Ridder 0.401 0.401
(0.252) (0.272)








East North Central -0.219
(0.300)
West North Central -0.182
(0.381)
East South Central 0.865**
(0.429)














Notes: In this table we regress newspaper coverage of
the Lewinsky scandal on the key determinants of par-
tisan media bias proposed in the literature, namely the
political leanings of the newspapers’ readership, the ed-
itorial slant of each newspaper, as well as the political
bias of the owners (where Gannett, Knight Ridder and
Advance Publications are the three largest newspaper
owners in our sample). In Column 2 we also include
a number of additional control variables like newspa-
per circulation, voter turnout and a dummy denoting
whether a newspaper is a broadsheet (as opposed to be-
ing a tabloid). In both columns, ‘coverage’ is denoted
as the number of Lewinsky-related articles published
over the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000 by
each newspaper, divided by the total number of articles
published by each paper over that same period.All data
sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.




1 if G∗i > 0
0 if G∗i ≤ 0
where Ai is the amount of coverage (per 1,000 articles) afforded to the Lewin-
sky scandal by the leading newspapers in respondent i’s congressional district over
the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000 (which is calculated by express-
ing the number of Lewinsky articles published as a fraction total number of news
stories published in each newspaper over the period under review), Xi is a vector
of covariates7 and εi is a random error term. We divide the number of Lewinsky
articles by the total number of published news stories in each newspaper in order
to properly gauge the amount of coverage given to the Lewinsky scandal by each
newspaper relative to its size (in terms of column inches available). This is due
to the fact that newspaper size varies considerably across the country, depending
on the format of the newspaper, editorial/advertising decisions and circulation
figures, meaning that the raw number of published Lewinsky articles may not be
a fair reflection of the actual amount of coverage or importance afforded to the
scandal by each paper.
Similarly, if we denote Bi as a binary variable indicating whether respondent
i voted for George W. Bush or not as observed in our data, with B∗i being the
corresponding latent variable based on the unobserved propensity to vote for
Bush, then we have the following specification:





1 if B∗i > 0
0 if B∗i ≤ 0
where υi is a random error term. Under the assumption that both εi and
υi are normally and independently distributed with zero mean and a constant
variance, the above two expressions can be estimated consistently using a Probit
model.8





= µ+ βAi + X
′
iα + εi (4.1)
We estimate (4.1) separately for each of the two binary explanatory variables
mentioned above using a Probit model.9
7A full description of the control variables used, including summary statistics, is provided
in Appendices A1 and A2.
8In Section 4.4.3 we use a Probit IV model in order to account for endogeneity issues,
particularly measurement error bias.
9Logit estimates were also produced for (4.1), yielding very similar results. A multinomial
logit model was also estimated for (4.1) using the combined voting patterns of the survey
respondents as our dependent variable. Once again, the results are quantitatively close to those
obtained using separate Probit/Logit specifications. These results have been omitted due to
space limitations.
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4.4.1 Basic Regression Results
Table 4.3 reports the initial regression results for (4.1). Columns 1 and 2 report
the regression results for the whole sample, with both Gi and Bi as dependent
variables, while the rest of the table deals with different subsamples of the data in
order to gauge the impact of Lewinsky-related media coverage on different respon-
dent subgroups. Columns 3 and 4 estimate(4.1) for both dependent variables, fo-
cussing solely on those respondents who identified themselves as non-Republicans
- i.e. Democrats, Independents and others. The idea behind this specification is
to acquire an understanding of the media coverage-voting relationship for non-
Republicans, since by definition this group would have been ex ante less likely to
vote for George W. Bush. By the same token, columns 5 and 6 focus on respon-
dents who identify themselves as non-Democrats, i.e. Republicans, Independents
and others.10 In each case, the explanatory variable of interest for the purposes
of this paper is the one denoting the amount of coverage afforded to the Lewinsky
scandal.
The regressions also contain various control variables related to each respon-
dent, including geographical location, educational background, income levels, em-
ployment status, gender, marital status, age, race, religion, prior voting patterns
in both the 1996 Presidential election as well as the 1998 House of Representa-
tives election, perceptions of each Presidential candidate and opinions regarding
Bill Clinton. We also include a variable denoting the average circulation figure of
the top three newspapers within each survey respondent’s congressional district
of residence, in order to account for the fact that high-circulating newspapers af-
forded more coverage to the Lewinsky scandal relative to more local papers which
tend to focus more on regional/micro-level news rather than national or interna-
tional stories. Due to space limitations, in Table 4.3 (and indeed throughout the
rest of this paper) we only present the coefficients of those control variables that
yielded statistically significant results across the majority of specifications; for a
complete list of all control variables used, consult Appendix A1.
As seen from the results, coverage of the Lewinsky scandal is positively and
significantly correlated with the probability of voting for Bush. A closer look at
the table suggests that this result is mainly being driven by non-Republicans,
as shown in Column 3. This implies that newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky
scandal may have influenced the voting behaviour of non-Republicans - who were
a priori less inclined to vote for Bush - by increasing the probability of voting for
the Republican candidate. By contrast, Lewinsky coverage is negatively corre-
lated with the likelihood of a Gore vote, although the coefficients are imprecisely
estimated. In terms of the other explanatory variables, it appears as though geo-
graphical location and age did not have any significant impact on voting patterns,
although prior voting behaviour, Clinton perceptions and religion all yielded sta-
tistically significant results across most specifications.11
10Later on we also use a different subgroup classification systems based on respondents’ voting
patterns during the 1996 Presidential election, obtaining very similar results to those shown in
the rest of this paper.
11In fact the results show that Protestants and Catholics were more likely to vote for Bush
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Table 4.3: Basic Regression Results
Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.0614* -0.0168 0.121** -0.0136 0.0569 -0.0492
(0.0334) (0.0406) (0.0525) (0.0448) (0.0469) (0.0602)
1998 House Republican 1.323*** -0.164 1.150*** -0.0743 1.342*** -0.112
(0.110) (0.112) (0.136) (0.134) (0.123) (0.144)
1996 Clinton -0.271** 1.036*** -0.315** 1.040*** -0.0504 0.800***
(0.132) (0.0976) (0.146) (0.103) (0.152) (0.140)
1996 Dole 1.134*** -0.508*** 0.992*** -0.440** 1.129*** -0.552***
(0.136) (0.159) (0.185) (0.197) (0.142) (0.199)
Like Gore -0.709*** 0.814*** -0.718*** 0.721*** -0.659*** 0.946***
(0.113) (0.0889) (0.138) (0.0980) (0.128) (0.119)
Like Bush 0.878*** -0.645*** 0.808*** -0.551*** 0.789*** -0.564***
(0.106) (0.0958) (0.123) (0.104) (0.119) (0.128)
Approve Clinton -0.257** 0.447*** -0.199 0.423*** -0.222* 0.405***
(0.113) (0.111) (0.136) (0.122) (0.120) (0.136)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.297** -0.363*** 0.371** -0.398*** 0.202 -0.470***
(0.120) (0.117) (0.151) (0.131) (0.132) (0.168)
Protestant 0.342*** 0.0973 0.293* 0.217* 0.338** -0.0210
(0.124) (0.113) (0.156) (0.121) (0.136) (0.159)
Catholic 0.438*** 0.141 0.430** 0.196 0.444*** 0.0465
(0.147) (0.123) (0.173) (0.131) (0.167) (0.168)
Marital Status 0.207* 0.121 0.249* 0.146 0.288** -0.00920
(0.107) (0.0972) (0.130) (0.106) (0.123) (0.139)
Advanced Education -0.176 0.344*** -0.194 0.414*** -0.215* 0.312**
(0.113) (0.0993) (0.136) (0.109) (0.128) (0.134)
Dropout -0.223 -0.497*** -0.178 -0.474*** -0.414** -0.676**
(0.178) (0.151) (0.212) (0.157) (0.191) (0.263)
White 0.323** -0.292** 0.391*** -0.311*** 0.190 -0.137
(0.128) (0.116) (0.150) (0.120) (0.149) (0.182)
Constant -1.279*** -1.140*** -1.288*** -1.009*** -1.071** -1.532***
(0.380) (0.334) (0.426) (0.369) (0.429) (0.465)
Observations 1552 1552 1151 1151 1028 1028
Pseudo R2 0.580 0.441 0.480 0.368 0.522 0.398
Notes: In this table we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election
as reported in the 2000 ANES on the level of newspaper coverage afforded to the Lewinsky scandal by
the leading 2-3 newspapers (by circulation) within each survey respondent’s congressional district,
as well as a host of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield
significant results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). We use two dependent variables
- one is a dummy indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the
other denotes a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression described
above using the full sample; in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents
whose political affiliation as recorded in the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent
or other); while in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is
non-Democrat (i.e. Republican, Independent or other). All data sources are listed in Appendix A1.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Nonetheless, we must also account for potential endogeneity in the regression
results presented above. This may be a cause for concern since it may reasonably
be argued that media coverage of the Lewinsky scandal is merely a reflection of
a general, non-partisan rise in anti-Clinton/Democrat sentiment during the Pres-
ident’s second term in office, particularly in light of the sizeable list of scandals
associated with the Clinton administration. This may have led newspaper edi-
tors and journalists to increase their coverage of the Lewinsky scandal in order to
account for this shift in public opinion, regardless of the individual newspaper’s
inherent political slant. Therefore, it could be the case that both Lewinsky cov-
erage and individual voting patterns are being driven by this (omitted) general,
cross-party antipathy towards the Democrats (an extreme form of the “Clinton
Fatigue” idea described by Geer (2004)). The inclusion of various control vari-
ables related to respondents’ approval of Bill Clinton and the two Presidential
candidates was intended to mitigate against the potential presence of this prob-
lem.
Of greater concern is the likely presence of measurement errors which may bias
our results downwards. This is because although we have implemented various
measures to ensure the reliability of the media coverage data, it is not possible
to identify the actual position of the news article within the newspaper. Plenty
of research has been done in terms of analysing the likelihood of reading a news
article based on its position in the newspaper, both in terms of page number
(Bogart, 1989) as well its relative position on the actual page (Fico and Cote,
1999). For example, apart from the obvious front-page news, stories that are
located in the first 5-6 pages of a newspaper are more likely to be read; the same
thing can also be said for articles printed at the top of the page rather than
towards the bottom. This means that our Lewinsky coverage variable contains
several stories which have a statistically low probability of having been read due
to their unfavourable position within the newspaper, which in turn would limit
their likely impact on voting patterns.
4.4.2 Identification Strategy
The instrumental variables (IV) approach developed in this paper revolves around
finding a suitable variable or instrument which can explain the variation in Lewin-
sky scandal media coverage (Ai) but is uncorrelated with the probability of voting
for either Bush or Gore. With this in mind, the identification strategy employed
is based on variations in the number of people who died, over the period January
17, 1998 to August 31, 2000, as a result of extreme weather incidences (at the
county level).12 The selection of this instrument stems from the fact that a typical
newspaper has a limited amount of space in which to publish news stories, with
several potential articles vying for publication. The battle for column inches is
than atheists or respondents from other religious denominations. By contrast, religion did not
have a statistically significant effect in terms of the probability of voting for Al Gore.
12Extreme weather incidents, as defined by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA), include various events like hailstorms, excessive heat, hurricanes, torna-
does, thunderstorm winds, drought and flash floods.
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perhaps even more critical in the presence of an incendiary news story like the
Lewinsky scandal which dominated headlines for several months, as attested by
the data presented in Figure 4.2.13
It would therefore take a relatively major local incident or news event within
the media outlet’s circulating area in order to usurp any potential reportage on
the Lewinsky scandal, or at the very least relegate it to ‘News in Brief’ status.
In this regard, extreme weather events appear to fit the description since they
are typically localised incidents and have significant public interest due to their
widespread ramifications in terms of deaths, injuries and/or damages for the local
community. It therefore comes as no surprise that extreme weather events are one
of the most widely-reported news topics in the U.S., with coverage levels on the
rise. Ungar (1999) looks at media coverage of extreme weather incidents in the
U.S. over the period 1968 and 1996, finding a significant positive trend over time
(independent of the actual number of weather incidents recorded), postulating
that this may be due to increased public awareness of climate change.
Therefore, based on the above discussion, we use the number of extreme
weather-related deaths over the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000
as our instrument of choice. By concentrating solely on deaths we automatically
eliminate any minor weather incidents which may not have been particularly
newsworthy and instead focus on major weather events. Ex-ante, the number
of deaths from extreme weather events is expected to be negatively-related to
newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky scandal, since as explained earlier extensive
casualties as a result of extreme weather may have led newspapers to focus more
on such stories at the expense of other articles, including the Lewinsky scandal.
We also contend that the only way in which the selected instrument is related
to the respondents’ voting patterns is through the Lewinsky coverage variable
and not via other channels. It may be argued that people living in areas which
registered a high death toll from extreme weather events may have been more
inclined to vote for Bush rather than Gore since the casualty rate may have been
a reflection of poorly-managed or inadequate protection and relief efforts by the
government - accusations which were, somewhat ironically, leveled at President
Bush himself in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in late August/September
2005 (Hartman and Squires, 2006). However, this assertion can be countered on
three fronts:
• It is entirely plausible that, in the event of a high death toll caused by a
perceived lack of government preparation or a slow response to the crisis,
people would apportion the majority of the blame to local/state govern-
ments rather than the Federal government. In fact, despite the criticism
received by the Bush administration in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, a
CNN/Gallup poll conducted on September 8, 2005 showed that 25% of peo-
ple blamed state and local governments for the devastation wrought by the
storm, compared to 13% who blamed President Bush;
13In fact, a Gallup poll (1998) reported that 72% of respondents believed that the U.S. media
afforded too much coverage to the Lewinsky scandal.
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• It is unclear whether a high casualty rate would favour either candidate,
since in reality this may simply reflect the scale of the disaster rather than
any incompetence from the government’s end. Healy and Malhotra (2010)
find no correlation between voting patterns and tornado-caused deaths in
the U.S.; instead, they argue that people may either reward or punish in-
cumbent governments on the basis of their perceived handling of the disas-
ter.
Another key feature of our extreme weather deaths instrument is that its
ubiquity in the news media helps us to directly address the problem of measure-
ment error caused by a lack of information regarding the positioning of Lewinsky
articles in newspapers. A Pew Research Center 2012a study shows that weather
events are the most popular news topic among U.S. citizens, with 52% of people
following such stories very closely, almost double the level of interest shown in the
next most popular topics (including crime and sports stories). This popularity
of extreme weather events has (as mentioned earlier) unsurprisingly resulted in
greater media attention over time, both in terms of the actual coverage (Ungar,
1999) as well as its prime positioning in newspapers and TV news broadcasts
(Sturken, 2001). Therefore, by using extreme weather deaths as our instrument
of choice we are explicitly identifying those Lewinsky stories that feature promi-
nently in the local newspapers, and which would be in competition for prime
column inches with extreme weather stories, while the other non-prime Lewinsky
stories would be eliminated from the reckoning since they would not exhibit any
relationship with extreme weather stories. This would in turn result in higher
coefficients for our Lewinsky coverage variable when using IV relative to those
obtained using standard Probit/Logit in Table 4.3.
Table 4.4 Panel B reports the first-stage results of the linear regression of
Lewinsky-related newspaper coverage on the number of weather-related deaths
over the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000. To construct our instru-
ment, we first obtain data on casualties related to extreme weather instances
from the NOAA for each newspaper’s main county/ies of circulation within each
congressional district in our ANES dataset. We then obtain a weighted average
of the number of weather-related deaths per congressional district using the same
weighting method utilised in the previous section, based on the relative popu-
lation size of each county.14 As expected, weather-related deaths are negatively
and significantly related to the number of Lewinsky news articles, with a unitary
increase in weather casualties associated with a 1% decline in newspaper coverage
of the scandal.
14To further assess the validity of our instrument, we also use changes in extreme weather
deaths in each newspaper’s main circulating county/ies, relative to the average in the previous
20 years. The results obtained are almost identical to those presented below, and are omitted
due to space limitations.
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4.4.3 Instrumental Variables (IV) Results
Table 4.4 Panel A shows the Probit IV results obtained for (4.1), using the num-
ber of extreme-weather deaths as our instrument of choice.15 We start with
column 3, where once again we observe a positive and significant relationship
between Lewinsky coverage and the likelihood of voting for George Bush among
non-Republicans. The estimates are also economically important - the computed
marginal effects (supplied in Appendix B) suggest that a 5% increase in news-
paper coverage of the Lewinsky scandal could have increased the likelihood that
a non-Republican voted for Bush in the 2000 Presidential election by around
1.9 percentage points. The magnitude of these coefficients is significantly higher
than those obtained under standard Probit/Logit in Table 4.3, which confirms
the presence of measurement error in the latter set of estimates which has now
been dealt with through the use of our extreme weather deaths instrument.
Interestingly, the IV results corresponding to voting patterns for Al Gore
among non-Republicans (column 4) this time also yield significant results: in
fact, they indicate that a 5% increase in Lewinsky coverage over the period under
review could have decreased the likelihood of non-Republicans voting for Al Gore
by approximately 1.8 percentage points (based on the marginal effects presented
in Appendix B), almost equivalent to the positive swing in Bush’s favour resulting
from an identical increase in news reportage. Similar results can also be observed
across the entire dataset (columns 1 and 2), although it appears as though me-
dia coverage did not have any impact on the voting patterns of non-Democrats
(columns 5 and 6), confirming what was observed in Table 4.3 previously.
Therefore the results obtained from the Probit IV analysis imply that Lewin-
sky scandal newspaper coverage had an important impact on individual voting
behaviour during the 2000 U.S. Presidential elections by increasing the likelihood
of a Bush vote at the expense of Al Gore, particularly among non-Republicans.
When we consider the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the actual gap between the
proportion of the popular vote obtained by both candidates was of 0.5 percentage
points, then it becomes clear that the media could have played a crucial role in
deciding the final outcome of the election, particularly given the controversy that
erupted in the aftermath of such a close result with the Florida recount.
In Table 4.5 we further sub-divide our dataset according to whether respon-
dents identify themselves as Republicans, Democrats or Independents, in order
to further analyse the results shown in Table 4.4 which are broader in scope.
We can clearly observe that Lewinsky scandal coverage had an important im-
pact on voting patterns for both Democrats and Republicans (columns 1 to 4),
where in either case the effect was to reduce the likelihood of voting for Gore
while raising the probability of a Bush vote, as obtained above. By contrast,
Independents (columns 5 and 6) were not influenced in their voting decisions by
Lewinsky-related media reportage.
A potential cause for concern may be that our current subgroup classifications
15Once again, due to space constraints we only present the estimates for those control variables
which yielded statistically significant results across most specifications.
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Table 4.4: IV Regression Results
Panel A Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.645*** -0.497** 0.784*** -0.463** 0.492 -0.474
(0.184) (0.195) (0.142) (0.204) (0.349) (0.307)
1998 House Republican 0.960*** -0.0975 0.743*** -0.0293 1.138*** -0.0619
(0.266) (0.112) (0.236) (0.131) (0.340) (0.144)
1996 Clinton -0.256** 0.918*** -0.249* 0.938*** -0.136 0.790***
(0.116) (0.152) (0.127) (0.149) (0.150) (0.157)
1996 Dole 0.735*** -0.338* 0.514** -0.284 0.888** -0.398
(0.265) (0.174) (0.249) (0.199) (0.351) (0.245)
Like Gore -0.561*** 0.704*** -0.536*** 0.657*** -0.577*** 0.831***
(0.151) (0.130) (0.154) (0.117) (0.182) (0.206)
Like Bush 0.677*** -0.551*** 0.579*** -0.495*** 0.704*** -0.506***
(0.182) (0.121) (0.167) (0.112) (0.200) (0.152)
Approve Clinton -0.171 0.360*** -0.130 0.370*** -0.142 0.305*
(0.104) (0.121) (0.108) (0.124) (0.136) (0.163)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.294*** -0.371*** 0.316** -0.401*** 0.205* -0.451***
(0.105) (0.109) (0.128) (0.122) (0.123) (0.167)
Protestant 0.355*** 0.0207 0.268** 0.169 0.387*** -0.0965
(0.111) (0.111) (0.130) (0.120) (0.128) (0.162)
Catholic 0.371*** 0.0931 0.249 0.209* 0.489*** -0.0580
(0.139) (0.115) (0.159) (0.121) (0.153) (0.173)
Marital Status 0.149 0.105 0.168 0.127 0.232 0.00950
(0.0990) (0.0880) (0.112) (0.0990) (0.141) (0.128)
Advanced Education -0.0882 0.261** -0.0820 0.335*** -0.150 0.243*
(0.102) (0.107) (0.112) (0.119) (0.138) (0.143)
Dropout -0.139 -0.451*** -0.119 -0.421*** -0.272 -0.694***
(0.159) (0.147) (0.164) (0.157) (0.256) (0.254)
White 0.383*** -0.342*** 0.391*** -0.335*** 0.258* -0.195
(0.105) (0.104) (0.122) (0.113) (0.140) (0.165)
Constant -2.376*** 0.142 -2.197*** -0.0719 -1.990*** -0.342
(0.390) (0.673) (0.359) (0.602) (0.737) (1.075)
Panel B
Weather Deaths -0.0179*** -0.0176*** -0.0175***
(0.00221) (0.00243) (0.00323)
Constant 2.128*** 2.115*** 2.091***
(0.0317) (0.0354) (0.0392)
F -statistic 65.72 52.18 29.27
Observations 1552 1552 1151 1151 1028 1028
Notes: Panel B reports the first-stage results from our instrumental variables approach, whereby we
regress newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky scandal on the number of deaths caused by extreme weather
events in each of the ANES respondent’s congressional districts. In Panel A we report the second-stage
results from our Probit IV analysis, where we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S.
Presidential election as reported in the 2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather
deaths), as well as a host of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which
yield significant results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). We use two dependent
variables - one is a dummy indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise,
and the other denotes a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression
described above using the full sample; in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents
whose political affiliation as recorded in the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent or
other); while in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is non-
Democrat (i.e. Republican, Independent or other). All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: IV Regression Results - Alternative Subgroups
Democrats Republicans Independents
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.956*** -0.621** 0.816*** -0.881*** 0.421 -0.487
(0.312) (0.247) (0.103) (0.0634) (0.503) (0.369)
1998 House Republican 0.827 0.410* 0.572 -0.0774 0.910*** 0.0671
(1.436) (0.234) (0.457) (0.117) (0.294) (0.205)
1996 Clinton -0.0568 0.703** -0.307 0.549** -0.472** 0.882***
(0.533) (0.290) (0.294) (0.246) (0.218) (0.199)
1996 Dole 1.042 0.0966 0.154 0.295** 0.861** -0.592
(1.962) (0.294) (0.378) (0.128) (0.421) (0.375)
Like Gore -0.778 0.379** -0.220 0.239 -0.540** 0.611**
(1.093) (0.176) (0.244) (0.282) (0.240) (0.257)
Like Bush 0.491 -0.284 0.309 -0.215 0.561*** -0.388**
(0.967) (0.188) (0.237) (0.205) (0.180) (0.173)
Approve Clinton 0.133 0.168 -0.0700 0.138 -0.212 0.448**
(0.568) (0.199) (0.158) (0.170) (0.192) (0.202)
Clinton Moral Climate 1.126 -0.276 0.135 -0.132 0.146 -0.535**
(1.211) (0.178) (0.133) (0.139) (0.202) (0.245)
Protestant 0.800 0.107 0.473** -0.426** 0.309 0.229
(1.121) (0.183) (0.195) (0.174) (0.219) (0.210)
Catholic 0.437 0.283 0.646** -0.454*** 0.403* 0.132
(1.176) (0.180) (0.266) (0.168) (0.243) (0.224)
Marital Status 0.0188 0.265* -0.00421 0.0301 0.253 -0.186
(0.227) (0.151) (0.182) (0.140) (0.206) (0.203)
Advanced Education -0.201 0.443** -0.126 -0.0194 -0.237 0.202
(0.490) (0.209) (0.193) (0.115) (0.207) (0.185)
Dropout 0.664 -0.188 0.0172 -0.294 -0.483 -0.708
(1.218) (0.204) (0.277) (0.224) (0.317) (0.436)
White 0.867 -0.399** 0.0989 -0.113 0.315 0.0143
(1.008) (0.167) (0.194) (0.177) (0.214) (0.227)
Constant -5.473 1.378* -2.809*** 2.104*** -0.678 -1.251
(4.405) (0.776) (0.484) (0.702) (0.887) (0.984)
Observations 524 524 401 401 427 427
Notes: In the table above we report the (second-stage) results using instrumental variables (Pro-
bit IV), where we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election as
reported in the 2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather deaths), as well as a
host of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant
results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). We use two dependent variables -
one is a dummy indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and
the other denotes a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression
described above using the subsample of respondents who identifed themselves as Democrats in
the ANES; in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents whose political
affiliation is Republican; while in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of respondents
whose affiliation is Independent. All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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rely heavily on self-reported party affiliation rather than actual prior voting be-
haviour, which may be a better indication of true partisan beliefs.16 Therefore,
we also utilise prior voting behaviour in the 1996 U.S. Presidential elections as
our new subgroups, in order to analyse whether the voting patterns observed in
the results obtained above are still evident. The results are reported in Table
4.6, where the first two columns refer to the subgroup of voters who did not vote
for Republican candidate Bob Dole, while columns 3 and 4 look at the subgroup
of respondents who did not vote for Democrat Bill Clinton, with the final two
columns highlighting the behaviour of those individuals who voted for Clinton.
As seen below, the positive impact of Lewinsky coverage on the likelihood of a
Bush vote is still evident and quantitatively very similar to that obtained previ-
ously across all specifications. In particular, it is interesting to highlight the final
two columns and the clear swing in voting patterns from Gore to Bush among
those who had previously voted for Bill Clinton.
4.4.4 Voter Turnout
It is also possible to analyse the impact of Lewinsky coverage on voter turnout.
Voter turnout in the U.S. is relatively low - the 67.5% turnout estimate reported
above is for registered voters only, with the actual figure plummeting to 51.3%
if we consider the total voting-age population eligible to vote in the 2000 Pres-
idential election. Several arguments have been put forward in order to explain
this low voter turnout in the U.S., including disillusionment with the political
establishment and the two-party system, trust in the government, demographic
considerations and socio-economic factors (Timpone, 1998). Evidence regarding
the influence of bad news on voter turnout appears to be mixed - Krupnikov
(2011) finds that negative news may dampen turnout levels among those whose
preferred candidate is the subject of such information, while Goldstein and Freed-
man (2002) argue that bad news actually induces a higher turnout across the
board, irrespective of voters’ individual partisan beliefs. Within the current con-
text, it would therefore be of interest to analyse the impact of Lewinsky-related
newspaper reportage on voter turnout in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election. The
results are shown in Table 4.7, where the first 3 columns refer to the same sub-
groups specified in Table 4.4. It is clear that media coverage of the Lewinsky
scandal had no impact on voter turnout across all subgroups. In addition, news-
paper coverage did not affect the turnout rate when compared to the previous
Presidential election in 1996, as shown in column 4 where we consider the sub-
group of those respondents who voted in the previous election.
To summarise, the Probit IV estimates show that soft media reportage (in this
case Lewinsky scandal coverage) had a significant impact on voting behaviour
during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election. More specifically, increased media
coverage of the scandal is consistent with an increase in the likelihood of voting
for George W. Bush and a corresponding decline in the probability of an Al
16The rationale behind choosing self-reported partisan affiliation as our main subgroup clas-
sifier stems from the fact that the 1996 U.S. Presidential election was a comfortable victory for
Bill Clinton, with a winning margin of 8.5%, one of the highest of the last century.
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Table 4.6: IV Regression Results - Prior Voting Subgroups
Dole = 0 Clinton = 0 Clinton = 1
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.499* -0.400 0.737*** -0.630** 0.888*** -0.500**
(0.300) (0.272) (0.150) (0.288) (0.129) (0.250)
1998 House Republican 1.102*** 0.169 0.895*** 0.209 0.486 -0.0560
(0.253) (0.123) (0.299) (0.148) (0.305) (0.161)
Republican 0.365** -0.462** 0.474*** -0.439** 0.0565 -0.154
(0.164) (0.187) (0.159) (0.198) (0.461) (0.338)
Democrat -0.724*** 0.838*** -0.571*** 0.797*** -0.396 0.624***
(0.173) (0.125) (0.158) (0.156) (0.321) (0.195)
Like Gore -0.615*** 0.689*** -0.267** 0.592*** -0.712 0.564***
(0.158) (0.123) (0.132) (0.217) (0.460) (0.176)
Like Bush 0.699*** -0.481*** 0.394** -0.263 0.893* -0.665***
(0.182) (0.122) (0.173) (0.170) (0.525) (0.170)
Approve Clinton -0.120 0.433*** -0.147 0.308* 0.0542 0.166
(0.122) (0.113) (0.122) (0.182) (0.250) (0.200)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.373*** -0.368*** 0.294** -0.476*** 0.240 -0.260
(0.139) (0.124) (0.114) (0.169) (0.212) (0.170)
Protestant 0.363*** 0.138 0.364*** 0.0399 0.420** -0.150
(0.138) (0.138) (0.135) (0.160) (0.209) (0.171)
Catholic 0.547*** 0.156 0.525*** 0.0442 0.145 -0.0372
(0.203) (0.119) (0.155) (0.178) (0.283) (0.182)
Marital Status 0.166 0.104 0.142 -0.102 0.192 0.335**
(0.117) (0.100) (0.129) (0.146) (0.195) (0.154)
Advanced Education -0.100 0.427*** -0.0718 0.177 0.0624 0.325*
(0.132) (0.135) (0.105) (0.133) (0.157) (0.196)
Dropout -0.222 -0.581*** -0.310 -0.498** 0.301 -0.500**
(0.203) (0.162) (0.221) (0.222) (0.306) (0.228)
White 0.389*** -0.263** 0.309*** -0.347*** 0.399* -0.158
(0.148) (0.113) (0.120) (0.134) (0.205) (0.162)
Constant -2.009*** -0.0155 -2.169*** -0.204 -3.080*** 1.397**
(0.643) (0.787) (0.439) (1.215) (0.676) (0.665)
Observations 1175 1175 974 974 578 578
Notes: In the table above we report the (second-stage) results using instrumental variables (Probit
IV), where we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election as re-
ported in the 2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather deaths), as well as a host
of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant results;
a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). We use two dependent variables - one is a dummy
indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the other denotes a
vote for Al Gore (or otherwise). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression described above using the
subsample of respondents whodid not vote for Republican Bob Dole in the 1996 U.S. Presidential
election (i.e. voted for Bill Clinton, Ross Perot or others); in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on
the subsample of respondents who did not vote for Democrat Bill Clinton in the 1996 election (i.e.
voted for Bob Dole, Ross Perot or others); while in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of
1996 Clinton voters. All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: IV Regression Results - Voter Turnout
Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats 1996 Voters
Lewinsky Coverage 0.110 0.0739 0.198 0.306
(0.294) (0.278) (0.432) (0.315)
1998 House Republican -2.055*** -1.976*** -2.099*** -1.323***
(0.282) (0.371) (0.326) (0.275)
1996 Clinton -0.990*** -0.980*** -0.802*** -0.118
(0.111) (0.117) (0.156) (0.174)
1996 Dole -1.200*** -1.372*** -1.127*** -0.278
(0.166) (0.258) (0.170) (0.211)
Like Gore -0.393*** -0.412*** -0.376*** -0.0607
(0.0970) (0.104) (0.127) (0.138)
Like Bush 0.0252 0.0899 -0.125 0.0864
(0.0997) (0.113) (0.119) (0.136)
Approve Clinton 0.0822 0.0449 0.114 0.0207
(0.109) (0.124) (0.129) (0.163)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.170 0.212 0.292** 0.201
(0.126) (0.144) (0.141) (0.142)
Protestant -0.226* -0.280** -0.0944 -0.0830
(0.123) (0.129) (0.169) (0.163)
Catholic -0.262** -0.213 -0.203 -0.129
(0.130) (0.140) (0.200) (0.167)
Marital Status -0.275*** -0.293*** -0.286** -0.408***
(0.0966) (0.108) (0.122) (0.133)
Advanced Education -0.346*** -0.481*** -0.219 -0.340**
(0.111) (0.126) (0.140) (0.152)
Dropout 0.547*** 0.452*** 0.891*** 0.427**
(0.134) (0.147) (0.187) (0.200)
White 0.303** 0.299** 0.194 0.253*
(0.119) (0.121) (0.162) (0.152)
Constant -0.171 -0.134 -0.135 -1.700**
(0.790) (0.660) (1.151) (0.737)
Observations 1552 1151 1028 1123
Notes: In the table above we report the (second-stage) results using instrumental variables
(Probit IV), where we regress a dummy variable denoting whether the 2000 ANES respondent
voted or not during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented
by weather deaths), as well as a host of control variables (in the table above we only include
those controls which yield significant results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix
A1). In columns 1 and 2 we focus on the subsample of respondents whose political affilia-
tion as recorded in the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent or other); in
columns 3 and 4 we analyze the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is non-Democrat
(i.e. Republican, Independent or other); while in columns 5 and 6 we focus only on those
respondents who also voted (for any party, and regardless of political affiliation) during the
1996 U.S. Presidential election. All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Gore vote; this swing is observed across both Republicans and Democrats. This
pattern is also observed when considering an alternative subgroup classification
based on prior voting behaviour during the 1996 Presidential election, where
Lewinsky coverage led to a significant shift from Gore to Bush among people who
had voted for Clinton. Conversely, Lewinsky coverage had no impact on voter
turnout across all specifications and subgroups.
4.4.5 Interpretation of Results
We now look at the channels through which Lewinsky coverage may have in-
fluenced individual voting behaviour. In Section 4.1.2 we argued that people
may opt to read soft news rather than more substantive hard stories due to the
time/effort required in order to interpret the latter, whereas the former is more
readily consumable as entertainment. This preference for soft political news may
be related to several individual characteristics, most notably a person’s level of
political engagement or involvement, with several authors (e.g. Baum, 2003 and
Prior, 2003) specifically citing this link as the key determinant in a voter’s read-
ing preferences. A priori, based on the earlier discussion we would expect that
people with a low level of political engagement would be more likely to opt for
Lewinsky-related stories over more substantive news, meaning that Lewinsky cov-
erage would have had a greater impact on their voting choices relative to others.
We can therefore check whether our results are consistent with this idea by
looking at different subsamples within our data on the basis of the ANES respon-
dents’ political knowledge/engagement (based on their survey responses). The
results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.8, where we report the IV results
obtained for different respondent subsamples in each column. In columns 1 and
2 we look at those respondents who were unable to mention at least one of the
candidates involved in the 2000 U.S. House of Representatives election within
their congressional district of residence. Columns 3 and 4 look at the subsample
of respondents who, in the survey, reported that their knowledge of American
politics and government was weaker than that of the average U.S. citizen. The
results are in line with our prior expectations, since in both cases the coefficients
on Lewinsky coverage are statistically significant and larger than those obtained
in the previous section. 17 Note that these results also hold when looking at
the non-Republican subgroup as in Table 4.4. Therefore, it appears as though
Lewinsky coverage had a higher impact in terms of voting on those people who
are politically disengaged or uninformed, in line with the discussion in Section
4.1.2.
We also postulated that respondents’ religiosity may have played a key role in
determining the impact of Lewinsky coverage on voting, since such stories would
have been of greater interest for people whose concern for moral issues is high.
17Conversely, when looking at the subsample of people who were able to mention at least
one House of Representatives candidate, or who reported an above-average knowledge of U.S.
politics/government, the coefficients on Lewinsky coverage were not statistically significant.
This suggests that the impact of Lewinsky articles on voting was mainly driven by people
whose political knowledge or interest is weak.
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Table 4.8: Interpretation of IV Results
Candidate Knowledge Political Knowledge Religiosity
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.760*** -0.512** 0.750*** -0.626*** 0.735*** -0.666***
(0.141) (0.214) (0.178) (0.189) (0.147) (0.154)
1998 House Republican 0.905*** -0.124 0.911** -0.0910 0.994*** -0.0942
(0.254) (0.135) (0.379) (0.146) (0.311) (0.133)
1996 Clinton -0.241** 0.958*** -0.216 0.851*** -0.233* 0.794***
(0.118) (0.165) (0.152) (0.206) (0.140) (0.192)
1996 Dole 0.692*** -0.331* 0.692** -0.335 0.553* -0.209
(0.218) (0.179) (0.327) (0.216) (0.292) (0.209)
Like Gore -0.460*** 0.712*** -0.516*** 0.684*** -0.429*** 0.521***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.194) (0.149) (0.160) (0.149)
Like Bush 0.548*** -0.444*** 0.480** -0.414*** 0.694*** -0.497***
(0.153) (0.122) (0.213) (0.143) (0.194) (0.143)
Approve Clinton -0.190** 0.373*** -0.122 0.284** -0.199* 0.262*
(0.0954) (0.127) (0.119) (0.144) (0.120) (0.137)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.315*** -0.358*** 0.414*** -0.396*** 0.356*** -0.377***
(0.103) (0.111) (0.115) (0.127) (0.118) (0.112)
Protestant 0.370*** -0.0567 0.316** 0.0722 0.439** 0.0309
(0.127) (0.139) (0.128) (0.159) (0.173) (0.194)
Catholic 0.330** 0.0814 0.405** 0.0777 0.318* 0.228
(0.131) (0.125) (0.174) (0.142) (0.181) (0.189)
Marital Status 0.123 0.134 0.103 0.207** 0.0419 0.139
(0.0956) (0.0971) (0.107) (0.102) (0.112) (0.106)
Advanced Education -0.0933 0.297*** -0.0804 0.0736 0.146 0.0363
(0.104) (0.111) (0.130) (0.132) (0.124) (0.111)
Dropout -0.104 -0.523*** -0.0318 -0.490*** -0.146 -0.257
(0.178) (0.161) (0.192) (0.172) (0.212) (0.168)
White 0.382*** -0.384*** 0.519*** -0.315*** 0.329*** -0.365***
(0.109) (0.107) (0.161) (0.116) (0.127) (0.118)
Constant -2.584*** 0.175 -2.504*** 0.281 -2.567*** 0.860
(0.407) (0.722) (0.433) (0.705) (0.498) (0.638)
Observations 1287 1287 1022 1022 933 933
Notes: In the table above we report the (second-stage) results using instrumental variables (Pro-
bit IV), where we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election as
reported in the 2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather deaths), as well as a
host of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant
results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). We use two dependent variables - one is
a dummy indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the other
denotes a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise). In columns 1 and 2 we look at those respondents who were
unable to mention at least one of the candidates involved in the 2000 U.S. House of Representatives
election within their congressional district of residence. Columns 3 and 4 look at the subsample of
respondents who, in the survey, reported that their knowledge of American politics and government
was weaker than that of the average U.S. citizen. Finally, columns 5 and 6 show the results for a
subsample of respondents who stated that religion plays an important part in their everyday lives.
All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional
district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Columns 5 and 6 show the results for a subsample of respondents who stated
that religion plays an important part in their everyday lives.18 Once again, the
results are markedly similar to those obtained for the full sample in Table 4.4,
confirming the idea that religious people may have been more acutely influenced
in their voting decision by Lewinsky coverage.19
The evidence so far supports the idea that Lewinsky coverage mainly had
an impact on voting behaviour for politically disengaged respondents, since they
would be more inclined to focus on soft political stories like the Lewinsky scandal
rather than more substantive material, meaning that the bulk of their political
information (which forms the basis of their voting choices) would have been gar-
nered via this channel. In Section 4.1.2 we also mentioned an alternative channel
through which Lewinsky coverage may have influenced voting, namely by crowd-
ing out hard political news. However, the use of IV based on the crowding-out
caused by extreme weather deaths significantly reduces the possibility that this
mechanism is the main driver behind our results. This is because it is reasonable
to expect that extreme weather stories would crowd out all kinds of news stories,
not simply the Lewinsky scandal, including also hard political news (e.g. each
candidate’s proposed tax policies once in Office).
In other words, the instrument helps us to identify the variation in Lewinsky
coverage caused by the presence (or absence) of major weather-related articles,
which would also have a similar impact on other more substantive political stories.
The fact that our IV results are still statistically significant therefore seems to
preclude the possibility that the crowding out of hard stories by soft stories is the
main mechanism through which Lewinsky coverage influenced the 2000 election.20
4.5 Robustness Tests
In this section we present a series of tests in order to examine the robustness of
the estimates presented in this paper. In particular, we test whether the conclu-
sions derived in the previous section are robust to the inclusion of an additional
variable denoting newspaper editorial slant, an alternative weighting system for
the Lewinsky scandal coverage variable based on circulation levels, potential at-
trition bias and the use of an alternative instrumental variable. We also test the
reliability of our estimates via a placebo treatment as well as an overidentification
test on our instrument.
18Various other measures of religiosity have been used, like for example the frequency with
which respondents stated that they attended some form of religious service (e.g. weekly), all
yielding very similar results to those reported above.
19Once again, the subsample of respondents who claimed that religion did not play an im-
portant part in their lives yielded results which are not statistically significant.
20In Section 4.5.4 we look at this crowding-out idea further by considering the possibility
that the decision to publish extreme weather stories rather than Lewinsky articles may have
been influenced by the newspaper’s editorial slant.
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4.5.1 Survey Response Validity
Firstly, we tackle one of the most commonly-cited criticisms of using election
surveys for this kind of analysis - namely that people who participate in such
surveys have a tendency to wilfully or unintentionally misrepresent their voting
behaviour (Lax, 2014). In fact, Reuben (2014) finds that one third of UK citizens
do not provide accurate information about themselves, or indeed their voting
choices, when asked questions by pollsters. Clearly, this is a cause for concern
in this paper since it may be the case that respondents have provided inaccurate
information regarding their voting preferences, which in turn may be the driving
force behind the results obtained above. For example, it is conceivable that non-
Republicans may have lied about voting for Bush in order to conceal the fact that
they had in fact voted for the losing candidate (i.e. Gore), due to various reasons
like a distaste for losing or concerns regarding the way in which such data may
be used or distributed.
We therefore use the results from a follow-up survey in order to test the valid-
ity of our current results. This is possible since in 2002 ANES conducted another
survey among the same respondents from the 2000 edition, asking the same ques-
tions regarding voting patterns as before in order to assess the sensitivity of the
original responses to misrepresentation. The results are shown in Table 4.9. As
seen below, the coefficients on our Lewinsky coverage variable, in all cases, are
very similar to those obtained previously in Table 4.4, where once again newspa-
per coverage of the scandal had a positive, significant impact on the likelihood
of a Bush vote, and a negative effect on the probability of voting for Gore. As
an additional robustness test, we also used the reported partisanship/ideology of
respondents in the 2002 survey in our original (2000) specification, due to the po-
tential pitfalls associated with using self-reported partisanship data. Once again
the results obtained are almost identical to those reported in Table 4.4 using the
2000 self-reported partisanship data.21
4.5.2 Placebo Tests
Impact on 1996 election: In this section we address the possibility that our
Lewinsky coverage variable is merely a reflection of the level of media attention
afforded to various Clinton-related scandals over his tenure as President, and in
particular the 1996 Whitewater investigation into numerous controversies sur-
rounding the Presidency.22 This is potentially problematic since many of these
controversies portrayed the entire administration in a negative light, including
then-Vice President Al Gore, and may thus be considered to be “informative” in
terms of his presidential credentials.
21These results are omitted due to space limitations, but are readily available on request.
22The Whitewater controversy mainly centred on the Clintons’ real estate investments in the
failed Whitewater Development Corporation in the 1970s and 1980s, although the investigation
also incorporated other Clinton-era scandals like the unprecedented dismissal of 7 White House
Travel Office employees in 1993 and the improper access of confidential FBI files by White
House officials in 1993-94.
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Table 4.9: Robustness Tests - ANES 2002 Data
Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.760*** -0.783*** 0.900*** -0.852*** 0.681*** -0.704***
(0.102) (0.0882) (0.0731) (0.114) (0.184) (0.191)
1998 Republican 0.418*** -0.158 0.282** -0.178 0.449** -0.220
(0.148) (0.109) (0.141) (0.134) (0.191) (0.158)
1996 Clinton -0.201** 0.663*** -0.117 0.600*** -0.236* 0.885***
(0.0977) (0.158) (0.0999) (0.190) (0.139) (0.219)
1996 Dole 0.459** -0.160 0.232 -0.243 0.477* -0.0825
(0.209) (0.164) (0.199) (0.227) (0.286) (0.221)
Like Gore -0.231** 0.360*** -0.136 0.304** -0.264 0.658**
(0.108) (0.129) (0.0997) (0.139) (0.163) (0.296)
Like Bush 0.526*** -0.383*** 0.426*** -0.399*** 0.594** -0.532**
(0.178) (0.144) (0.156) (0.155) (0.247) (0.242)
Approve Clinton -0.198* 0.239** -0.174 0.274* -0.0893 0.150
(0.104) (0.120) (0.113) (0.141) (0.120) (0.162)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.218** -0.296*** 0.201* -0.309** 0.115 -0.226
(0.0982) (0.107) (0.107) (0.121) (0.117) (0.160)
Protestant 0.236** -0.168 0.0977 -0.0416 0.335*** -0.346**
(0.106) (0.103) (0.115) (0.114) (0.129) (0.151)
Catholic 0.301** -0.173 0.0700 -0.0184 0.611*** -0.642***
(0.124) (0.112) (0.127) (0.128) (0.164) (0.186)
Marital Status 0.0528 0.0157 0.0310 0.0398 0.0805 0.0373
(0.0834) (0.0820) (0.0900) (0.0948) (0.115) (0.129)
Advanced Education -0.0544 0.281** -0.0966 0.354** -0.0811 0.395**
(0.0857) (0.117) (0.0959) (0.152) (0.111) (0.193)
Dropout -0.0748 -0.185 -0.161 -0.0918 -0.00694 -0.683**
(0.144) (0.134) (0.154) (0.157) (0.200) (0.273)
White 0.232** -0.280*** 0.149 -0.210* 0.220 -0.258
(0.0993) (0.101) (0.104) (0.113) (0.142) (0.177)
Constant -2.147*** 1.268*** -1.945*** 1.132** -1.776*** 0.339
(0.304) (0.416) (0.328) (0.480) (0.458) (0.923)
Observations 1184 1184 864 864 781 781
Notes: In the above table we report the second-stage results from a Probit IV analysis, where we
regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election as reported in the 2002
ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather deaths), as well as a host of control variables
(in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant results; a full list of controls
is provided in Appendix A1). We use two dependent variables - one is a dummy indicating whether
the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the other denotes a vote for Al Gore
(or otherwise). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression described above using the full sample;
in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents whose political affiliation as
recorded in the 2002 ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent or other); while in
columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is non-Democrat (i.e.
Republican, Independent or other). All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Since the investigation took place prior to the 1996 Presidential election, it
is reasonable to expect that if coverage of such scandals had any impact on the
2000 election then it would also have had at least an equivalent impact on 1996
voting patterns. We can therefore test whether coverage of prior scandals is
driving our results by looking at the relationship between Lewinsky articles and
voting in the 1996 election. Given that the 2000 ANES Time Series study reports
respondents’ voting patterns for both the 2000 (in the post-election survey) and
1996 U.S. Presidential elections, it is possible to construct a placebo treatment by
regressing 1996 voting patterns on our Lewinsky coverage variable and the other
control variables specified in Section 4.2. In addition, the test also enables us
to further analyse the validity of the reported causal relationship between media
coverage and voting.
Table 4.10 shows the IV results, where the same explanatory variables, in-
strument and subgroup classifications are used as above, with the only difference
being that now our dependent variable refers to the Presidential candidates that
took part in the 1996 elections. Hence, in columns 1, 3 and 5 the dependent vari-
able is a dummy denoting whether the respondent voted for Republican candidate
Bob Dole or not, while in columns 2, 4 and 6 the dependent variable assumes a
value of 1 if respondents voted for Bill Clinton. As seen from the results, coverage
of the Lewinsky scandal had no impact on voting patterns across all columns and
subgroups.
Impact of prior extreme weather incidents: We now assess the validity
of our identification strategy by looking at the relationship between Lewinsky
coverage and extreme weather deaths in the equivalent time period immediately
prior to the actual scandal. As stated earlier, our identifying relationship rests
on the premise that extreme weather deaths in a given county generate significant
and prominent news stories, which in turn crowd-out coverage of the Lewinsky
scandal from the county’s top circulating local newspapers. This is backed up
by the first-stage results reported in Table 4.4 Panel B as well as the use of the
change in weather deaths in the period under review relative to the previous 20-
year average, which yields similar results. Nonetheless, to further ensure that our
identifying relationship is indeed valid, we regress our Lewinsky coverage variable
on the number of extreme weather deaths (using NOAA data, as before) in the
equivalent period before the Lewinsky story broke - namely January 17, 1995 to
August 31, 1997. Any significant, negative relationship from such a regression
would raise significant concerns regarding the validity of our identification strat-
egy since it would indicate that our first-stage relationship is either spurious or
driven by extraneous factors.
The results are shown in Table 4.11, where we regress Lewinsky coverage on
both the number of extreme weather deaths in each respondent’s congressional
district over the period January 17, 1995 to August 31, 1997 (Column 1), as well
as the change in extreme weather deaths over the same period relative to the
average in the previous 20 years (Column 2). As seen below, neither measure
yields statistically significant results.
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Table 4.10: Robustness Tests - Impact on 1996 Election
Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Dole Clinton Dole Clinton Dole Clinton
Lewinsky Coverage 0.355 0.122 0.313 -0.0561 0.251 0.165
(0.294) (0.251) (0.357) (0.252) (0.387) (0.378)
1998 House Republican 0.570*** -0.285*** 0.564*** -0.249** 0.567*** -0.126
(0.138) (0.102) (0.162) (0.125) (0.140) (0.130)
Like Gore -0.473*** 0.624*** -0.552*** 0.600*** -0.363*** 0.622***
(0.109) (0.0859) (0.144) (0.0924) (0.117) (0.114)
Like Bush 0.972*** -0.632*** 0.928*** -0.492*** 0.943*** -0.542***
(0.153) (0.0894) (0.163) (0.0998) (0.142) (0.121)
Approve Clinton -0.536*** 0.928*** -0.371*** 0.848*** -0.494*** 0.707***
(0.127) (0.102) (0.143) (0.115) (0.144) (0.120)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.395*** -0.136 0.483*** -0.123 0.384*** -0.157
(0.0996) (0.107) (0.138) (0.122) (0.111) (0.129)
Protestant 0.271** 0.272** 0.346** 0.259** 0.305** 0.212
(0.115) (0.106) (0.170) (0.117) (0.134) (0.146)
Catholic 0.219* 0.294*** 0.223 0.338*** 0.314** 0.250
(0.123) (0.107) (0.197) (0.119) (0.149) (0.156)
Marital Status 0.203* -0.000617 0.0859 0.0782 0.222* -0.0989
(0.109) (0.0892) (0.158) (0.0969) (0.124) (0.123)
Advanced Education 0.319*** 0.243*** 0.287** 0.275*** 0.318*** 0.237**
(0.0973) (0.0869) (0.136) (0.0980) (0.107) (0.116)
Dropout -0.316 -0.183 -0.378 -0.194 -0.411 0.135
(0.225) (0.145) (0.302) (0.154) (0.284) (0.211)
White 0.397*** -0.0700 0.382** -0.0550 0.282 -0.0738
(0.138) (0.115) (0.176) (0.113) (0.173) (0.170)
Constant -2.110*** -1.205* -2.095*** -0.872 -1.744* -1.527
(0.659) (0.636) (0.702) (0.597) (0.943) (0.937)
Observations 1552 1552 1050 1151 1028 1028
Notes: In the table above we report the second-stage results from a Probit IV analysis, where
we regress individual voting patterns during the 1996 U.S. Presidential election as reported in the
2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather deaths), as well as a host of control
variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant results; a full
list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). We use two dependent variables - one is a dummy
indicating whether the respondent voted for Bob Dole or otherwise, and the other denotes a vote
for Bill Clinton (or otherwise). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression described above using the
full sample; in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents whose political
affiliation as recorded in the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent or other); while
in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is non-Democrat (i.e.
Republican, Independent or other). All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.11: Robustness Tests - Validity of Identification Strategy
(1) (2)
Weather Deaths 1995-97 -0.00236
(0.00279)





Pseudo R2 0.0003 0.0006
F 0.712 1.301
Notes: In this table we test the validity of our original identi-
fication strategy between newspaper Lewinsky coverage and
extreme weather deaths, used throughout this paper as the
backbone of our IV analysis. In column 1 we regress Lewin-
sky coverage on the number of extreme weather deaths in
the period January 17, 1995 to August 31, 1997 (i.e. the
period prior to the one analysed in this paper, and prior to
the disclosure of the Lewinsky affair). In column 2 we regress
Lewinsky coverage on the change in extreme weather deaths
over the period January 17, 1995 to August 31, 1997, relative
to the average from the previous 20 years. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.5.3 Attrition Bias
Here we address concerns that the results obtained are being driven by the non-
random composition of respondents in the post-election survey. As mentioned
earlier the ANES Time Series study consists of two phases - the pre-election in-
terview, held prior to election day, which records respondents’ voting intentions
and the post-election interview which deals with actual voting patterns. The ini-
tial pre-election interview consisted of 1,807 survey participants; however, when
it came to the post-election phase (which was used in this study) only 1,555
respondents participated in the interview. This drop in participation of 252 re-
spondents (almost 14% of the original sample size) may be problematic since it
may have significantly altered the composition of our sample, thus limiting the
applicability of our subsequent conclusions. In particular, there may be concerns
that these respondents refused to participate in the post-election phase since they
abstained from voting in the 2000 Presidential election, or else were either un-
happy at the outcome of the election since their favoured candidate was defeated
(in the case of Democrat voters), or elated following electoral victory (in the case
of Republicans).
We therefore account for any potential attrition bias in Table 4.12, where we
combine the actual voting outcomes reported by the 1,555 post-survey respon-
dents with the voting intentions stated by the remaining 252 dropouts, with the
latter acting as a proxy for actual voting. This is possible since in the pre-election
phase respondents were specifically asked to state who they would vote for in the
upcoming Presidential election. The results obtained are broadly similar to those
reported in Table 4.4 Panel A, particularly with regards to the positive and sta-
tistically significant impact of Lewinsky coverage on the likelihood of voting for
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Bush. The only difference is that the relationship between coverage and voting
for Al Gore is now statistically insignificant in all cases. This may be due to
the fact that prior voting intentions do not perfectly match up to actual voting
- in fact from the 1,555 post-election survey participants almost 30% of respon-
dents did not vote according to their stated intentions in the pre-election phase.
Furthermore, among these 1,555 respondents 668 said that they would vote for
Gore in the pre-election survey, compared to the 589 who actually did as per the
post-election responses. Therefore it is possible that the 252 dropouts may have
overstated their intentions to vote for Gore prior to the election, and changed
their vote subsequently as observed in the main sample.
4.5.4 Newspaper Editorial Slant
In Section 4.3 we showed that the level of Lewinsky coverage was not influenced
by the newspapers’ editorial slant. Nonetheless, a reasonable argument can be
made that editorial slant may be correlated with the decision to publish Lewinsky
stories versus news on extreme weather deaths, as postulated in our identification
strategy. For example, it possible that a newspaper editor with strong Democratic
tendencies would have been more predisposed to cease coverage of the Lewinsky
scandal in order to focus on news related to extreme weather fatalities. Therefore,
such behaviour could well be the driving force behind the strong negative rela-
tionship observed in Table 4.4 Panel B between the number of extreme weather
deaths and Lewinsky coverage. To address this problem we include the edito-
rial slant variable previously used in Section 4.3, once again based on data by
Groseclose and Milyo (2005).23
Table 4.13 replicates the IV regressions estimated in Table 4.4 Panel A, this
time with the inclusion of our editorial slant variable. The results are almost iden-
tical to those obtained in the previous section, with the only difference being that
now Lewinsky coverage is negatively and significantly-related to the likelihood of
voting for Al Gore within the non-Democrat subgroup (column 6). Notice that
the editorial slant variable has no statistically significant relationship with voting
patterns across all specifications set out in Table 4.13.
4.5.5 Alternative Weighting System
In this section we employ a different weighting method in order to derive our
variable for Lewinsky-related news coverage, in order to address any doubts re-
garding the dependence of our results to the specific weighting method used. As
described earlier, the current weighting method is based on the relative popula-
tion size of each newspaper’s target county/ies within each congressional district
included in the survey. Here we utilise a similar method, although this time the
basis of the calculation is the relative circulation level of each newspaper. The
rationale behind this method is that a high-circulation newspaper within a given
23In total estimates of editorial slant are available for 200 out of the 257 newspapers used in
this paper.
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Table 4.12: Robustness Tests - Attrition Bias
Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.599*** -0.291 0.750*** -0.282 0.401 -0.0920
(0.182) (0.245) (0.146) (0.243) (0.326) (0.387)
1998 House Republican 0.973*** -0.113 0.768*** -0.0425 1.173*** -0.0546
(0.217) (0.109) (0.211) (0.129) (0.230) (0.137)
1996 Clinton -0.252** 0.935*** -0.231** 0.927*** -0.148 0.752***
(0.104) (0.107) (0.110) (0.108) (0.136) (0.136)
1996 Dole 0.784*** -0.469*** 0.551** -0.353* 0.947*** -0.591***
(0.225) (0.165) (0.226) (0.195) (0.254) (0.199)
Like Gore -0.618*** 0.827*** -0.564*** 0.738*** -0.662*** 0.985***
(0.148) (0.109) (0.150) (0.100) (0.174) (0.121)
Like Bush 0.749*** -0.653*** 0.633*** -0.572*** 0.790*** -0.579***
(0.167) (0.104) (0.163) (0.102) (0.171) (0.118)
Approve Clinton -0.147 0.390*** -0.0957 0.370*** -0.128 0.317**
(0.0916) (0.107) (0.0993) (0.114) (0.110) (0.129)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.270*** -0.391*** 0.313*** -0.402*** 0.148 -0.512***
(0.0973) (0.105) (0.118) (0.116) (0.116) (0.156)
Protestant 0.346*** 0.0806 0.291** 0.199* 0.391*** 0.0121
(0.107) (0.105) (0.123) (0.111) (0.123) (0.152)
Catholic 0.417*** 0.0928 0.311** 0.174 0.519*** 0.0588
(0.128) (0.111) (0.145) (0.115) (0.141) (0.175)
Marital Status 0.185** 0.0768 0.173* 0.101 0.260** -0.0392
(0.0915) (0.0855) (0.101) (0.0936) (0.118) (0.126)
Advanced Education -0.107 0.276*** -0.125 0.340*** -0.140 0.295**
(0.0924) (0.0944) (0.109) (0.104) (0.117) (0.124)
Dropout -0.0664 -0.385*** 0.00581 -0.328** -0.183 -0.398*
(0.138) (0.134) (0.140) (0.140) (0.206) (0.230)
White 0.208** -0.320*** 0.168 -0.308*** 0.197 -0.202
(0.101) (0.0985) (0.106) (0.103) (0.136) (0.160)
Constant -2.174*** -0.389 -2.092*** -0.380 -1.802*** -1.432
(0.379) (0.694) (0.346) (0.614) (0.694) (0.990)
Observations 1802 1802 1353 1353 1185 1185
Notes: In the table above we report the (second-stage) results using instrumental variables (Pro-
bit IV), where we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election as
reported in the 2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather deaths), as well as a
host of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant
results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). In this case, we combine the actual
voting outcomes reported by the 1,555 post-survey respondents with the voting intentions stated
by the remaining 252 dropouts, with the latter acting as a proxy for actual voting. We use two
dependent variables - one is a dummy indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush
or otherwise, and the other denotes a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise).Columns 1 and 2 refer to the
regression described above using the full sample; in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample
of respondents whose political affiliation as recorded in the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat,
Independent or other); while in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of respondents whose
affiliation is non-Democrat (i.e. Republican, Independent or other). All data sources are listed in
Appendix A1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in
parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.13: Robustness Tests - Newspaper Editorial Slant
Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.546*** -0.479*** 0.746*** -0.473*** 0.353 -0.555***
(0.193) (0.160) (0.147) (0.166) (0.330) (0.209)
Editorial Slant -0.00261 -0.00335 -0.00545 -0.00148 0.00106 -0.0154
(0.00679) (0.00618) (0.00753) (0.00691) (0.00900) (0.00963)
1998 House Republican 1.062*** -0.107 0.842*** -0.0861 1.196*** -0.0667
(0.209) (0.119) (0.205) (0.140) (0.217) (0.147)
1996 Clinton -0.345*** 0.935*** -0.340** 0.935*** -0.212 0.793***
(0.131) (0.131) (0.142) (0.135) (0.162) (0.162)
1996 Dole 0.868*** -0.428** 0.620*** -0.364* 0.984*** -0.413**
(0.214) (0.169) (0.240) (0.206) (0.215) (0.206)
Like Gore -0.596*** 0.714*** -0.527*** 0.669*** -0.596*** 0.737***
(0.143) (0.121) (0.156) (0.121) (0.157) (0.184)
Like Bush 0.758*** -0.533*** 0.609*** -0.441*** 0.769*** -0.470***
(0.158) (0.114) (0.160) (0.115) (0.158) (0.150)
Approve Clinton -0.177 0.385*** -0.0989 0.418*** -0.173 0.267*
(0.112) (0.120) (0.122) (0.129) (0.135) (0.147)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.280** -0.336*** 0.329** -0.380*** 0.174 -0.367**
(0.121) (0.119) (0.145) (0.134) (0.141) (0.164)
Protestant 0.331*** 0.0780 0.220 0.263** 0.339** -0.141
(0.124) (0.116) (0.146) (0.126) (0.145) (0.147)
Catholic 0.342** 0.0590 0.237 0.172 0.408** -0.0821
(0.144) (0.122) (0.160) (0.131) (0.174) (0.164)
Marital Status 0.0736 0.177* 0.0464 0.206* 0.140 0.155
(0.112) (0.0978) (0.122) (0.109) (0.143) (0.131)
Advanced Education -0.162 0.280*** -0.208 0.374*** -0.186 0.229*
(0.115) (0.106) (0.132) (0.119) (0.137) (0.133)
Dropout -0.371* -0.519*** -0.265 -0.441** -0.610** -0.949***
(0.199) (0.171) (0.192) (0.186) (0.279) (0.298)
White 0.390*** -0.273** 0.431*** -0.282** 0.218 0.0119
(0.124) (0.114) (0.138) (0.123) (0.158) (0.173)
Constant -1.903*** 0.116 -1.734*** -0.163 -1.603** 0.610
(0.510) (0.521) (0.559) (0.537) (0.651) (0.597)
Observations 1314 1314 972 972 879 879
Notes: In the table above we report the (second-stage) results using instrumental variables (Pro-
bit IV), where we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election as
reported in the 2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather deaths), as well as a
host of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant
results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). In this case, we also include newspaper
editorial slant as an additional control variable. We use two dependent variables - one is a dummy
indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the other denotes
a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise).Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression described above using
the full sample; in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents whose political
affiliation as recorded in the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent or other); while
in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is non-Democrat (i.e.
Republican, Independent or other). All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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congressional district is more likely to be read by the average person than a lower-
circulating paper, meaning that he/she is more likely to have been exposed to
the former’s coverage of the Lewinsky scandal over the period under review.
Recall the example presented in Section 4.2, where we considered California’s
48th congressional district and its top circulating newspapers in 2000, namely the
Orange County Register (circulation of 250,724 copies per week), the San Diego
Union-Tribune (296,331) and the Riverside Press-Enterprise (172,593). As stated
earlier, the amount of coverage (per 1,000 articles) afforded to the Lewinsky
scandal in each of these newspapers over the period January 17, 1998 to August
31, 2000 was 2.19, 3.2 and 1.15 articles respectively. Hence the weighted average
level of Lewinsky coverage for California’s 48th congressional district based on
this alternative weighting system was of 2.36 articles, which in reality is not far off
the 2.34 obtained under the previous weighting system based on relative county
population.
The results are shown in Table 4.14, where due to space limitations we only
show the results obtained using IV for the new weighting method; they are very
similar to those obtained in the previous section (Table 4.4 Panel A).
4.5.6 Alternative Instrument and Overidentification Tests
As a final robustness check, we now use the cost in US dollars of damages caused
by extreme weather events in each congressional district as our instrument (once
again using NOAA data). The rationale behind the use of this instrument is
similar to the original identification strategy employed based on the number of
weather-related deaths, although in this case its scope is somewhat more broad
since it encompasses extreme weather events that may have not led to any casual-
ties but which were nonetheless still large or significant enough to cause material
damages. It is therefore plausible to check whether the use of this new instru-
ment alters the results obtained above since it would capture a wider range of
prominent stories that may crowd out Lewinsky coverage, thus helping to fur-
ther alleviate the measurement error problem. Table 4.15 Panel B shows the
first-stage regression results where our Lewinsky coverage variable is regressed
on extreme weather-related damage costs, where as expected we observe a nega-
tive and statistically significant relationship, similar to the one obtained for the
original instrument. The results of the IV regression using this new instrument
are reported in Panel A. Once again, the results are almost identical to those
derived earlier in Table 4.4 Panel A across all columns; the only difference is that
Lewinsky coverage now has a statistically significant (negative) impact on the
probability of voting for Al Gore among non-Democrats (column 6).
This alternative instrument also enables us to run a series of overidentification
tests in order to check the validity of our identification strategy. To assess each
instrument’s exogeneity we use a modified overidentification test similar to the
one employed in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). These tests involve
running the usual IV regressions using both extreme weather deaths and damage
costs as our instruments and including each instrument separately as an explana-
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Table 4.14: Robustness Tests - Alternative Weighting Method
Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.675*** -0.530*** 0.805*** -0.493** 0.523 -0.512*
(0.176) (0.192) (0.135) (0.201) (0.337) (0.300)
1998 House Republican 0.908*** -0.0827 0.699*** -0.0153 1.094*** -0.0475
(0.274) (0.112) (0.236) (0.131) (0.360) (0.144)
1996 Clinton -0.244** 0.889*** -0.236* 0.915*** -0.126 0.766***
(0.115) (0.161) (0.126) (0.155) (0.144) (0.168)
1996 Dole 0.700*** -0.320* 0.496** -0.270 0.860** -0.382
(0.266) (0.173) (0.245) (0.197) (0.357) (0.244)
Like Gore -0.552*** 0.692*** -0.528*** 0.647*** -0.573*** 0.821***
(0.151) (0.134) (0.151) (0.119) (0.182) (0.212)
Like Bush 0.641*** -0.525*** 0.549*** -0.477*** 0.673*** -0.483***
(0.187) (0.126) (0.167) (0.116) (0.215) (0.160)
Approve Clinton -0.171* 0.351*** -0.140 0.367*** -0.138 0.297*
(0.102) (0.121) (0.106) (0.123) (0.134) (0.164)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.296*** -0.371*** 0.325*** -0.403*** 0.205* -0.445***
(0.103) (0.107) (0.124) (0.121) (0.122) (0.167)
Protestant 0.361*** 0.00306 0.288** 0.146 0.385*** -0.103
(0.109) (0.111) (0.127) (0.122) (0.126) (0.158)
Catholic 0.363*** 0.0828 0.249 0.200* 0.481*** -0.0634
(0.138) (0.113) (0.155) (0.120) (0.153) (0.168)
Marital Status 0.127 0.115 0.147 0.133 0.202 0.0351
(0.0997) (0.0865) (0.111) (0.0979) (0.152) (0.130)
Advanced Education -0.0817 0.250** -0.0878 0.331*** -0.125 0.215
(0.0997) (0.108) (0.110) (0.117) (0.144) (0.148)
Dropout -0.144 -0.429*** -0.125 -0.406*** -0.284 -0.663***
(0.153) (0.147) (0.159) (0.156) (0.242) (0.256)
White 0.380*** -0.341*** 0.394*** -0.337*** 0.261* -0.198
(0.103) (0.102) (0.120) (0.111) (0.137) (0.161)
Constant -2.481*** 0.306 -2.333*** 0.0788 -2.075*** -0.188
(0.381) (0.694) (0.358) (0.627) (0.716) (1.095)
Observations 1552 1552 1151 1151 1028 1028
Notes: In the table above we report the (second-stage) results using instrumental variables (Pro-
bit IV), where we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election as
reported in the 2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather deaths), as well as a
host of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant
results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). In this case, for every congressional
district we weight the amount of Lewinsky coverage afforded by each of the top 2-3 newspapers
according to their respective circulation levels. We use two dependent variables - one is a dummy
indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the other denotes
a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise).Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression described above using
the full sample; in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents whose political
affiliation as recorded in the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent or other); while
in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is non-Democrat (i.e.
Republican, Independent or other). All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the congressional district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.15: Robustness Tests - Alternative Instrument
Panel A Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.482* -0.633*** 0.758*** -0.756*** 0.333 -0.611**
(0.259) (0.158) (0.189) (0.126) (0.408) (0.274)
1998 House Republican 1.139*** -0.0690 0.780*** 0.0146 1.256*** -0.0424
(0.247) (0.106) (0.282) (0.117) (0.263) (0.141)
1996 Clinton -0.279** 0.815*** -0.260* 0.688*** -0.106 0.743***
(0.123) (0.170) (0.135) (0.178) (0.162) (0.186)
1996 Dole 0.915*** -0.250 0.552* -0.100 1.012*** -0.307
(0.252) (0.163) (0.286) (0.174) (0.282) (0.242)
Like Gore -0.645*** 0.618*** -0.561*** 0.491*** -0.628*** 0.732***
(0.142) (0.142) (0.169) (0.126) (0.156) (0.256)
Like Bush 0.782*** -0.477*** 0.601*** -0.360*** 0.759*** -0.450***
(0.166) (0.126) (0.189) (0.113) (0.159) (0.171)
Approve Clinton -0.206* 0.309*** -0.128 0.267** -0.177 0.252
(0.111) (0.118) (0.114) (0.116) (0.135) (0.160)
Clinton Moral Climate 0.314*** -0.343*** 0.336** -0.330*** 0.211 -0.406**
(0.112) (0.104) (0.131) (0.109) (0.129) (0.177)
Protestant 0.369*** -0.0112 0.271** 0.0888 0.378*** -0.116
(0.116) (0.103) (0.135) (0.107) (0.137) (0.150)
Catholic 0.414*** 0.0701 0.264 0.183* 0.485*** -0.0904
(0.143) (0.108) (0.173) (0.107) (0.164) (0.165)
Marital Status 0.175 0.0930 0.174 0.0931 0.260* 0.0130
(0.107) (0.0824) (0.118) (0.0881) (0.138) (0.119)
Advanced Education -0.122 0.209** -0.0880 0.207* -0.179 0.197
(0.112) (0.104) (0.119) (0.111) (0.137) (0.145)
Dropout -0.179 -0.402*** -0.129 -0.302** -0.336 -0.660***
(0.171) (0.144) (0.169) (0.149) (0.245) (0.253)
White 0.375*** -0.341*** 0.375*** -0.302*** 0.235 -0.212
(0.117) (0.0971) (0.132) (0.102) (0.151) (0.149)
Constant -2.133*** 0.584 -2.172*** 0.720 -1.683* 0.142
(0.541) (0.599) (0.371) (0.480) (0.907) (1.065)
Panel B
Weather Damage Costs -0.00175*** -0.00165*** -0.00147***
(0.000285) (0.000327) (0.000349)
Constant 2.135*** 2.121*** 2.095***
(0.0322) (0.0362) (0.0396)
F -statistic 37.78 25.60 17.75
Observations 1552 1552 1151 1151 1028 1028
Notes: Panel B reports the first-stage results from our instrumental variables approach, whereby we regress
newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky scandal on the cost in US$ of damages caused by extreme weather
events in each of the ANES respondent’s congressional districts. In Panel A we report the second-stage
results from our Probit IV analysis, where we regress individual voting patterns during the 2000 U.S.
Presidential election as reported in the 2000 ANES on Lewinsky coverage (instrumented by weather costs),
as well as a host of control variables (in the table above we only include those controls which yield significant
results; a full list of controls is provided in Appendix A1). We use two dependent variables - one is a dummy
indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the other denotes a vote
for Al Gore (or otherwise). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression described above using the full sample;
in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents whose political affiliation as recorded in
the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent or other); while in columns 5 and 6 we analyze
the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is non-Democrat (i.e. Republican, Independent or other).
All data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district
level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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tory variable. The rationale behind these tests is that if either instrument were
somehow related to respondent voting patterns via some direct channel other
than through Lewinsky coverage then the slope coefficients for the instruments
when included as explanatory variables would be statistically significant (these
are the coefficients reported in Table 4.16, where for brevity we only report the
results for the full sample). This approach is preferable since standard overiden-
tification tests typically have low power and only test for the joint-exogeneity
of the instruments used assuming one of them is indeed exogenous. As seen in
Table 4.16, the point estimates obtained are all statistically insignificant across
all columns.
Table 4.16: Robustness Tests - Overidentification Test
Full Sample
Bush Gore Bush Gore
Weather Deaths -0.0135 -0.0123
(0.0260) (0.0113)
Weather Damage Costs 0.000588 0.00110
(0.000911) (0.00138)
Observations 1552 1552 1552 1552
In this table we test the validity of our instruments by implementing a
modified overidentification test. The test involves running the usual IV
regressions using both extreme weather deaths and damage costs as our
instruments and including each instrument separately as an explanatory
variable (in columns 1 and 2 respectively). The results reported above
focus solely on these added instruments as explanatory variables - we omit
all the other coefficients obtained from the IV regressions, although the
explanatory variables used above are the same as those used throughout
this paper. We use two dependent variables - one is a dummy indicating
whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the
other denotes a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise). All data sources are listed
in Appendix A1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional
district level, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigate the extent to which soft media reportage influences
voting patterns. For this purpose we look at the infamous Monica Lewinsky
sex scandal which erupted in the U.S. during the Presidency of Bill Clinton,
and how newspaper reports of the scandal impacted on the outcome of the 2000
Presidential election. We first sought to analyse the main determinants of media
reportage, and particularly the main demand/supply side factors affecting media
political slant as promulgated in the literature, including readers’ beliefs/opinions,
newspaper ownership and editorial slant. We find that Lewinsky coverage was
not driven by partisan media slant: this independence thus enables us to focus
solely on the electoral impact of soft news reportage, abstracting away from all
considerations related to political bias, in contrast to the majority of the literature
(e.g. DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007).
To account for any endogeneity issues we adopt an instrumental variables
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approach, where the identification strategy employed exploits variation in the
number of deaths caused by extreme weather events over the period under review
for each of the newspapers’ main counties of circulation. The results show that
overall, media coverage had a positive and statistically significant impact on the
likelihood of voting for George W. Bush in the 2000 Presidential election, and
conversely a negative influence on the probability of voting for Al Gore. If we
look at different subgroups within our dataset, then this pattern is visible among
both Democrats and Republicans, with the effect strongest among the former
subgroup. In fact, a 5% increase in newspaper coverage of the Lewinsky scandal
could have increased the likelihood that a non-Republican voted for Bush in the
2000 Presidential election by around 1.9%, with a similar decline reported in the
probability of voting for Gore. Various tests are conducted in order to check
the robustness and validity of the main results, including checking the validity of
survey responses, controlling for newspaper editorial slant, the use of a different
instrument, testing for attrition bias, as well as the use of a placebo treatment.
The main conclusion that emerges from this paper is that soft media reports
can have a significant impact on individual voting behaviour. This raises several
questions regarding the role of the media in the democratic process, particularly
since the media has traditionally been considered as a vital informational link
between the political classes and the general populace (Eisensee and Stromberg,
2007). The rise of soft news or sensationalism has already diluted this role, as
can be observed from dwindling public trust in media organisations over the years
(Pew, 2012c). This paper suggests that such reportage may also have an impact
on people’s voting behaviour, despite the fact that these stories provide little
meaningful information regarding the candidates’ electoral credentials.
Various explanations have been proposed in order to justify this increase in
media coverage of soft news. Hamilton (2004) states that the increased focus on
such stories is driven by numerous factors including ownership changes, dereg-
ulation of media markets and increased competition among cable TV channels.
Bagdikian (2000) on the other hand maintains that such reportage is fuelled by
a desire to appease advertisers, since readers would be more attentive to adver-
tising signals if the news content on offer were “dumbed-down” as described by
the author. It would be interesting to analyse these factors individually in more
detail in order to understand what, if anything, can be done by policymakers to
change the current situation.24
24For example, Ellman (2014) suggests that government subsidies to media outlets may be a




Appendix A1: Description of Variables
Variable Name Description of Variable Source
Bush Dummy denoting whether respondent
voted for George W. Bush in the 2000
U.S. Presidential election
ANES 2000
Gore Dummy denoting whether respondent
voted for Al Gore in the 2000 U.S.
Presidential election
ANES 2000
No Vote Dummy denoting whether respondent
abstained from voting in the 2000 U.S.
Presidential election
ANES 2000
Lewinsky Coverage Number of published newspaper arti-
cles on the Monica Lewinsky scandal
over the period January 17, 1998 to
August 31, 2000, expressed as a frac-
tion of the total number of articles
published by each newspaper over the
same period
NewsLibrary, ProQuest, archives, 2014
Circulation Number of newspaper copies sold per
week for each newspaper
Alliance for Audited Media, 2000
New England Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the New
England region of the U.S.
ANES 2000
Mid-Atlantic Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the Mid-
Atlantic region of the U.S.
ANES 2000
East North-Central Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the East
North-Central region of the U.S.
ANES 2000
West North-Central Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the West
North-Central region of the U.S.
ANES 2000
East South-Central Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the East
South-Central region of the U.S.
ANES 2000
West South-Central Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the West
South-Central region of the U.S.
ANES 2000
Mountain Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the Moun-
tain region of the U.S.
ANES 2000
Pacific Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s county is located in the Pacific
region of the U.S.25
ANES 2000
1998 House Republican Dummy denoting whether respondent
voted for a Republican candidate in
the 1998 House of Representatives elec-
tion
ANES 2000
Gender Dummy denoting whether the respon-
dent is male
ANES 2000
25Omitted category is South Atlantic
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Variable Name Description of Variable Source
Children Dummy denoting whether the respon-
dent has any children
ANES 2000
1996 Dole Dummy denoting whether respondent
voted for Bob Dole in the 1996 U.S.
Presidential election
ANES 2000
1996 Clinton Dummy denoting whether respondent
voted for Bill Clinton in the 1996 U.S.
Presidential election
ANES 2000
Like Bush Dummy denoting whether respondent
expressed a liking for George W. Bush
ANES 2000
Like Gore Dummy denoting whether respondent
expressed a liking for Al Gore
ANES 2000
Approve Clinton Dummy denoting whether respondent
approved of Bill Clinton’s performance
as U.S. President
ANES 2000
Clinton Moral Climate Dummy denoting whether respondent
believed that Bill Clinton’s Presidency
had harmed the country’s moral cli-
mate
ANES 2000
Protestant Dummy denoting whether respondent
is a Protestant
ANES 2000
Catholic Dummy denoting whether respondent
is a Catholic
ANES 2000
Other Religion Dummy denoting whether respondent
belongs to another formal religious or-
ganisation (including Judaism, Islam,
etc.)26
ANES 2000
Marital status Dummy denoting whether respondent
is married
ANEs 2000
Advanced Education Dummy denoting whether respondent
has an advanced (i.e. tertiary) level of
education
ANES 2000
Dropout Dummy denoting whether respondent
ceased formal education prior to high
school graduation27
ANES 2000
Employed Dummy denoting whether respondent
is gainfully occupied
ANES 2000
Income < $10000 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s annual income is below $10,000
ANES 2000
Income $10000-$34999 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s annual income is between
$10,000 and $34,999
ANES 2000
Income $35000-$64999 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s annual income is between
$35,000 and $64,999
ANES 2000
Income $65000-$94999 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s annual income is between
$65,000 and $94,999
ANES 2000
Income $94999-$249999 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s annual income is between
$95,000 and $249,99928
ANES 2000
26Omitted category in this case is for respondents with no religious beliefs (i.e. Atheists).
27Omitted category in this case is for respondents with a high school diploma.
28Omitted category in this case is for respondents with annual income of $250,000 and over.
121
Variable Name Description of Variable Source
White Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s race is Caucasian
ANES 2000
Age 18-24 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 18 and 24 years
ANES 2000
Age 25-34 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 25 and 34 years
ANES 2000
Age 35-44 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 35 and 44 years
ANES 2000
Age 45-54 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 45 and 54 years
ANES 2000
Age 55-64 Dummy denoting whether respon-
dent’s age is between 55 and 64 years29
ANES 2000
Editorial Slant Index ranging from 0-100 denoting the
ideological slant of each newspaper.
The index compares the number of
times a newspaper refers to a partic-
ular think-tank to the number of times
they are cited by members of Congress.
Low scores (below 50) denote conser-
vatism, while higher scores (over 50)
denote a liberal slant.
Groseclose and Milyo (2005)
Gannett Dummy denoting whether newspaper
was owned by Gannett in 2000
Individual newspaper websites
Knight Ridder Dummy denoting whether newspaper
was owned by Knight Ridder in 2000
Individual newspaper websites
Advance Dummy denoting whether newspaper
was owned by Advance Communica-
tions in 200030
Individual newspaper websites
Broadsheet Dummy denoting whether newspaper
was a broadsheet in 2000
Individual newspaper websites
29In this case the omitted category is for respondents above the age of 65.
30Omitted category in this case is all other newspaper owners (like NewsCorp or Tribune).
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Appendix A2: Descriptive Statistics of Explana-
tory Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Circulation 213967.921 321625.662 5235 2000000
New England 0.058 0.234 0 1
Mid-Atlantic 0.115 0.319 0 1
East North-Central 0.174 0.379 0 1
West North-Central 0.079 0.269 0 1
East South-Central 0.069 0.253 0 1
West South-Central 0.127 0.333 0 1
Mountain 0.063 0.242 0 1
Pacific 0.153 0.36 0 1
1998 House Republican 0.285 0.452 0 1
Gender 0.434 0.496 0 1
Children 0.738 0.44 0 1
1996 Clinton 0.372 0.484 0 1
1996 Dole 0.243 0.429 0 1
Like Gore 0.512 0.5 0 1
Like Bush 0.467 0.499 0 1
Approve Clinton 0.637 0.481 0 1
Clinton Moral Climate 0.214 0.41 0 1
Protestant 0.312 0.463 0 1
Catholic 0.2 0.4 0 1
Other Religion 0.171 0.377 0 1
Marital Status 0.523 0.5 0 1
Advanced Education 0.414 0.493 0 1
Dropout 0.095 0.294 0 1
Employed 0.631 0.483 0 1
Income < $10000 0.224 0.417 0 1
Income $10000-$34999 0.264 0.441 0 1
Income $35000-$64999 0.249 0.432 0 1
Income $65000-$94999 0.151 0.358 0 1
Income $95000-$249999 0.064 0.244 0 1
White 0.794 0.404 0 1
Age 18-24 0.077 0.266 0 1
Age 25-34 0.162 0.368 0 1
Age 35-44 0.233 0.423 0 1
Age 45-54 0.186 0.389 0 1
Age 55-64 0.151 0.358 0 1
N 1552
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Appendix B: Marginal Effects for IV Regression
Results in Table 4.4 (Panel B)
Full Sample Non-Republicans Non-Democrats
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore
Lewinsky Coverage 0.2245*** -0.1754*** 0.1948** -0.1844** 0.1959 -0.0891
1998 House Republican 0.3520*** -0.0340 0.2237*** -0.0117 0.4245*** -0.0115
1996 Clinton -0.0873** 0.3311*** -0.0613** 0.3604*** -0.0543 0.1924***
1996 Dole 0.2717*** -0.1134** 0.1517** -0.1112 0.3382*** -0.0697**
Like Gore -0.1940*** 0.2438*** -0.1400*** 0.2549*** -0.2269*** 0.1774***
Like Bush 0.2351*** -0.1907*** 0.1567*** -0.1933*** 0.2750*** -0.1023***
Approve Clinton -0.0601* 0.1232*** -0.0334 0.1448*** -0.0565 0.0575**
Clinton Moral Climate 0.1061*** -0.1232*** 0.0865** -0.1554*** 0.0815* -0.0742***
Protestant 0.1272*** 0.0073 0.0706** 0.0672 0.1527*** -0.0178
Catholic 0.1352*** 0.0333 0.0664* 0.0833* 0.1897*** -0.0107
Marital Status 0.0516 0.0368 0.0417 0.0505 0.0923* 0.0018
Advanced Education -0.0306 0.0930** -0.0202 0.1329*** -0.0597 0.0467*
Dropout -0.0467 -0.1423*** -0.0282 -0.1621*** -0.1080 -0.0895**
White 0.1244*** -0.1256*** 0.0879*** -0.1329*** 0.1027* -0.0397
Observations 1552 1552 1151 1151 1028 1028
Notes: The table above shows the computed marginal effects, evaluated at the mean, for the second-stage
results of the instrumental variables (IV) regression analysis. We use two dependent variables - one is a
dummy indicating whether the respondent voted for George W. Bush or otherwise, and the other denotes
a vote for Al Gore (or otherwise). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the regression described above using the full
sample; in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the subsample of respondents whose political affiliation as
recorded in the ANES is non-Republican (i.e. Democrat, Independent or other); while in columns 5 and 6
we analyze the subsample of respondents whose affiliation is non-Democrat (i.e. Republican, Independent
or other). All data sources are listed in Appendix A1.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix C: Additional Information on the Lewin-
sky Coverage Dataset
In this section we describe in greater detail the process involved in collating data
on the number of newspaper articles on the Lewinsky scandal over the period
January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000. As mentioned in the paper, the choice
of newspapers was largely determined by the geographical location of the survey
respondents in the 2000 ANES Time Series Study, whereby the top 2-3 circulating
newspapers in each of the respondents’ congressional district of residence were
identified using circulation data from the Alliance of Audited Media as well as
(where necessary) advertiser information provided by the newspapers themselves.
Three main resources were used in order to acquire the actual Lewinsky cov-
erage data, namely NewsBank’s NewsLibrary database, ProQuest and the indi-
vidual newspapers’ online archives. In line with other papers within this liter-
ature (e.g. Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010) we develop a suitable Boolean string-
search protocol in order to identify relevant articles on the Lewinsky scandal.
For the purposes of this paper, articles containing the words “Monica Lewinsky”
or “Lewinsky” or “Lewinskygate” or “Monicagate” or “tailgate” or “sexgate” or
“zippergate” or “Clinton” in the headline, and “Monica Lewinsky” or “Lewinsky”
or “Lewinskygate” or “Monicagate” or “tailgate” or “sexgate” or “zippergate” in
the main body of text were sought out, excluding those articles containing the
words “letter” or “letters”, over the period January 17, 1998 to August 31, 2000.
The search protocol used can be justified on the basis of the following points:
• The somewhat exhaustive list of search terms reflects the relative ‘richness’
of the vocabulary used by the media in order to describe the scandal. By
incorporating a large number of search terms, it is hoped that omissions of
relevant articles would be kept at a minimum across all newspaper formats,
since certain terms like “zippergate” were almost exclusively used by tabloid
or tabloid-style newspapers as opposed to broadsheets;
• By directing the search towards articles containing the list of terms in both
the headline and the main body of text, this enabled us to focus on stories
that dealt specifically with the Lewinsky scandal, eliminating those articles
which simply alluded to the scandal briefly as part of some turn-of-phrase
within the scope of an altogether distinct story31;
• The approach also minimised the number of Lewinsky scandal news stories
appearing as part of a ‘News in Brief’-type section, where the actual story
would only form a small part of the overall content;
• The exclusion of articles containing the words “letter” or “letters” was done
to eliminate all letters to the editor, since it was felt that despite their
31Notice that although the search term “Clinton” is included in the headline search, it was
excluded from the main body search. This was purposely done in order to exclude any Clinton-
related stories that were not related in any way to the Lewinsky scandal.
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ubiquity they do not constitute news stories within the context of ‘media
coverage’ as defined in this study.
As an additional precautionary measure, the search results obtained for each
newspaper were then individually checked in order to eliminate any invalid articles
(like for example news in brief or letters to the editor) which somehow evaded
the search protocol. As a general rule, all articles below 200 words in length were
eliminated in order to avoid minor stories or news in brief. This entire process
was conducted for a total of 257 daily newspapers from across the U.S., including
national, state-wide and local newspapers
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